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Abstract 
The thesis aims to recover Hume’s connection with utilitarianism. It is argued 
that Hume is best interpreted as a conservative utilitarian, and this is intended to be a 
corrective to recent approaches in Hume scholarship. Nowadays the view that Hume 
is one of the founders of modern utilitarianism is undermined by two views: one sees 
Hume as a conventionalist contractarian who is the follower of Hobbes, another 
situates Hume in the Scottish Enlightenment and emphasises his resemblance to 
Hutcheson. The thesis does not deny that Hume’s political philosophy is influenced 
by these philosophers. Instead, it is because these views are regarded as providing an 
exhaustive account of Hume that the thesis aims to challenge them. What is crucial to 
contemporary Hume studies is a more balanced interpretation of Hume, and this is to 
be found in the traditional approach which sees Hume as a utilitarian. The thesis is 
original because, although it recovers a traditional approach, it relates it to 
contemporary debate by showing that the late 20
th
 century concern to avoid seeing 
everything through the eyes of utilitarianism has obscured the genuine utilitarian 
elements of Hume’s political philosophy. The resurgence of interest in the problems 
of utilitarianism is part of the legacy of post-Rawlsian political theory. Philosophers 
the thesis criticises such as Gauthier and Barry both follow Rawls in marginalising 
the contribution of utilitarianism to liberalism. For scholars, the traditional 
interpretation of Hume should be rejected if Hume’s political philosophy is to be 
secured, thus they found it on the basis of social contract. The thesis challenges them 
on two grounds. First, it illustrates that more similarities are to be identified between 
Hume and Locke. Second, it argues that Hume is best interpreted as founding the 
school succeeded by Burke and Sidgwick, which has impact on contemporary 
utilitarianism and philosophical debates. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Recovering Hume’s Conservative Utilitarianism 
The purpose of the thesis is to recover David Hume’s theoretical connection 
with the tradition of utilitarianism. I argue in this thesis that Hume is best interpreted 
as a conservative utilitarian, and this is intended to be a corrective to more recent 
approaches in Hume scholarship. Recently the view that Hume is one of the founders 
of modern utilitarianism is undermined by two other views which are prevalent in 
Hume studies: one sees Hume as a conventionalist contractarian who is the follower 
of Thomas Hobbes, another situates Hume in the context of the Scottish 
Enlightenment and emphasises his resemblance to Scottish philosophers such as 
Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith. The thesis aims to challenge these 
interpretations of Hume by showing that neither of them alone is able to provide an 
adequate account of Hume’s political philosophy. Some essential elements of 
Hume’s political philosophy are missed by the views which see him simply as 
Hobbesian or Hutchesonian. The thesis does not intend to deny that the development 
of Hume’s political philosophy is influenced by various philosophers, among which 
both Hobbes and Hutcheson are included. Instead it is because these views are 
regarded as providing an exhaustive account of Hume’s thought that the thesis aims 
to challenge their adequacy. What is crucial to contemporary Hume studies is a more 
balanced interpretation of Hume’s political philosophy, and this is to be found in the 
traditional approach which sees Hume as a utilitarian. 
The originality of the thesis lies in that, although it recovers an old tradition of 
approach, it relates it to contemporary debates by showing that the late 20
th
 century 
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concern to avoid seeing everything through the eyes of utilitarianism has obscured 
the genuine utilitarian elements of Hume’s thought. The resurgence of interest in the 
problems of utilitarianism is part of the legacy of post-Rawlsian political theory. 
Important political philosophers criticised in this thesis such as David Gauthier and 
Brian Barry all follow John Rawls in marginalising the significant contribution of 
utilitarianism to the tradition of liberalism. For them, utilitarianism is not able to 
provide an adequate theory of justice because it fails to accord due respect to 
individuals. The contemporary critique of utilitarianism is important for Hume 
scholarship because it refutes the traditional view on Hume’s important contribution 
to the development of modern utilitarianism. For scholars, the traditional view should 
be rejected if Hume’s theory of justice is to be secured, thus they seek to found 
Hume’s theory of justice on the basis of social contract. Consequently what is 
embodied in Hume’s political philosophy is not the legacy he left to modern 
utilitarianism, but a more systematic expression of social contract theory inherited 
from Hobbes. The thesis criticises the contractarian interpretation of Hume’s political 
philosophy on two grounds. First, it is illustrated that more similarities are to be 
identified between Hume’s idea of convention and John Locke’s theory of property, 
a dimension largely neglected by contractarians such as Barry and Gauthier. Second, 
Hume’s political philosophy implies a principle of practical reasoning which 
embodies the characteristics of a school within utilitarianism, that is, conservative 
utilitarianism. It is argued that Hume’s position in the tradition of political 
philosophy is best interpreted as founding the school which was then succeeded by 
Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick, which still has impact on 
contemporary utilitarian theory and philosophical debates. 
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1.2 Method and Approach 
Despite my criticism of contractarians such as Barry and Gauthier, we share 
the same method of research. We all grant the importance of reconstructing the 
philosophers’ intentions in composing their works. Indeed, one will find that to 
explore Hume’s intention in composing his A Treatise of Human Nature (hereafter 
Treatise), An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (hereafter EPM), An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (hereafter EHU), Essays, Moral, 
Political, and Literary (hereafter Essays), and History of England (hereafter History), 
is a lasting motivation behind many questions this thesis asks, and to which it then 
attempts to find a sensible answer. However, on the other hand, we are not convinced 
by the view that the significance of exploring Hume’s intention through careful 
reading of texts and various debates lies in discovering a final, closed answer to the 
question we explore. We are skeptical about the existence of such an answer. What is 
discernible from the scholars’ works and, I hope, from this thesis is a view that the 
meaning of philosophical texts is not to be recovered in the historical context by 
reconstructing the linguistic utterance deployed by the authors. The view which 
Cambridge historians of political philosophy such as John Pocock, Quentin Skinner 
and John Dunn hold that ‘there is a pure or authentic meaning that can be extracted 
from our complex hermeneutic practices that privileges the perspective of the author’ 
is not convincing to us (Kelly, 2011: 25). Rather, it is believed that meaning is to be 
constructed between the philosophical texts and their readers. Ideally, there would be 
equilibrium of interpretation which can be reached between them, so ‘The 
acknowledgement of surplus meaning does not mean that anything goes’ (Kelly, 
2011: 25). From this viewpoint, what really matters is what the reader thinks the 
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philosopher intends to say rather than wondering, as a reader, if he has succeeded in 
absorbing what the author genuinely intends to convey. The recovering of the 
meaning of utterance may concern some scholars out of their choice of research 
interest between narrowly historical questions of texts and more philosophical 
questions. Yet the point is that one needs not to solve the latter only by means of the 
former. Indeed, the philosophical questions may not be reduced to the historical 
questions. On the contrary, the solving of the historical questions, and by this I do 
not mean the proposal of a closed answer but only a tenable one, is to enrich the 
resources which may contribute to the solving of the philosophical questions, again, 
by a tenable but not final view. This is why the classical texts in the tradition of 
political philosophy have never ceased to retain their significance and inspire 
generations of readers. This is also why I make no apology if the scholars I consider 
do not find my characterisation of their views utterly satisfactory. For just as their 
interpretation of Hume is to point out the most convincing way in which they think 
Hume’s thought could be understood rather than the way in which they think Hume 
intends his works to be understood, I hope to employ the same privilege of 
interpretation in my account either of the scholars’ works or of Hume’s, especially 
when my reading of Hume deviates from theirs. However, it should be noted that 
none of us consider our mission as providing an authoritarian interpretation of 
philosophers’ thought. On the contrary, our works are intended to criticise those who 
claim to have the final say with respect to philosophers’ intentions. For us, the idea 
of meaning is itself complex and multi-stranded and the idea that there is ‘single pure 
or more authentic meaning’ is not accepted, because it is too difficult to distinguish, 
in our reading of classic texts such as Hume’s Treatise and Locke’s Second Treatise 
of Government (hereafter STG), where the original intentions of philosophers’ end 
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and then the hermeneutic meanings of these texts begin. This is so because what has 
not been clearly realised is that historical question is itself a philosophical, 
hermeneutic question (Kelly, 2011: 25). 
Some theories presuppose an opposition between the perspective of philosophy 
and the perspective of history, and the latter is rejected in favour of the former. For 
example, Raymond Geuss poses the choice between philosophical political theory 
and a turn to history, and by favouring the latter he intends to make the whole 
activity of political philosophy redundant. This Collingwoodian turn in the study of 
political theory shows not only the crucial role of history in making sense the works 
of political theorists, but, more importantly, it asserts that political theorists must fail 
in their endeavour to construct a universal reason without being caught by historical 
contingency, for the best they can offer are local prejudices and parochial values 
wrapped in the appearance of universal reason. But the opposition between history 
and philosophy as drawn by Geuss is neither helpful nor necessary. Instead, one 
solution is this: so long as it is believed that the ideas deployed by a philosophical 
text and the questions it aims to address can more properly be understood by 
considering the context and tradition in which the author is situated, the meaning of 
texts is also to be constructed by using the language in the context familiar to the 
readers. In other words, there does not exist a more ‘real’ pre-philosophical mode of 
experience as history has itself been transformed into a part of interpretative 
enterprise. This is precisely what Professor Paul Kelly advances based on Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic theory. Indeed, this is the most important consequence of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic theory as far as the opposition between philosophy and history is 
concerned. Such an opposition is denied by Gadamer; far from forcing an adequate 
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political theory to make a choice between the two, Gadamer’s ‘hermeneutic 
understanding of experience forces history to become philosophy, just as it forces 
philosophy to become history’ (Kelly, 2011: 31). 
Therefore, from the hermeneutic perspective, the questions which have been 
regarded as separate or even irreconcilable are in fact the same question, or at least 
allow the same solution, i.e. a philosophical, hermeneutic method. That here 
philosophy has been appealed to as the ultimate solution is not without reason. As 
stated, for hermeneutic theory, if the question a philosophical theory addresses is not 
to lose its significance, it must have an empirical basis in the social context and 
practice in which it was born. This then inevitably brings the researchers of such 
philosophical theory to the question of the original intention of the philosopher. Now, 
in addressing this question one must not suppose that the original intention is to be 
found in a discrete and fixed context which we can only approach by reconstructing 
the rhetoric of the authors. This historicist method assumes that our understanding of 
political life or the development of political theory must be based on a historical 
reconstruction of context and rhetoric, as if we may not claim to have a sound 
understanding of Hume’s political theory before we may properly recover what ideas 
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like liberty or equality literally meant to an 18
th
 century English gentleman.
1
 Yet this 
is misleading in the way that it undermines the philosophical enterprises of political 
philosophers who are the objects of our study. For, again, to take Hume as an 
example, before he has developed his philosophical systems in response to various 
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von 
Pufendorf, and to philosophical traditions including Skepticism, Epicureanism, and 
Stoicism, among others, there is nothing to show that Hume only regards his 
philosophical system as sensible when he has founded it on the reconstruction of the 
historical context of his predecessors. On the contrary, what one finds is that Hume 
has based criticisms on his own reading and interpretation of various classical texts. 
Hume has felt free to do so because he shares a view with the hermeneutic theories 
of Kelly and Gadamer that human understanding is an accumulation of the 
numberless and continuous interpretations of others. As Kelly writes: 
To recognize and understand others is to assume overlaps of schemes of 
interpretation which make possible trans-generational communication. 
This precludes the possibility of identifying fixed and discrete contexts 
within which the meanings of others are locked. Contexts are fluid and 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis I treat Hume primarily as an English rather than a Scottish philosopher, and this is not 
because I am unaware of the fact that Hume was born and educated in Scotland, but is precisely one 
consequence of applying the hermeneutic theory as my methodology. That is to say, in my 
interpretation of Hume’s political thought, I find it makes most sense when one traces the origin of 
Hume’s thought back to John Locke. In other words, when addressing the historical questions such as 
the development of Hume’s thought between the Treatise and EPM and Hume’s position in the 
tradition of political thought, I am convinced that it is most sensible to interpret Hume as primarily a 
descendant of Locke’s empiricism rather than the Scottish sentimentalism of Francis Hutcheson. This 
perspective is based on my reading and interpretation of the classical texts. In this way, I am 
attempting to address historical questions with a philosophical method. 
15 
 
overlapping, and meaning is mediated through all of these moves within 
complex traditions. Meaning is therefore not something that is the sole 
prerogative of the author, and to claim otherwise is to reintroduce some 
variant of the private language argument (Kelly, 2011: 31). 
To argue that the one must try hard to reconstruct the historical context of a 
political philosopher and that in which philosophical texts were written is frustrating. 
We would never be able to think, write and converse in a way in which an 18
th
 
century English gentleman did, for our thinking, writing, and conversation are all 
inevitably constituted by those ingredients belonging specifically to the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
century. What is equally frustrating is that the historicist approach presupposes that 
the historical context of Hume and of his Treatise is complete in itself. In thinking 
this way it ignores the fact that the development or rather the accumulation of human 
intellect is not composed of various discrete historical experiences. Instead, the 
development of human understanding may be compared to a stream whose fountain 
was built in ancient times, from the very moment when human beings started to think 
and reflect philosophically. It is to this stream that various political philosophers 
contributed, and thinkers like Locke and Hume were esteemed as prominent and as 
making significant contributions primarily because their philosophical systems 
provided important interpretations, constructions, and criticisms of the ideas of their 
forerunners and contemporaries, so important that they not only contribute to extend 
this stream of thought but have an impact on where it went.
2
 
                                                 
2
 For criticism of adopting historicist approach in the study of political theory, see also Mark Philp, 
2008: 128-149. 
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1.3 The Interpretation of Hume’s Political Philosophy: An Overview 
My purpose in this section is to provide a selective overview of recent Hume 
scholarship designed to recover an approach to understanding Hume’s political 
theory. What is common among them is to challenge a tendency as part of the 
reaction against utilitarian dominance of moral and political philosophy to downplay 
the utilitarian dimension of Hume’s thought and the tradition of conservative 
utilitarianism within British liberal political thought. 
This dissertation is a result of, and is also intended to extend, a trend in Hume 
studies which arose at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, namely a constructive, 
naturalistic interpretation of Hume’s philosophy. Despite the fact that my 
interpretation of Hume is largely inspired by this trend, I have not taken its teaching 
for granted, and I am by no means unique in this respect. It is very likely that 
contemporary readers would have a quite different general impression of Hume’s 
position from that of Hume’s readers in the 18th and 19th century. Contrary to the 
view that Hume is a thoroughly destructive skeptic who brings Locke’s empiricism 
to a dead end, nowadays Hume’s positive construction of empiricism, particularly in 
the domain of morals, is found familiar by many readers and is the starting point of 
some Hume scholars. This transformation of trend has much to do with Norman 
Kemp-Smith’s work ‘The Naturalism of Hume’ first published in Mind in 1905 and 
then developed into a book-length work The Philosophy of David Hume published in 
1941. It was almost from then on that a naturalistic interpretation of Hume has been 
found convincing by more and more scholars, and Hume’s reputation as a 
philosopher has since then gradually been restored. However, just as hermeneutic 
theory treats the growth of human understanding as motivated by the interpretation 
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of others, the rise of the naturalistic view has not only not put an end to the debate 
between Hume scholars but launched a new debate on the feature of Hume’s 
naturalism. It is within this debate that I regard this thesis as participating. 
What the naturalistic perspective gives rise to is not only the debate on how 
Hume’s naturalism could properly be characterised, but also the voice against it. For 
example, G. E. Moore thinks that all forms of ethical naturalism inevitably commit 
what he calls ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ (Moore, 1993). As it is believed that Moore’s 
argument has posed a critical challenge to ethical naturalism, and as my account of 
Hume is to defend the naturalistic perspective, I will try to show that the latter has 
not been undermined by Moore’s argument if the feature of Hume’s ethics is 
characterised in a particular way, that is, descriptive naturalism. The view that 
descriptive naturalism may properly represent Hume’s position has much to do with 
the nature of Hume’s moral theory, which is in essence a psychological scheme 
rather than a normative doctrine. This observation would then bring one to consider 
whether Hume has succeeded in performing his role as a moral anatomist and 
replacing normativity with psychological causal explanation. What has been argued 
here is that, if this was Hume’s ambition, then perhaps he was not completely 
successful in adopting an external point of view, to use H. L. A. Hart’s terminology, 
in conducting his psychological investigation.
3
 For, it will be shown, what Hume 
regards as general in his observation of human psychology does in fact reflect the 
features of a certain type of society, that is, the English society in Hume’s time. 
                                                 
3
 John Plamenatz agrees that Hume’s philosophy engaged more in explaining how we use certain 
moral and political concepts and explaining the origins and functions of social institutions, yet he has 
not denied that Hume also engaged in advocating certain form of behaviour (Plamenatz, 1958: 161). 
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However, if one purpose of Hume’s rewriting his moral theory a decade later is to 
moderate the associationism of his first work and instead, as the title of his later work 
shows, propose ‘principles of morals’ (the transformation of Hume’s concern from 
developing a psychological scheme into advocating a moral principle is a 
phenomenon which has not been explicitly declared by Hume himself, but is 
discernible from a comparison between the Treatise and EPM, especially that utility 
has replaced sympathy and become the core of Hume’s moral thought), in that case 
Hume’s position seems to be more defendable and one might want to characterise it 
as negative prescriptivism. 
Given that descriptive naturalism and negative prescriptivism are two concepts 
that may respectively represent Hume’s positions in the Treatise and EPM, my 
interpretation of Hume is in line with the scholars who value Hume’s own evaluation 
of EPM as his best work and who believe that a more adequate understanding of 
Hume’s political thought is not to be derived from one’s preoccupation with the 
Treatise, such as Professor Frederick Rosen, James King, and Jacqueline Taylor, 
among others. It should be added that although it is convincing to me that descriptive 
naturalism and negative prescriptivism may respectively stand for Hume’s theories in 
the Treatise and EPM, I am not trying to suggest that there is a clear gap between 
Hume’s early and later thought. Instead, careful readers will find that just as Hume’s 
psychologism still operates in the background of EPM, the principle of utility does 
not first appear in EPM but has been mentioned by Hume in the Treatise. For 
example, when Hume was discussing the origin of property rules in Book III Part II 
Section 3 of the Treatise, he writes in a long footnote that 
19 
 
No questions in philosophy are more difficult, than when a number of 
causes present themselves for the same phenomenon, to determine which 
is the principal and predominant. There seldom is any very precise 
argument to fix our choice, and men must be contented to be guided by a 
kind of taste or fancy, arising from analogy, and a comparison of similar 
instances. Thus, in the present case, there are, no doubt, motives of public 
interest for most of the rules, which determine property; but still I suspect, 
that these rules are principally fix’d by the imagination, or the more 
frivolous properties of our thought and conception. I shall continue to 
explain these causes, leaving it to the reader’s choice, whether he will 
prefer those deriv’d from public utility, or those deriv’d from the 
imagination (Treatise, 323 n.71). 
Accordingly, what is argued here is not without foundation, namely that by 
considering and comparing the implications of sympathy and utility, one may 
observe the development of Hume’s political thought, and presumably this is a 
scheme Hume had in mind as early as when the Treatise was written. This then 
justifies the efforts of the researchers who take the differences between the Treatise 
and EPM seriously. Unlike another perspective that shape many scholars’ views, i.e. 
that the Treatise is the most comprehensive philosophical work of Hume and the 
works after it are meant only to be more accessible to the public, this thesis is 
inspired by scholars like Rosen and King in that by taking the differences between 
Hume’s works seriously, we benefit from observing the internal development of 
Hume’s thought which tends to be ignored by others. Moreover, another benefit is 
that we may also observe how those ideas Hume has inherited from his philosophical 
predecessors, Locke for example, are digested and amended by him throughout his 
life, the result of which then turn out to be Hume’s legacy and to inspire his 
successors. 
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From this viewpoint, it is inspiring to know that the question about the 
relationship between the Treatise and EPM has now drawn more attention from 
researchers and has been recognised as an important aspect of Hume studies. For 
example, when the first edition of The Cambridge Companion to Hume was 
published in 1993, it was composed of eleven essays from Hume experts and covers 
different important issues in Hume studies, like Hume’s skepticism, moral 
psychology, political theory, political economy, and so on. Yet the issue in question 
is omitted, and one possible consequence of the omission is worth noting. The 
Cambridge Companions have enjoyed the reputation for being useful reference 
works not only for scholars but especially for students and beginners who attempt to 
develop a general picture of the challenging thinker whom they are facing. Therefore, 
one reasonable inference is that either students who are interested in the connection 
and contrast between two texts may not derive much help from it, or, what is equally 
probable, is that many of them would neglect the importance of the issue for lack of 
due incentive. However, when the second edition of the work was published in 2009, 
minor adjustments were made to the collection and included five new essays, among 
which and what concern us here is Jacqueline Taylor’s ‘Hume’s Later Moral 
Philosophy’. In this essay Taylor offers an analysis of the differences between the 
Treatise and EPM and points out some significant improvements Hume makes in the 
latter. Taylor’s observation, not unlike that of King’s, is that when Hume was 
composing his later work, his focus had been transferred from moral psychology to 
moral language and public discourse, and it is by means of public dialogue that man 
corrects the partiality of his moral views so that the moral standard of society is in 
happy progress. Although I only accessed Taylor’s works when the structure and 
essence of this thesis was finished, it was inspiring to find that our accounts of Hume 
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are harmonious in a number of ways.
4
 For example, we both agree that the emphasis 
which Hume puts on the benevolent nature of man does not render him a typical 
disciple of the moral sense school or a Hutchesonian. Also, I agree with Taylor’s 
observation that Hume’s moral theory is progressivist, and that Hume’s criticism of 
monkish virtues reveals his view that man’s pursuit of self-advance and well-being 
are both worthwhile goals. Moreover, I agree with Taylor’s view that Hume’s two 
texts reveal a development, even an improvement, of his moral thought, and the 
advantages of EPM over the Treatise may not be reduced to Hume’s refining of style 
but represent significant alterations Hume made to his ‘juvenile’ work. While I agree 
with Taylor on the principal role of sympathy in Hume’s theory, however, unlike 
Taylor’s strategy of taking it as an idea that links and penetrates Hume’s two texts, I 
am persuaded by Selby-Bigge’s view that in EPM sympathy has been deprived of its 
particular significance and has been replaced by utility as the foundation of Hume’s 
moral theory (Selby-Bigge, 1975: xxvi-xxvii). This then distinguishes my argument 
from Taylor’s, for in spite of the fact that we share the view that it is important to 
observe the development of Hume’s thought, our interpretations of the issues are not 
identical. The function of sympathy in Hume’s psychological scheme is recognised 
and elaborated on in this thesis. For example, its connections with man’s love of 
reputation and with the formation of national characters are central to my account of 
Hume’s theory of property. Yet Taylor’s preoccupation with sympathy has somehow 
led her to overlook the crucial role of utility in Hume’s later moral theory. For this 
reason, Taylor then omits to connect the well-known is/ought question and Hume’s 
                                                 
4
 For a shorter comparison between Hume’s two texts provided by Taylor in Blackwell Companion to 
Hume, see Taylor, 2008: 283-285. 
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view on the proper mission of philosopher with the differences between the Treatise 
and EPM, a dimension which is crucial for one to observe the development of 
Hume’s thought. 
By considering the relationship between sympathy and utility in Hume’s 
philosophical system, one is led to see the inner development of Hume’s thought, and 
this is significant enough for a more adequate interpretation of Hume’s political 
philosophy. However, when one digs deeper and connects this with modern English 
political thought, one sees that the transformation of Hume’s thought, on the one 
hand, reveals his responses to his philosophical predecessors and contemporaries, 
and, on the other hand, has an impact on the development of subsequent English 
political thought. Central to modern English political thought is the question of the 
origin of social order. Many great political philosophers devoted themselves to the 
contemplation of the issue, and the different views they advanced derived from the 
different ways they treated human nature and what they took to be the relationship 
among man, society, and political authority. In other words, central to the question of 
social order is the relationship between the private interest of each individual and the 
public interest of society. Although most political theorists of this period recognised 
that social order can be secured only when private interest is harmonised with public 
interest, the different views they hold on human nature lead to diverse theories about 
how such harmony is to be achieved. In Hume’s time three main theoretical views 
were prevalent; they were respectively founded on fear of God, contractarian 
agreement, and draconian coercion by the state (Hardin, 2007: 81). Hume finds none 
of them convincing, hence he advances a fourth view, which turned out to be his 
most significant contribution to the tradition of political thought, and which, though 
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being a complex theoretical view based on Hume’s psychological scheme of human 
nature, could nevertheless be expressed in a single term of ‘convention’, or as Hume 
sometimes puts it, ‘a general sense of common interest’. It is indeed a complex 
notion expressed in a concise manner, for a large proportion of Hume’s moral 
thought as found in Book III of the Treatise and EPM was devoted to the elaboration 
of this idea and how it gives rise to various moral and political rights and obligations, 
based on which social peace is created. Its complexity is still illustrated in that, 
despite the numerous efforts Hume made to elucidate it, different interpretations of 
Hume’s argument in this regard have become a fundamental cause of so many 
debates on his position in the tradition of political thought. To name just some of the 
most prominent which this thesis aims to reflect on: one’s answer to interpretive 
questions like Hume’s connections with Hobbes and Locke, with contractarianism 
and utilitarianism, all depend on the way one understands Hume’s idea of convention. 
It is understandable that Hume’s thought is open to different interpretations, 
some of which are not entirely reconcilable. For example, while Hume is regarded by 
some as a Hobbesian in essence, others are convinced that there is more resemblance 
between Hume and theorists of the moral sense school such as Lord Shaftesbury, 
Francis Hutcheson, and Joseph Butler. This is because Hume’s intention is to provide 
a description and explanation of moral phenomena, rather than to construct a moral 
theory based on one single tendency of human nature. Therefore, the challenge for 
Hume was not to construct a philosophical system within which all human 
behaviours and characters may be perfectly reduced to a single propensity, whether 
it’s man’s pursuit of self-interest or his kindness to others. Instead, what is 
remarkable in Hume’s philosophy is that it provides a descriptive theory which 
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comprehends a large amount of characters regarded by people as useful or agreeable, 
and in his tracing the origin of their moral values to human psychology. In a 
philosophical system like this, man’s egoistic nature and other-regarding tendency 
equally have their roles to play and none is regarded as predominant since, for Hume, 
this is precisely how men behave in their daily life. 
Although this feature of Hume’s philosophy makes the works of interpreters 
who hope to identify Hume’s position challenging, it is a proof of Hume’s greatness: 
since the selfish egoist school and the moral sense school may both be related to 
Hume one way or another, then the interpretation of Hume’s thought would 
inevitably have impact on the interpretation of these schools. That is to say, these 
seemingly irreconcilable theoretical views may be connected to one another by 
means of Hume’s mediation. To put it more specifically, if Hume may correctly be 
regarded as, according to John Plamenatz, the founder of British utilitarianism 
(Plamenatz, 1958: 28), then in observing Hume’s theoretical connections with other 
schools, what one is doing is more than clarifying the origins of Hume’s thought: he 
is also constructing the genealogy of British utilitarianism. Due to their influence on 
Hume, philosophers of the selfish egoist school and philosophers of the moral sense 
school would all be assigned a place in the tradition of utilitarianism. The difference 
lies in how one observes their connection with Hume. For example, although one 
may hold that the contrast between Hume and Hobbes is essentially negative and that 
it is Hutcheson’s theory that Hume has inherited, others may hold it the other way 
round. However, in any case both interpreters may justly be viewed as contributing 
to the clarification of the theoretical fountain of English utilitarianism in modern 
times. 
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This is where Elie Halévy starts in The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism. In 
the tradition of English utilitarianism, Hume’s position may be characterized as 
conservative utilitarianism, which was then inherited by Edmund Burke. This is in 
contrast with the radical utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, but even 
so the development of Benthamite utilitarianism is still overshadowed by Hume’s 
views on the reconciliation between private and public interest. As Halévy indicates, 
there are three solutions implied in Hume’s theory. The first is founded on Hume’s 
idea of sympathy and may be called the principle of the fusion of interest. According 
to this principle, ‘the identification of personal and general interest is spontaneously 
performed within each individual conscience’ by means of man’s sympathetic 
feeling for the happiness of others (Halévy, 1972: 13). The point here is that since the 
fate of others interests us only through sympathy, then the latter may be viewed as a 
particular form of the principle of utility. On this account, the moral sense school 
theorists like Lord Shaftesbury and Hutcheson may already be considered as 
utilitarians. As Halévy indicates, the language of utility is found in the works of 
Shaftesbury, and Bentham owes the utilitarian principle underlying his philosophy to 
Hutcheson, who in his Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil explicitly writes that 
‘in equal Degree of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the Virtue is in 
proportion to the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend’ and ‘that 
Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers’ 
(Hutcheson, 2008: 125). 
Along with this, according to Halévy, a second and very different principle is 
also revealed in Hume’s philosophy, namely the predominance of man’s egoistic 
tendency. Hume opens his essay ‘Of the Independence of Parliament’ with a political 
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maxim: ‘every man must be supposed a knave’, and indicates that it is based on the 
maxim that an effective constitution is contrived and government established (Essays, 
42).
5
 In politics everyone must be supposed to have no other end than private interest: 
‘By this interest we must govern him, and by means of it, make him, notwithstanding 
his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to public good’ (Essays, 42). Without 
this, the governed shall nowhere benefit from the constitution, and shall count on 
nothing to secure their liberty and property, except on the good-will of the governor, 
which is unreliable. From the predominance of man’s selfishness derives the second 
view on the reconciliation between private and public interest: the natural identity of 
interests. For example, in The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits 
Bernard Mandeville argues that men’s pursuit of self-interest would contribute to the 
general interest of society, on this account, ‘what we call Evil in this world, moral as 
well as natural, is the grand principle that makes us sociable creatures’ (quoted in 
Halévy, 1972: 16). A similar view is adopted by Adam Smith in the sphere of 
political economy. In The Wealth of Nations Smith develops the thesis that, by the 
mechanism of exchange and the division of labour, individuals are contributing to the 
realisation of the general utility in pursuing their own interest, though without 
desiring or being aware of it.  
However, on the premise of the predominance of man’s selfishness, there is 
still another way in which the principle of utility can be interpreted, and it may be 
called the artificial identification of interests. According to this principle, the 
harmony between men’s pursuit of self-interest and the general interest of society 
                                                 
5
 Emphasis in quotations is in the original unless otherwise stated. 
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cannot be reached naturally, and it is the business of the legislator to bring this about, 
since it is in the interest of citizens. It is argued by some interpreters that Hume’s 
men are solely selfish, they desire only their own survival and well-being, and 
compete with others for scarce natural resources; in that situation conflict is 
inevitable. Fortunately, Hume’s men are also rational, so they learn the disadvantage 
of anarchy from experience and design to get rid of it by establishing an empire, that 
is, the state. With the establishment of the state and its authority to punish the 
transgressor of law, the harmony between the private and the public interest is 
created and social order secured. In interpreting Hume this way, he is viewed as the 
disciple of Thomas Hobbes who argues that the miserable state of nature is ended 
with the establishment of a political authority. According to Halévy, although one 
may find in Bentham’s works that he occasionally adopts the principle of the fusion 
of interest, and, as following Adam Smith, applies the principle of the natural 
identity of interest in the sphere of political economy, ‘the primitive and original 
form in which in his doctrine the principle of utility is invested is the principle of the 
artificial identification of interests’. Bentham appeals to a legal system as a solution 
to the great problem of morals, that is, he thinks the interest of the individual is to be 
identified with the interest of the community by means of a well-regulated 
application of punishments. Thus his first great work was an ‘introduction to the 
principles’ not only ‘of morals’, but also ‘of legislation’ (Halévy, 1972: 17-18). 
Accordingly, Hume’s philosophical system comprehends almost every 
essential element of modern English political thought, and they have been used to 
justify different interpretations of his position. However, as stated, the significance of 
Hume’s thought consists in that it transforms these interpretations, which seem in 
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stark contrast on the surface, into the debate within one theoretical family, that is, 
into different views on the development of English utilitarianism. While some focus 
on man’s selfish nature and argue that social order can be secured by means of the 
principle of natural or artificial identification of interests, others advocate the 
sympathetic feeling in human nature and suggest that the harmony between the 
individual and the community can be reached spontaneously. In any case, different 
depictions of the feature of Hume’s thought would influence one’s account of the 
origin of English utilitarianism. This thesis is founded on an understanding of the 
significance of Hume’s thought like this. It is practicable to construct a utilitarian 
genealogy on the basis of Hume’s connections with other philosophers; both 
Professor Frederick Rosen and Professor John Plamenatz have demonstrated their 
great achievements in this respect. It is also my aspiration, although what is 
presented in this thesis would have to be more confined and may be viewed as 
developing a foundation for greater theoretical enterprise. I hope first to defend a 
utilitarian interpretation of Hume and clarify the features of his utilitarianism, and I 
will do these by comparing Hume’s theory with those of Hobbes and Locke. By 
analysing the similarities and differences between three philosophers, I hope to 
suggest that there is a negative contrast between Hume and Hobbes and a positive 
contrast between Hume and Locke. By this I mean, on the one hand, Hume’s 
political philosophy is essentially a refutation of Hobbes’s position; on the other, 
while Hume has criticised Locke’s theory in some significant ways, he is 
nevertheless a sympathetic reader of Locke and his intention is to amend the latter’s 
theory and place it on a sounder basis. If this is the case, it will then be sensible to 
outline a utilitarian school initiated by Locke, which was then inherited by Hume and 
afterwards shapes Burke’s thought, as in contrast with another school founded by 
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Hobbes which then has Bentham and James Mill as its disciples. With this idea in 
mind, before I can explore Hume’s impact on Burke and the development of 
utilitarianism thereafter, I must trace Hume’s philosophy to its origin and show that it 
is Locke rather than Hobbes who has overshadowed Hume’s thought. 
It seems to me that this is a work of dual advantages: first, as said, it is helpful 
for developing a genealogy of utilitarianism; second, when we turn our attention to 
the critics of utilitarianism, it is useful to defend a utilitarian interpretation of Hume. 
In fact, another trend observable in contemporary Hume studies is the refutation of 
Hume’s theoretical connection with utilitarianism, and this is to be found in the 
works of a number of important political philosophers including David Gauthier and 
Brian Barry. Both Gauthier’s contractarianism and Barry’s contractualism take 
Thomas Hobbes as the founding father of modern political thought, and the 
contribution of Hume lies not in providing an original perspective, but in expressing 
Hobbes’s theory in a more systematic manner. The debate between Gauthier and 
Barry is thus a debate within the broader tradition of social contract theory, and, on 
this account, what they both approve of is marginalising utilitarianism and refusing 
to take it seriously as the third approach in the contemporary debate on justice. If the 
views of Barry and Gauthier are not entirely convincing, as I am going to suggest, it 
is partly because they overemphasise the role of the principle of artificial 
identification of interest in Hume’s theory of social order, yet pay almost no or only 
very limited attention to the principle of sympathy. This is problematic because, as 
Halévy writes, the three principles ‘form three logically distinct and perhaps 
contradictory doctrines; nevertheless there is not one of them which is not present, 
more or less explicitly, in every Utilitarian doctrine’ (Halévy, 1972: 13). This follows 
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that observing the different roles assigned by different philosophers to these three 
principles will provide a useful clue for us to develop a genealogy of utilitarianism 
and to clarify the connection between each member of the family. In contrast, it is 
only when one confines himself to the function of any of these principles in Hume’s 
thought while paying no attention to that of the others, that one will then reject Hume 
as an utilitarian. In this way, the interpretations of Hume as proposed by Barry and 
Gauthier are indefensible because some very important elements of Hume’s thought 
have been overlooked, e.g. the conception of sympathy. 
Sympathy and utility are two conceptions most crucial in this thesis. If, as 
Professor Plamenatz says, Hume is not a complete utilitarian, then it is partly because 
Hume has always had some reservation about the idea that the mission of the 
philosopher is to construct a normative doctrine following the instruction of which 
people may lead a happy life. So when utility takes the place of sympathy and 
becomes the foundation of his philosophical system, Hume’s purpose is to strengthen 
his argument that sociability is implanted in human nature rather than artificially 
created and to place it on a more solid foundation. However, a move from sympathy 
to utility implies something much more important than the mere adjustment of 
wording. It is a move from a psychological tendency of human nature to a moral 
principle by which human motivation is to be evaluated. It is a move from a 
description of how we feel other people’s feelings to how we ought to feel about 
them. Sympathy reveals a psychological mechanism by means of which various 
feelings are instilled into us before a moral judgment is made, with the assistance of 
reason, which corrects the natural partiality of our emotive responses. However 
utility is itself impartial and public, and if it is still connected with human nature and 
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represents a tendency of man, as Hume intends it to be, utility is connected with 
those feelings that are redirected and impartial. Utility skips the complex 
psychological mechanism which sympathy implies and stands for the result derived 
from it. If Hume’s elaboration of sympathy is to provide scientific evidence for 
man’s natural sociability, then his appeal to utility shows more of his approval than 
verification of this propensity. Whether or not this is a theoretical consequence 
intended by Hume, his move from a psychological mechanism to a moral principle 
has inspired Benthamite utilitarianism. That is, if Hume’s purpose is not to deny that 
value can be derived from fact, but rather to show that the former must be derived 
from the latter of a specific kind, i.e. human nature, then, for Hume, Bentham’s 
utilitarianism is certainly developed on a legal basis since it appeals to human nature 
as its basis and to nothing else. Meanwhile, Hume’s observation that mankind has 
stronger feelings for things they own than for those that are yet to belong to them, 
and that opinions as well as beliefs are crucial to man’s daily practice, both forecast 
the important roles of security and expectation in Bentham’s theory and the value of 
tradition and prejudice in Burke’s conservatism. Although Hume’s own 
interpretation of utility has greater resemblance with that of Burke’s, he is positive 
about reform in the spheres of politics, economics, and morals at the proper time and 
is convinced that human civilisation is in a steady progress. In this way, if Hume is 
not a complete utilitarian, it is with his nourishing that utilitarianism was bound to 
flourish. 
1.4 The Structure of the Argument and the Order of Chapters 
The structure of this dissertation is arranged in accordance with the structure of 
Hume’s theory: given that Hume’s political theory is based on his moral psychology, 
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I therefore believe I can approach Hume’s theory of property, of justice, and of 
government only after I explain the philosophical background of Hume’s thought, 
the structure and implication of his moral psychology, and the feature of his ethical 
naturalism. Therefore I start in Chapter Two with a sketch of theories which, though 
having an influence on Hume’s philosophy, are primarily the objects of his criticism, 
including the selfish-egoist school such as Hobbes and Mandeville and the moral 
sense school such as Hutcheson. I argue that to distinguish himself from these great 
philosophers is one of Hume’s motives in recasting his moral theory. It is true that 
one main purpose of this thesis is to explore the connection between Hume and 
Locke and revive the view that Hume is the most important philosopher in the 
tradition of empiricism after Locke, a view once standard in the studies of Hume. 
However I will leave this until I focus more specifically on Hume’s political theory. 
Before then, I hope to explore the reason why this once standard point of view has 
now gradually lost its credit, and it is suggested that it has much to do with the 
dominance of the view that Hume is a disciple of Hobbes. This view does not rise 
only recently. In fact, when Hume’s first work was published, it was seen as 
defending Hobbes’s theory and its anonymous author was seen as a moral skeptic 
who was destroying the foundation of morality. If there is a reason for Hume’s 
failure to acknowledge the Treatise as his work and hope that EHU, EPM and Essays 
alone be taken as representative of his thought, it seems sensible to infer that the 
unsympathetic criticism he has suffered due to people’s misunderstanding of the 
Treatise would inevitably have an impact on his writing strategy thereafter. This then 
leads us to compare the Treatise and EPM carefully and consider the significance of 
their differences. 
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Before Hume felt the necessity of rewriting his works, it seems that he had 
little doubt about his role as moral scientist whose task was to provide a precise 
causal explanation of moral phenomena. It is based on this conviction that Hume 
offers a dichotomy of virtues in the Treatise and devotes nearly two-thirds of Book 
III to explaining the origin of artificial virtues such as justice, fidelity, allegiance, and 
chastity. On this account, it is misleading when Selby-Bigge describes Hume’s 
theory of justice in the Treatise as ‘awkward’. Based on the comparison between the 
Treatise and EPM in Chapter Two, my purpose in Chapter Three is to continue the 
refutation of Selby-Bigge’s unsympathetic reading of Hume in his famous 
‘Introduction’ to his edition of Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (hereafter Enquiries). I argue that the Treatise 
is important for the development of Hume’s thought in the sense that it contains the 
most fundamental elements of Hume’s ethical naturalism. Hume’s position in that 
work may correctly be described as that of an ethical naturalist because he attempts 
to reduce ethics to psychology and sociology. Hume’s advocacy of sympathy in the 
Treatise is the strongest objection to the theorist who rejects the idea that Hume is an 
ethical naturalist, for Hume has told us that virtues and vices may all be traced to the 
propensity of human nature or to the interaction between human nature and the 
physical environments in which men are contingently placed. Hume has never 
clearly stated that from ‘facts’ one cannot derive ‘values’, by contrast, he only says 
that it is ‘inconceivable’ how this could be done, and most of his philosophy is 
devoted to addressing this question. Although the famous is/ought paragraph only 
appears in the Treatise, in EHU we find Hume’s concern is more explicitly expressed 
in his criticism of religionists. 
34 
 
If by considering the function of the idea of sympathy we have been led to the 
core of Hume’s moral psychology, then by reflecting on the implication of utility in 
Hume’s later thought, we will then see what Hume adds to his early philosophy, thus 
acquiring a comprehensive understanding of Hume’s ethical naturalism. This is the 
purpose of Chapter Four. As stated, the rise of the debate on the feature of Hume’s 
naturalism reveals the reverse of the trend in the study of a philosopher whose 
position has been controversial since his lifetime. Kemp-Smith’s work challenges the 
conventional Reid-Beattie view which represents Hume as a dangerous skeptic. 
However, since naturalism is a term never used by Hume, and Kemp-Smith neither 
provides a specific definition of it, the view that Hume is a constructive philosopher 
though restores his philosophical reputation, has inevitably given rise to another 
debate on the features of Hume’s naturalism. In addressing this question, I find 
Railton’s argument very useful. According to him, there are two forms of naturalism: 
methodological and substantive naturalism. What is more complicated is deciding 
whether Hume is a substantive naturalist, and this relates us to the second debate I 
would like to consider in Chapter Four, in which ethical naturalism being the target 
of the philosopher’s attack. I suggest that Hume has defined the idea of good in terms 
of natural property, and this is particularly evident when utility becomes the core of 
his philosophy in EPM. Moore’s ‘open question’, however, has not undermined 
Hume’s philosophy, because Hume’s moral conventionalism corresponds to a type of 
naturalism which, according to Railton, is most interested in developing an effective 
account of moral concepts. In this way, Hume does not intend his definition of good 
as utility to be conceptually incontestable, thus Moore’s open question poses no 
challenge to his ethical naturalism. 
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After refuting the criticisms of Hume’s ethical naturalism from a prescriptivist 
such as R. M. Hare and an intuitionist such as G. E. Moore in the first part, in the 
second part I explore Hume’s political philosophy by relating it to a post-Rawlsian 
debate on justice. The important participants of the debate I consider in Chapters 
Five and Six are David Gauthier, Brian Barry, Russell Hardin, Jonathan Harrison and 
Paul Kelly. Gauthier and Barry both defend the tradition of social contract theory, 
though by different approaches; both Hardin and Harrison are utilitarians, though 
they belong to different sects of the school. Utilitarianism and contractarianism as 
these scholars interpret them are not completely distinct, as Barry and Hardin both 
apply the model of game theory implied in Hobbes’s thought to their interpretation of 
Hume. The difference lies in Hardin taking Hume as developing an innovative theory 
of coordination on the basis of Hobbes’s thought, whereas Barry criticises Hardin for 
his overstating the originality of Hume. The point of Hume’s political theory that 
these researchers are arguing about and the part which is most controversial, is 
Hume’s example of the two rowers when explaining the implication of his idea of 
convention which he takes as the basis of social order. This analogy is regarded by 
contractarians such as Gauthier and Barry as confusing because oarsmen will 
cooperate without relying on external sanctions whereas the interaction in the case of 
justice is simply otherwise. It is argued that Hume’s example of rowing makes 
perfect sense when his reasoning is understood as utilitarian rather than contractarian: 
my sympathy with others’ feelings restrains me from being a free-rider when I take 
part in a practice, whether it’s rowing or larger social cooperation, and no external 
sanction is indispensable for either to operate smoothly. 
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What makes Gauthier’s interpretation of Hume inadequate is likewise fatal to 
Barry’s reconstruction of Hume. Barry is more enthusiastic about interpreting Hume 
as a successor of Hobbes’s social contract theory than revealing what Hume intends 
to achieve by his philosophical system. This then explains why he makes no mention 
of Hume’s conception of sympathy, as that would run the risk of making explicit 
Hume’s resemblance with utilitarianism which is a main target of Barry’s criticism. 
However, to neglect such a crucial conception only renders Barry’s reconstruction of 
Hume and the link between Hume and Hobbes questionable. Although they both 
adopt the game theoretic model and take it as an important clue through which the 
similarities between Hume and Hobbes can be shown, the goals that Barry and 
Hardin aim to achieve by reconstructing Hume’s theory of property are not identical. 
In contrast to Barry’s intention of absorbing Hume into the social contract tradition, 
Hardin’s work may be seen as developing a genealogy of utilitarianism in which he 
thinks the modern origin of this tradition should be traced to Hobbes rather than 
Locke. My criticism of Hardin, therefore, is not exactly the same with my criticism 
of Barry. Contrast with my endorsement of Harrison’s utilitarianism in Chapter Five, 
I think Hardin’s utilitarian approach does not contribute much as clarification either 
of Hume’s thought per se or of Hume’s position in the tradition of political thought. 
However, in both cases, the criticism and endorsement take place in the camp of 
utilitarianism and may be seen as contributing, whether negatively or positively, as 
clarification of Hume’s connection with this tradition and, as a consequence, to 
secure utilitarianism from being marginalised by its social contract antagonists. 
If Barry has falsely attributed Hobbes’s position to Hume, and if there is indeed 
an idea of spontaneous social order wider than the idea of the political in Hume’s 
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thought, then it is to Locke that Hume owes this insight. Locke’s theory of property 
has been one of the most important topics in the research of political theory, and this 
is so not only because it comprehends Locke’s ideas of distribution and labour, but 
also because it explicitly defends the priority of society over the state or of the moral 
over the political. The elaboration of Hume’s theoretical connection with Locke 
continues in Chapter Seven, where I focus on Hume’s theory of government. My 
objective in that chapter is to reflect on the conservative interpretation of Hume as 
found in the works of Sheldon Wolin and Frederick Whelan, in order to clarify 
Hume’s conservative utilitarianism. As stated, conservative utilitarianism, in contrast 
with radical utilitarianism, stands for an interpretation of the principle of utility. It is 
conservative because it sees that more (or no less) utility may be acquired from the 
status quo than from innovation; nevertheless, what it defends is still a reasonable 
philosophical principle of utility rather than the intrinsic value of the existing social 
norms. To put it differently, even if there is indeed some value implied in a practice 
or tradition long existing in human society, that value can be expressed in no better 
way than by the notion of utility. In this way, it is conservative primarily because it 
reveals the view that the cases in which the utility of social and political reform 
outweighs their cost are less constant as radical utilitarians suppose, therefore one 
must be cautious and prudent in this respect. Along with Hume, Edmund Burke, John 
Stuart Mill (to some degree), and Henry Sidgwick are characterised as conservative 
utilitarians, despite the significant differences between their philosophical systems. 
Chapter Eight is the conclusion of the dissertation, and by revealing their approval of 
the Glorious Revolution, I shall try to suggest that it is plausible to justify a 
utilitarian school from Locke and Hume, to Burke. 
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Hume’s political philosophy, when compared to Locke and Burke and 
interpreted as conservative utilitarianism, reveals important features which have been 
obscured by its contractarian interpretation. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
challenge the exhaustive view as found in the works of Gauthier and Barry. By 
recovering Hume’s connection with utilitarianism, this dissertation is intended to 
secure the important utilitarian elements of Hume’s thought without which a more 
balanced account of Hume’s political philosophy is unlikely to be achieved. 
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Chapter 2 Sympathy and Utility: A Comparison between Treatise 
and EPM 
2.1 Anatomist and Painter 
The purpose of this chapter is to challenge the view that a sound understanding 
of Hume’s political and moral thought can be founded solely on one’s reading of 
Hume’s earliest work. The intention is not to deny the fact that the Treatise is the 
most comprehensive philosophical work Hume ever wrote, but to suggest that there 
are some important questions contained in that work which Hume has reflected on 
throughout his life. Therefore, it seems arbitrary to claim that EPM, a work described 
by Hume as ‘of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably 
the best’ (My Own Life: xxxvi), is nothing but his ‘juvenile’ work expressed in an 
elegant style. Hume’s two major works on morals deserve a more careful comparison, 
and by considering the differences and continuity between them, we are led to 
observe that which occupied the philosopher’s mind from 1740 to 1751, a decade 
that is the golden period of Hume’s philosophical career right before he devoted 
himself to the writing and publishing of History for next ten years. 
As James King remarks, the relationship between the Treatise and EPM has 
long been a controversial topic among Hume scholars (King, 1976: 349). Scholars 
either hold that EPM is a fine restatement of the Treatise, that there is no difference 
between the two and Hume’s thought is coherent. Moreover, the Treatise is 
exceptional for its comprehensiveness and depth (Stewart, 1973: 17; Plamenatz, 
1958: 23; Selby-Bigge, 1975: vii-xl; Snare, 1991; Bricke, 1996; Baier, 2010: 214-
250). Along with this, however, some scholars are convinced that EPM 
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authoritatively represents Hume’s thought according to Hume’s own evaluation of 
this work (Albee, 1902: 91-112; Sidgwick, 1954: 205 n; Broad, 1930: 84; King, 1976: 
343-361; Gauthier, 1998: 17-18; Rosen, 2003: 29-57).
6
 Scholars have argued that 
these views are only partially true, for not all of them take the differences between 
the two works seriously. In this chapter I hope to show that the differences between 
the Treatise and EPM reveal that Hume’s philosophical perspective has transformed 
from that of an ‘anatomist’ into a ‘painter’, to use Hume's own terms, although this is 
not a transformation originally intended by Hume. For the former, Hume’s aim is to 
describe and explain man’s motive for being virtuous, which is why the Treatise is 
primarily a psychological work founded on the principal idea of sympathy. On the 
other hand, Hume’s task as a painter is to demonstrate that the tendency to promote 
the public utility is indispensable for those qualities and characters regarded as 
virtuous, and this is so because the connection between the public utility and men’s 
natural concern for the public interest motivates men to praise those qualities. I 
suggest that Hume’s positions in the Treatise and in EPM may respectively be 
characterized as descriptive naturalism and utilitarianism. It is true that, in both 
works, Hume has consistently regarded himself as an anatomist, which is a role he 
takes as the most proper for a philosopher. However, unlike in the Treatise which 
demonstrates both the selfish and sympathetic propensity of human nature, the 
principal role of utility in EPM shows that Hume deliberately takes the public 
interest of society as the foundation of morals and downplays men’s selfish nature in 
                                                 
6
 In a letter dated 1775 to a French man of letters Abbé Le Blanc who is also the translator of Hume’s 
Political Discourses, Hume wrote that EPM is ‘my favourite Performance’ (The Letters of David 
Hume, vol.1: 227, hereafter Letters, quoted in Taylor, 2009: 311 n.1). 
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this regard. Hume does not deny men’s selfish nature in EPM, but he endeavours to 
show that as well as being selfish, men are also by nature altruistic; he rejects 
reducing the latter to the former and describes any such attempt as a fruitless love of 
simplicity (EPM, 166). In this way, despite the fact Hume never forgets that his 
mission in EPM was explaining the causal relation between human nature and moral 
phenomena, the consequence of that work may nevertheless be prescriptive, i.e. it 
shows not only the cause of men’s being virtuous, but provides a reason for his 
readers to be so. It is this significant though implicit transformation of Hume’s role 
between his two major works on morals that I would like to capture and consider in 
this chapter, for by so doing the contribution of Hume’s theory and his position in the 
tradition of political thought can properly be observed. That is, Hume is pivotal in 
the development of modern English political thought from John Locke to the rise of 
utilitarianism after him. 
2.2 Between Benevolence and Selfishness 
The Treatise is composed of three books, Book I ‘Of the Understanding’ (1739) 
corresponds to, in terms of the subject, EHU published in 1749, and Book III ‘Of 
Morals’ (1740) corresponds to EPM published in 1751.7  As to Book II ‘Of the 
Passions’ (1739), it was recast by Hume in the form of an essay and published as one 
of the Four Dissertations in 1757. In 1893 Selby-Bigge wrote an important 
‘Introduction’ to his edition of Enquiries, where he enumerated the differences and 
continuities between the Treatise and its corresponding works by a careful 
                                                 
7
 For an objection to the received view that EPM is an intended replacement of ‘Of Morals’, see J. B. 
Stewart, 1973. 
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comparison between them. Selby-Bigge argues that ‘although in one sense the 
Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals is the best thing Hume ever wrote, to 
ignore the Treatise is to deprive him of his place among the great thinkers of Europe’ 
(Enquiries, x-xi). In comparing the Treatise and EPM, Selby-Bigge indicates that 
one difference between them lies in the fact that the idea of sympathy had 
significantly changed its meaning between the two works. On the one hand, in the 
Treatise sympathy represents a psychological mechanism which facilitates the 
communication of feelings among people. It is by means of such a mechanism that 
the feelings of each agent are perceived by others and the social or public feelings are 
thus formed in society.
8
 However, in EPM the conception of sympathy has lost its 
special function and become one feeling among many others, and has therefore 
usually been used by Hume as interchangeable with humanity and benevolence. 
According to Selby-Bigge, such a difference is caused by Hume’s feeling that the 
machinery assigned to sympathy in the Treatise did not work effectively, so he 
decided to get rid of it in the later work. In so doing, Selby-Bigge thought that 
[Hume] may be said to have abandoned perhaps the most distinctive 
feature of his moral system as expounded in the Treatise, so that in the 
Enquiry there is little to distinguish his theory from the ordinary moral 
sense theory, except perhaps a more destructive use of ‘utility’ (Enquiries, 
xxvi). 
                                                 
8
 The conception of sympathy first appears in Book II of the Treatise when Hume refers to men’s love 
of fame, he writes: ‘No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its 
consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own’ 
(Treatise, 206). For a criticism of Hume’s conception of sympathy, see C. Taylor, 2002. 
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Two important points may be drawn from Selby-Bigge’s observation. First, in 
EPM, utility has replaced sympathy and become the core idea of Hume’s ethics. 
Second, Selby-Bigge seems to be suspicious of Hume’s strategy mentioned in the 
last point. I agree with the first point and will try to explore its implication in the next 
section, but I reject Selby-Bigge’s suspicion. I think it is a misunderstanding of 
Hume to treat his intention in EPM as attempting to develop a moral sense theory 
which was then obstructed by the idea of utility, for it was the latter rather than the 
former which was taken by Hume as the foundation of his moral theory. This is 
particularly true when we observe the development of Hume’s thought between the 
Treatise and EPM. 
Compared with the Treatise, the idea of utility replaces sympathy and is central 
to Hume’s argument in EPM. Selby-Bigge’s concern is that this ‘even freer use of 
Utility’ (Enquiries, xxvii) would have weakened the emphasis that Hume placed on 
the benevolent nature of human beings in that work, although Selby-Bigge is pleased 
that Hume avoided drawing such conclusion from the principle. Presumably the 
reason for Selby-Bigge’s concern is that he regards Hume’s use of utility as his 
endorsement of psychological hedonism, and, moreover, equates psychological 
hedonism with psychological egoism. However, this is a misunderstanding of Hume. 
Just as Ernest Albee’s objection to Selby-Bigge that 
Why the admission of a certain undefined degree of native altruism and 
the use of the principle of ‘utility’ should be regarded as necessarily 
conflicting, I have never been able to understand (Albee, 1902: 98). 
As Albee rightly indicates, for the hedonist who holds that one is always 
determined to act for one’s own pleasure, he is not therefore committed to egoism in 
44 
 
any offensive sense. If one derives pleasure from the pleasure of others, one is just so 
far altruistic.
9
 John Plamenatz agrees with this in his rejection of the view that Hume 
is in essence a Hobbesian: 
Hume explicitly rejects the notion that egoism is in any sense 
fundamental, and altruism either a disguised form of it or else its 
derivative…he borrows the simple argument of Bishop Butler, that a man 
must be able to desire other things besides his own pleasure, because, 
before anything can please him, he must first desire it. A man must, 
before he can get pleasure from quenching his thirst, feel thirsty. And if 
he can desire other things besides his own pleasure, there is no reason 
why other people’s pleasures should not be among those things…What 
Butler and Hume, therefore, most desire to do is to refute Hobbes. For 
the egoistic hedonism of Hobbes is not properly a theory of morals. It 
does not explain the facts of our moral experience but obliges us to reject 
them as illusions. Hume is as well aware as anyone, and much better 
aware than either Bentham or James Mill, that no true moral philosophy 
can make an accommodation with Hobbes (Plamenatz, 1958: 30). 
It seems to me that this expresses Hume’s view properly, for utility in Hume’s 
theory represents a principle extracted from the altruistic feelings with which human 
nature is universally endowed. In other words, acts with utility make people feel 
pleased and thus earn their approbation because such acts have touched their 
                                                 
9
 The distinction between egoism and psychological hedonism is also made clear by Professor Paul 
Kelly. As Kelly indicates, the feature of egoism is self-regarding motivation. That is, in an egoistic 
theory a person’s motives are confined to the pursuit of his own interests, which incorporate the 
interests of others only to the extent that their interests correspond with his. Therefore, those actions 
which are done solely for the benefits of others are ruled out in an egoistic theory of motivation. By 
contrast, psychological hedonism only implies that the cause of action be self-referring, that is, one’s 
own pleasure. This does not entail that self-interest is the only object of one’s action, for except self-
interest there are still many ways to bring one pleasure, including actions which are wholly other-
regarding, such as caring for others (Kelly, 1990: 23). 
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altruistic nature. Therefore, Selby-Bigge’s concern is redundant. Furthermore, what 
is implied in Albee’s and Plamenatz’s comments is a sustained debate on human 
nature in the tradition of political philosophy to which Hume is an important 
contributor. 
Thomas Hobbes has been regarded as the initiator of this debate in modern 
times. For Hobbes, man is a rationally selfish individual; he acts for self-interest and 
for nothing else. Things that conform to a man’s interest are good for him; otherwise 
they are bad. Given that one man’s situation is differentiated from that of others and 
their interests naturally diverge, there is no room for objective moral qualities or 
relations. Hobbes believed that for people who were by nature selfish and equal in 
their ability there were three principal causes of quarrel, i.e. competition for 
resources, diffidence with respect to each other, and the search for glory. The result 
is a war of every man against every man. In Hobbes’s state of nature, society is not 
yet formed, not to mention the development of industry, so men’s knowledge, 
civilisation, and art remain blank. Worst of all, men live in continual fear and danger 
of violent death, and Hobbes has famously described men’s life in that state as 
‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes, 1994: 74-76). It is worth noting 
that for Hobbes, men are by nature anti-social; it is the concern for self-interest that 
drives them to cooperate with others and put an end to the state of conflict; it is the 
same egoistic concern that leads them to set up a ‘common power’ to prevent the 
natural state from happening again. As Hobbes writes, ‘All society, therefore, exists 
for the sake either of advantage or of glory, i.e. it is a product of love of self, not of 
love of friends’ (Hobbes, 1998: 24). Being a follower of Hobbes, Bernard 
Mandeville takes over Hobbes’s view on human nature, saying: ‘no species of 
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animals is, without the curb of government, less capable of agreeing long together in 
multitudes than that of man’, and ‘being an extraordinary selfish and headstrong, as 
well as cunning animal’, although man may be subdued by external force, still force 
alone cannot make them tractable (Raphael, 1991 vol.1: 229-230). In this way, in 
order to preserve his authority, the governor will endeavour to convince his people 
that the most effective way to fulfil their private interests is to restrain desires and 
pursue the public interest. However, for men who were born selfish, it is difficult to 
ever persuade them to set their own interests aside, unless rewards are provided as 
incentives. The difficulty lies in that for a country, however opulent it is, so huge an 
amount of rewards would still be unaffordable, given that this scheme is aimed at all 
citizens rather than just the minority. Fortunately, ‘the lawgivers and other wise men’ 
discover that all men are vulnerable to vanity: ‘none were either so savage as not to 
be charmed with praise, or so despicable as patiently to bear contempt’, so they take 
flattery as an imaginary reward (Raphael, 1991 vol.1: 230). They first teach people 
that men are different from other animals, that the rationality and intelligence of the 
former is superior to the latter; then they instruct them in the notions of honour and 
shame, representing the one as the highest good, and the other as the worst of all 
evils. Subsequently, they inculcate people with the grossness of gratifying their 
natural appetites and the glory of attempting to defeat them. Finally, they divide 
people into two classes: the one consisting of abject, low-minded people who are 
enslaved by sensual pleasure and incapable of performing other-regarding acts, the 
other made up of high-spirited people who despise whatever they have in common 
with irrational creatures and make a continual war with themselves to promote the 
public welfare. When these conceptions become widespread, people being motivated 
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by their passions of vanity will endeavour to show that they belong to the latter camp, 
and this is the result most welcome to governors (Raphael, 1991 vol.1: 229-236). 
However, the view that men are by nature selfish and anti-social and that the 
state is indispensable for social order was not unchallengeable in the time before 
Hume. From the end of 17
th
 century, this view was critically objected to by the moral 
sense school led by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, other 
important philosophers of this camp including Francis Hutcheson and Bishop Joseph 
Butler. This camp of philosophers opposed the rationalist systems of ethics, and 
located the active principles of human conduct in passions, to which they regarded 
the rational faculty as subordinate. Meanwhile, the selfish conception of the person 
advocated by Hobbes and Mandeville was rejected, the moral sense philosophers 
bringing the ‘public affections’ of men into prominence to show the fact that men 
naturally tend to perform altruistic acts, therefore men are social animals (Whelan, 
1985: 138; 162 n.102). Hutcheson was elected Professor of Moral Philosophy at the 
University of Glasgow in December 1729, and he delivered his inaugural oration ‘On 
the Natural Sociability of Mankind’ in November 1730, on the occasion of his formal 
admittance to the university. In this lecture Hutcheson concisely expressed the 
philosophical essence of the moral sense school. He criticised Hobbes’s use of the 
state of nature as being not only despicable as philosophy, but also an insult to 
human nature (Hutcheson, 2006: 198). Contrary to Hobbes’s distortion of the term, 
Hutcheson thinks that ‘state of nature’ should be used to represent the perfect state 
which men may attain after their natural social affections are fully developed. 
Admittedly, Hutcheson goes on to argue, the imperfectness of our nature usually 
carries us into vices and makes corruption inevitable. However, when we 
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contemplate our nature, there must be something we will discover aside from desires, 
that is the ‘the social and kindly (communes et benignos) affections and that moral 
sense which we may also call natural conscience’ (Hutcheson, 2006: 199). Then we 
realise that vices and corruptions are not natural to our nature, for the faculties which 
ought to moderate sensual desires have presented themselves to us. Although in 
men’s ordinary life natural conscience does not always win in the battle with desires, 
it is by nature fit to govern. As Hutcheson says, ‘Nor indeed can the true fabric of our 
nature as God disposed it be restored until conscience, seated on this its proper 
throne, crushes the bodily desires beneath its feet’ (Hutcheson, 2006: 199). In this 
way, Hutcheson argues that philosophers should ‘unlearn’ the use of the ‘natural 
state’ and instead adopt ‘state of liberty’ to refer to the social life as opposed to the 
civil state. 
Hutcheson proceeds to deal with another question, namely ‘in what sense is 
this social life natural to man?’ In other words, can men’s pursuit of the social life 
eventually be reconciled with their pursuit of self-interest? It is not surprising that 
Hutcheson certainly would not agree with the egoistic view, but it is worth noting 
that his purpose is not to deny the fact that men do benefit from social life, whether it 
physically satisfies men’s desire for existence or psychologically satisfies them by 
the pleasure that can be derived only from social interactions. On the contrary, what 
Hutcheson endeavours to show is that the egoistic view on the origin of society does 
not reveal the whole story, for what is important is that men are naturally endowed 
with benevolent and social feelings. It is these feelings that motivate people to share 
others’ pleasure disinterestedly, motivate them to heartily admire the nobleness of a 
historical figure, and so they cannot be indifferent to the fate of their offspring, 
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friends, and fellow-citizens even before their death. For Hutcheson, the same feelings 
prompt men to seek social life without reasoning and make the duties of social life 
agreeable and delightful (Hutcheson, 2006: 204-208). Through manifesting the 
feeling of benevolence and men’s natural sociability, Hutcheson, on the one hand, 
justifies the values of social life, and on the other, takes the public interest that they 
symbolise as the foundation of morality.
10
 
The two philosophical positions briefly sketched here greatly influenced 
Hume’s thought. Hume reflected on and criticised both sides of the argument, while 
being inspired by both of them; Hume’s thought contains similarities with each of 
these two positions, but he has deliberately kept them at a distance. In short, it seems 
that Hume’s attempt is to take middle course between egoism and the moral sense 
school.
11
 Hume’s theory aims to develop an empirical and secular foundation for 
morals, and it seems sensible to see Hume as the philosopher who contributed most 
significantly to the secularisation of morals in the age of Enlightenment, particularly 
when we find that Adam Smith, who was deeply influenced by Hume, again secured 
a place for God in the realm of morals.
12
 This trend of secularisation of morals can be 
                                                 
10
 For example, Hutcheson thinks that the cardinal virtues, i.e. temperance, courage, prudence, and 
justice, are regarded as virtues because they promote the public good and are associated with men’s 
benevolent motives (Mackie, 1980: 27). 
11
 The thinkers briefly introduced in this section are, except Hobbes, mentioned by Hume in a footnote 
at the beginning of the Treatise. Hume describes them as representatives of philosophers who 
introduce the scientific method into the research of human nature (Treatise, 5; see also An Abstract of 
A Treatise of Human Nature, 407 (hereafter Abstract)). 
12
 It remains controversial that whether God has a substantial role to play in Smith’s moral theory 
since his function has been replaced by men’s conscience which Smith termed ‘inner God’ (Smith, 
1982). For the relationship between Hume and Smith, see Haakonssen, 1981. 
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traced back, at least, to Hugo Grotius, who in his discussion of justice claimed that 
‘all we have now said would take place, though we should even grant…that there is 
no God, or that he takes no Care of human Affairs’ (Grotius, 2005 vol.1: 89).13 It is 
so because, for Grotius, a system of property is indispensable for social life, and 
social life is a natural consequence of human nature.
14
 Indeed, the idea that men are 
by nature social animals or that sociability is implanted in human nature is essential 
to the interpretation of Hume’s thought. Taking the idea of sociability as a clue, it 
would not only help us to clarify Hume’s place in the tradition of political thought, 
but would also help to answer the controversial question about the relationship 
between Hume’s Treatise and EPM. On the surface, when one focuses on the role of 
the idea of sociability in Hume’s thought, it seems natural to regard it as evidence of 
Hume’s theoretical resemblance to the moral sense school, based on our 
understanding of Hutcheson’s position as outlined earlier, and thus attribute Hume to 
that school. Although I do not intend to deny Hutcheson’s influence on Hume, it is 
one of the main purposes of this thesis to show that the basic elements of Hume's 
                                                 
13
 With regard to this empirical, naturalistic tradition of natural law and Hume’s place in it, see Forbes, 
1975 and Buckle, 1991. The views advocated by these interpreters have been challenged by Pauline 
Westerman by a detailed comparison between Grotius and Hume. Westerman argues that, though both 
Grotius and Hume may employ much the same concepts, it is for different purposes. Grotius’s account 
of human nature is for justifying the existing rules of justice, whereas Hume’s is for explaining justice. 
To identify Hume as a natural lawyer thus only contribute to distort his position (Westerman, 1994: 
83-104). 
14
 Therefore Grotius argues against Carneades, who is the representative of those who denied the 
existence of natural law and who regard interest as the only spring of justice, by saying that ‘the 
Mother of Natural Law is human Nature itself, which, though even the Necessity of our Circumstances 
should not require it, would of itself create in us a mutual Desire of Society’ (Grotius, 2005 vol.1: 93). 
See also Forbes, 1975: 6 and Albee, 1902: 2-3. 
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thought, the idea of sociability being no exception, are not inherited from Hutcheson 
alone. Instead, we can see that it is primarily John Locke that has also inspired Hume 
and that Hume reflects on problems from Locke (to borrow the title of Mackie’s 
famous book, see Mackie, 1976) as well as defending some non-theological Lockean 
premises. On these terms, when Hume argues in the Treatise that ‘so far am I from 
thinking with some philosophers, that men are utterly incapable of society without 
government’ (Treatise, 346), he is objecting to Hobbes’s thought, but he needs not be 
understood as rejecting the selfish nature of mankind and regarding benevolence as 
the only basis of social life, as Hutcheson holds. Rather, one significant contribution 
of Hume lies in the fact that he provides an authentic depiction of human nature and 
shows that despite men’s natural partiality, social order is still to be created among a 
group of men without the interference of political authority. Indeed, Hume is 
convinced that the social order which justice stands for would be invented by men 
spontaneously in order to prevent conflicts and inconveniences. So long as the 
convention of justice is formed to maintain order, a society which was founded on 
the connection between families may operate for a long period of time before 
government was established, and for Hume, this ‘state of society without government 
is one of the most natural states of men’ (Treatise, 346).15 As will be shown in the 
                                                 
15
 For Hume, justice rather than government is indispensable to society, and not long after society was 
formed, the idea of justice would gradually be developed in a process of evolution. Christopher Berry 
thinks that a feature of the theories of Hume and Adam Ferguson who being the representatives of the 
Scottish Enlightenment is to criticise the rationalism advanced by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, and 
to explain the origin of social institutions and norms from the view of gradualism (Berry, 1997: 23-51). 
As will be shown more clearly in what follows, I am afraid Berry has misunderstood the relationship 
between Hume and Locke in the respect. 
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following chapters, this view of human nature and society, namely that social order is 
the product of men’s sociability for which both benevolence and selfishness are 
important ingredients, is to be found neither in Hobbes nor in Hutcheson, but in the 
works of Locke. 
Since men’s instinct renders society inevitable, Hume’s concern is how morals 
are possible in this form of human life. In a sense, both the Treatise and EPM are 
meant to address this question, the difference lying in the approaches Hume adopts in 
these two works, which may respectively be termed descriptive naturalism and 
utilitarianism. The former has description and explanation as its purpose, while the 
unintended consequence of the latter is justification and prescription. In the Treatise 
Hume distinguishes two ways of conducting the research of morals: one is similar to 
that of an anatomist, who dissects men’s appearance and studies his internal structure 
authentically; the other is like that of a painter who represents the charming looks of 
men. For Hume, the two approaches are distinct and may not be confused. Although 
in a sense these two approaches may complement each other and complete our 
understanding of morals, the point Hume attempts to make clear is that, as far as the 
work of a philosopher is concerned, it is the role of anatomist that is fulfilled by him, 
whereas the role of moral painter is to be played by each individual as a practical 
person. To put it differently, Hume does not think that the mission of philosopher is 
to provide a reason for men’s being virtuous. Instead he provides only a scientific 
and causal explanation of the origin and principles of morals. Hume’s intention of 
composing the Treatise is an exact demonstration of the descriptive and explanatory 
task of the philosopher, as he concludes the work by saying that: 
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the most abstract speculations concerning human nature, however cold 
and unentertaining, become subservient to practical morality; and may 
render this latter science more correct in its precepts, and more 
perswasive in its exhortations (Treatise, 395; see also Abstract, 407). 
Hume’s conception of the task of philosopher thus explains his reply to and 
difference from Hutcheson. When Hutcheson read the manuscript of the still 
unpublished Book III of the Treatise, he commented that the work ‘wants a certain 
Warmth in the Cause of Virtue’. However, what we find in Hume’s reply to the 
criticism is not an attempt to defend himself by showing his enthusiasm for 
promoting virtues in the Treatise which might have been overlooked by Hutcheson. 
On the contrary, Hume once again appealed to the dichotomy between anatomist and 
painter, and he not only recognised Hutcheson’s observation but stressed that it did 
not happen by chance, and was the effect of his reasoning as an anatomist (Letters 
vol.1: 32-35). A physical anatomist studies men’s biological structure and functions, 
and a moral anatomist has his eyes on the features and rules of men’s psychology, 
thus the psychological tendency that characterises the Treatise, and thus the crucial 
role of the idea of sympathy in it. 
As John Plamenatz remarks, ‘No theory of morals assigns a larger role to 
sympathy than does Hume’s’ (Plamenatz, 1958: 30). The meaning of sympathy was 
elaborated on by Hume in Book II of the Treatise and was then frequently applied in 
his discourse on morals in Book III. Its function is described by Hume thus: 
As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to 
the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and 
beget correspondent movements in every human creature. When I see the 
effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind 
immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a 
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lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself. 
In like manner, when I perceive the causes of any emotion, my mind is 
convey’d to the effects, and is actuated with a like emotion (Treatise, 
368). 
Instead of treating sympathy as one of various feelings operating in human 
nature, it seems more plausible to view it as medium for other feelings. Sympathy in 
Hume’s Treatise is like an invisible channel connecting one person’s mind with that 
of another, and it is via this psychological mechanism of the communication of 
feelings that men are capable of perceiving the feelings that other people experience. 
As Charlotte Brown remarks: 
Sympathy is our capacity to receive the passions, sentiments, and even 
belief of others. It is not itself a passion, so it should not be confused with 
such feelings as compassion, pity, or empathy…Rather, it is a mechanism 
by means of which the feelings of others are imparted to us. Sympathy 
explains how we literally enter into the feelings of others, feeling what 
they are feeling (Brown, 2008: 232).16 
Moreover, the importance of sympathy is further highlighted by Hume’s 
treating his work in the Treatise as an anatomy of human nature, for just like a 
physical anatomist who describes his observation that the blood vessels function as 
circulatory system to transport blood and oxygen throughout the body, Hume intends 
by his description of sympathy to reveal the fact that men are by nature capable of 
communicating their feelings with each other. In so doing, Hume’s purpose is to 
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 Frank Balog also asserts that the idea of sympathy in both Hume’s and Smith’s systems is a 
foundation of conscience and is a passion ‘in itself not specifically moral’ (Balog, 1990: 199). Philip 
Mercer likewise argues that ‘sympathy is emphatically not a passion or emotion of any kind’ (Mercer, 
1972: 21; 42). See also Kemp, 1970: 35 and Stroud, 1977: 197. 
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provide empirical evidence of the public character of men and reject Hobbes’s view 
that self-interest is the only motive of mankind.
17
 However, once the fact that men 
are by nature social animals is proved by the moral anatomist, the task of cultivating 
men’s moral character is beyond the scope of his task and left to a moral painter, 
namely to each individual in his common life. Where this practical dimension of 
morals is concerned, the philosopher does not and ought not to have superiority over 
common people. To put it differently, in cultivating moral agency, the moral 
philosopher is equal with the vulgar, because this task can only be fulfilled when he 
returns from being a philosopher to one of the vulgar, for whom the causal law of 
moral phenomenon and of social life is not an object of philosophical inquiry but his 
way of life. From this, one may discern the libertarian and egalitarian feature 
underlying Hume’s thought, though he deliberately avoids developing them into a 
normative doctrine either in the Treatise or EPM, and only feels free to demonstrate 
these evaluative positions when he has switched his role from a philosopher to an 
essayist and historian. 
Hume’s aim in the Treatise is to discover the connections between human 
nature and morals, that is, he explores how moral phenomena arise out of the 
psychological constitution of human beings. However, the structure of his theory has 
been altered in EPM and one more element is now added between human nature and 
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 In Hume’s explanation of the operation of sympathy, he notes that sympathy as a psychological 
mechanism ‘is an object of the plainest experience, and depends not on any hypothesis of philosophy’ 
(Treatise, 208). Hume’s elaboration of the conception of sympathy and its impact on the development 
of social psychology is noted by Lauren Wispé, he calls Hume, along with Adam Smith and Arthur 
Schopenhauer, ‘heroes of sympathy’ (Wispé, 1991: chap. 1). 
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morals, namely utility. In EPM, human nature remains the only foundation of morals, 
since Hume rejects any attempt to found morals on transcendental ideas; the 
difference, however, lies in the fact that he has adjusted his strategy for moral 
discourse and turned the dual structure into a triadic relationship, the core of which is 
utility. On the one hand, Hume shows the close connection between virtues and 
utility. He teaches that a just or benevolent act is virtuous because it has the quality 
of utility, that is, it contributes to the public interest of society. On the other hand, 
one might go on to ask why an act with utility is going to earn our moral approval. 
The reason Hume offers is that utility corresponds with the natural public feeling of 
mankind and thus makes us satisfied. In other words, although Hume regards morals 
as arising from men’s subjective feelings, by highlighting the role of utility, just like 
the function of sympathy in the Treatise, Hume shows that men can pull themselves 
out of their selfish and narrow-minded situation and develop a more public, impartial 
foundation for morals. This is also Hume’s response to the selfish and the moral 
sense school. On the surface, utility being a tendency of virtues, it seems inapplicable 
to separate one from the other. However, Hume’s intention is to show that from his 
inductive reasoning of various virtues observable in men’s daily life and in history, 
utility has been extracted by him as a quality generally shared by most of men and 
thus may be seen as a principle underlying morals. In this sense, utility functions as a 
stable and constant ‘moral principle’ which guides men’s daily life. For Hume, 
human nature is plural and complex; it is various kinds of instincts, propensities, and 
passions which continuously conflict and blend with each other that make human 
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nature what it is (Miller, 1981: 105).
18
 Morals being the derivative of human nature 
inevitably share its plurality and complexity. Besides, external environments 
fluctuate, so a virtuous act is beneficial to the society here and now, but might cause 
more harm than good once circumstances change. This is why Hume shows that, 
though justice is indispensable to a well-ordered society, under certain circumstances 
the public benefit more from the temporary suspension than the strict observance of 
it. This is also why Hume argues that, certain conducts though being performed out 
of benevolence, that is, to relieve the distress and pains of others’, once their 
consequences of decreasing rather than increasing public utility are discovered, this 
conduct is then considered a weakness rather than a virtue, such as tyrannicide and 
giving alms to beggars. Therefore, utility is a constant quality that Hume grasps from 
the changeable human condition; it always guides men through plurality and 
complexity to the moral judgment which benefits society in every circumstance. 
What is particularly worth noting is that it was not Hume’s original intention to 
detach utility from human nature and take it as a basis for normative doctrine which 
would then in turn prescribe what men ought to perform. Rather, utility is of interest 
because it reveals a propensity of human nature. Indeed, for Hume utility is the 
human nature he has endeavoured to show in EPM. By means of reflecting on this 
propensity or dimension of human nature, Hume aims in that work to illustrate that 
men are by nature capable of creating pre-political moral life and, in this sense, it is 
                                                 
18
 The state, however, to use Frazer’s terms, should be described as ‘psychic democracy’ rather than 
‘psychic anarchy’. As Frazer remarks: ‘Just as a nation as a whole can govern itself through 
democratic deliberation…so too can a mind as a whole govern itself through reflectively refined and 
endorsed moral sentiments’ (Frazer, 2010: 11). 
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the society rather than the state onto which the moral tendency of human nature is 
primarily projected. This for Hume, as for Locke, is a fact of human evolution 
supported by historical experience. However, it is interesting to observe how far 
Hume succeeded in sticking to his role as a moral scientist and avoiding advocating 
normative judgment, especially when the principle of utility has replaced that of 
sympathy as the foundation of his moral theory. The view advanced in this thesis is 
that, despite Hume’s intention, the adoption of the principle of utility forced him to 
deviate from his descriptive and psychological enterprise, which seems more 
successful in the Treatise but which was undermined when he transferred his 
attention from ‘human nature’ to the ‘principles of morals’. 
2.3 From the Treatise to EPM 
Compared with the idea of sympathy which Hume uses to explain the origin of 
moral consensus within society in the Treatise, what catches our attention when 
reading the EPM is the idea of utility. In EPM, utility is adopted by Hume as a 
principle by which various virtues are connected. To explain this, let us take Hume’s 
treatment of justice and benevolence as example. In EPM at the end of Section 2 ‘Of 
Benevolence’, Hume indicates ‘that a part, at least, of its merit arises from its 
tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human 
society’ (EPM, 82). Then, in Section 3 ‘Of justice’, Hume observes that ‘justice is 
useful to society, and consequently that part of its merit, at least, must arise from that 
consideration, it would be a superfluous undertaking to prove’. By contrast, what 
Hume aims to explore is that ‘public utility is the sole origin of justice, and that 
reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the sole foundation of its 
merit’ (EPM, 83). Later, Hume again affirms at the end of the same section that ‘The 
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necessity of justice to the support of society is the SOLE foundation of that virtue’ 
(EPM, 98). Moreover, Hume continues to say, given that ‘this circumstance of 
usefulness has, in general, the strongest energy, and most entire command over our 
sentiments’, it must be 
the source of a considerable part of the merit ascribed to humanity, 
benevolence, friendship, public spirit, and other social virtues of that 
stamp; as it is the SOLE source of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, 
justice, veracity, integrity, and those other estimable and useful qualities 
and principles (EPM, 98). 
Finally, in the Conclusion of EPM Hume again emphasises that 
Are not justice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chastity, esteemed 
solely on account of their tendency to promote the good of society? Is not 
that tendency inseparable from humanity, benevolence, lenity, generosity, 
gratitude, moderation, tenderness, friendship, and all the other social 
virtues (EPM, 151)? 
From the passages quoted above we may discern the close connection 
discovered by Hume between utility and virtues, while also noticing that the 
connection between them varies from virtue to virtue, namely, that some virtues are 
more inseparable from utility than others. That is to say, artificial virtues such as 
justice have no foundation other than utility, whereas natural virtues represented by 
benevolence, while to a certain extent being inseparable from utility, are not founded 
solely on it; Hume believes that the second category of virtues are already implanted 
in human nature (EPM, 170), although the question concerning the origin of virtues 
is not his focus in EMP. To put it another way: when we contemplate the acts of 
justice performed by a person, such as abstaining from taking the possessions of 
others and being faithful to his promises, he earns our approbation simply because 
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such acts contribute to the public interest or at least cause no harm to it. By contrast, 
when another’s benevolent act earns our approval, this is so not only because such an 
act brings pleasure to its beneficiary and such a feeling is then conveyed to us by 
means of sympathy, but because we are driven by nature to anticipate certain 
reactions on that agent’s side. Once our anticipation of that other person’s action is 
frustrated by actions such as doing nothing to save one from ruin or gloating over 
another’s misfortune, he would become the object of our contempt. 
In this way, two categories of virtues may be distinguished on the basis of 
utility, and the result of this distinction coincides with the dichotomy between the 
natural and the artificial virtues as proposed by Hume in the Treatise. The difference, 
however, is that in EPM Hume deliberately avoids the dichotomy between the 
natural and the artificial virtues. Instead his intention is to reveal that utility is a 
feature shared by both categories of virtues, thus he frequently considers both of 
them as under the concept of ‘social virtues’ (EPM, 77, 117, 135, 151, 170-171). In 
terms of the relationship between the Treatise and EPM, this difference reveals a 
significant development of Hume’s thought. For it shows that, despite the difference 
of their connections with utility, what Hume aims to manifest in EPM is the fact that 
utility is a principle that unites justice and benevolence, namely they both contribute 
to the maintenance of a proper social life. It is this commonality of virtues that Hume 
endeavoured to make explicit when he recast his moral theory over the eleven years 
between the two works. Accordingly, one may infer that what concerns Hume in the 
Treatise is the origin of virtues, so he highlights the differences between justice and 
benevolence, whereas in EPM his concern is the consequence or use of virtues, thus 
he unites justice and benevolence by utility and emphasises their commonality. 
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Certainly, I am not suggesting that in EPM justice and benevolence are considered 
identical by Hume – they are two distinct virtues – but it seems to be Hume’s 
intention to compress the main thesis of Book III of the Treatise into Appendix III of 
EPM. From this perspective it is then clear why many notable arguments of the 
Treatise are restated by Hume in that Appendix. For example, he again refers to the 
idea of convention as the basis of justice, and argues that convention is different from 
a promise for without being founded on ‘a sense of common interest’ which the 
former stands for, the latter would have nothing on which to base its binding force. 
Meanwhile, Hume lists several vivid examples to show the implication of convention, 
including two men rowing a boat to cross a river, the rise of money, and of words 
and language in human society, all of these examples verifying Hume’s argument 
that convention is the origin of social order, and all of them appearing in the Treatise. 
Moreover, in a footnote of that Appendix, Hume again picks up his earlier arguments 
and explains the meaning of ‘natural’ by contrasting it with ‘unusual’, ‘miraculous’, 
and ‘artificial’, which, again, is a view familiar with the readers of the Treatise.19 
The difference lies in that at the end of footnote Hume concludes: ‘But all these 
disputes are merely verbal’ (EPM, 173 n.64), which seems to suggest that the 
dichotomy of natural and artificial which reveals the origin of virtues is not his 
primary concern in EPM. 
So far we may conclude, that the difference between the Treatise and EPM lies 
in that, on the one hand, Hume deliberately downplaying the importance of his 
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 As observed by James King that ‘the best of Hume’s analytical and psychological work from 
Treatise III…is located in the Appendices, as if to set abstract speculation off from the basic import of 
the Enquiry’ (King, 1976: 355). 
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earlier arguments and, on the other, utility being adopted as a principle that 
penetrates the whole book of EPM. What we are curious about is: what is Hume’s 
intention behind such adjustment of his argument? To put it differently, what is it 
that Hume aims to achieve by recasting his moral theory after eleven years? To 
explore this, some clues seem to be implied in Hume’s definition of utility. In his 
explanation of ‘Why Utility Pleases’ Hume notes that 
Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of 
fact, confirmed by daily observation. But, useful? For what? For some 
body’s interest, surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For our 
approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest 
of those, who are served by the character or action approved of; and these 
we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By 
opening up this principle, we shall discover one great source of moral 
distinctions (EPM, 108). 
Hume continues: 
we must renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment 
by the principle of self-love. We must adopt a more public affection, and 
allow, that the interests of society are not, even on their own account, 
entirely indifferent to us. Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; 
and it is a contradiction in terms, that any thing pleases as means to an 
end, where the end itself nowise affects us. If usefulness, therefore, be a 
source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always 
considered with a reference to self; it follows, that every thing, which 
contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our 
approbation and good-will (EPM, 109). 
These paragraphs clearly show that Hume’s intention of composing EPM is to 
reveal the fact that, among various kinds of feelings with which men are naturally 
endowed, there is one of a public or altruistic kind. It makes no difference whether it 
is termed humanity, benevolence, sympathy, friendship, or social feeling, and it is 
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true that this feeling might not be as intense as feelings like vanity or ambition, but 
the point is that it does exist and is generally shared by human beings. Hume’s 
endeavour to prove this point is evident in numerous paragraphs of EPM. For 
example, he writes in the Conclusion that 
It is sufficient for our present purpose, if it be allowed, what surely, 
without the greatest absurdity, cannot be disputed, that there is some 
benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of 
friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove, kneaded into our 
frame, along with the elements of the wolf and serpent (EPM, 147). 
One purpose of Hume’s considering benevolence as the foundation of morals is 
to object to Hobbes’s view that men are only motivated by self-interest and by 
nothing else. It is true that selfishness, just like benevolence, is also implanted in 
human nature, but appealing to men’s egoistic nature in no way contributes to a 
stable moral standard which is indispensable for a decent social life. In Hume’s view, 
Hobbes’s egoism is not only contradictory to his understanding of morality; it is also 
a distortion of human nature which Hume would like to oppose by revealing men’s 
altruistic propensity. To put it another way, morality being the cement of society 
must be generally applicable to every individual in every particular circumstance; 
therefore morality can only be founded on benevolence or humanity, since 
One man’s ambition is not another’s ambition; nor will the same event or 
object satisfy both: But the humanity of one man is the humanity of every 
one; and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures 
(EPM, 148). 
Society would soon collapse without morality, and morality would not 
contribute to the peace and order of society if an impartial and stable moral standard 
were not available to overcome men’s partiality. Also, in order to achieve this goal, 
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morality must be founded on the public character of mankind, namely on the 
character which is common to all mankind and which is directed to the overlapping 
end: the maintenance of society. Hume’s view of the public feature of morality is 
made explicit in the following paragraph: 
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his 
adversary, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to 
express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular 
circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the 
epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another 
language, and expresses sentiments, in which, he expects, all his 
audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his 
private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, 
common to him with others: He must move some universal principle of 
the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an 
accord and symphony. If he mean, therefore, to express, that this man 
possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society, he has 
chosen this common point of view, and has touched the principle of 
humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs. While the 
human heart is compounded of the same elements as at present, it will 
never be wholly indifferent to public good (EPM, 148). 
To judge from these paragraphs, one may think that Hutcheson’s influence on 
Hume is evident, but what must be noted is that Hume believes human nature is 
composed of various passions and propensities, none of which is predominant. As 
mentioned in the last section, this is the middle course Hume takes between the 
selfish and moral sense school. However, if this is the case, why does Hume put so 
much emphasis on the altruistic tendency of mankind in EPM? To answer this 
question is to clarify Hume’s purpose of composing EPM, and I would suggest that 
Hume’s purpose is to revise his position as revealed in the Treatise and to clarify the 
misunderstanding that he is a disciple of Hobbes. Indeed, what is likely to impress 
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the readers of Hume’s first work is his affinity with Hobbes.20 For example, Hume’s 
treatment of justice in the Treatise takes this virtue as derived from the co-working 
of human nature and external circumstances in which men are contingently situated. 
On the one hand, men are by nature fragile and selfish, on the other, the resources 
which may be collected from the physical environments are inconstant and scarce in 
comparison with men’s endless greed. Consequently, men are driven by their instinct 
for survival to seek a set of rules in order to prevent the conflicts and disorder arising 
from the distribution of resources. For Hume, justice turns out to be the norm 
fundamental to human society because the stability of possessions that justice 
represents is crucial to a well-ordered societal frame within which each individual 
may safely pursue self-fulfilment. If this is the outline of Hume theory one is likely 
to grasp from the Treatise, i.e. justice as a virtue originating from men’s selfish 
nature and the scarcity of resources, it seems to be Hume’s intention in EPM to reject 
or at least moderate the perception of a close link drawn between his argument and 
Hobbes’s.21 In EPM Hume retains the same structure which frames Book III of the 
Treatise, but the proportion of each section of this structure is changed. In the 
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 See, for example, Mercer’s criticism of the unduly egocentric of Hume’s conception of sympathy in 
the Treatise (Mercer, 1972: 44). However, Mercer does not seem to endorse the separate criticism that 
Hume’s philosophy of mind as a whole is unduly egoistic, a view which can be traced, at least, to T. H. 
Green’s ‘Introduction’ to his edition of Hume’s Treatise (Green, 1874). 
21
 This presumably is a reason why David Gauthier takes the Treatise as ‘more contractarian’ than 
EPM, although his own contractarian interpretation of Hume is primarily based on the latter, because 
by focusing on a work with which Hume is more satisfied Gauthier intends to establish an account 
‘which Hume could not but find himself obliged to acknowledge’ (Gauthier, 1998:18). In spite of this, 
Gauthier’s intention seems clear: if his contractarian interpretation of Hume based on EPM is justified, 
then it seems less controversial to apply the same view to the more contractarian work, i.e. the 
Treatise. A discussion and rejection of Gauthier’s essay is provided in Chapter Five. 
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Treatise, the space devoted to the discussion of justice and other artificial virtues is 
twice as large as that of benevolence and the rest of virtues. This is so because that 
work is Hume’s first attempt to explore human psychology, his goal therefore being 
to trace various moral phenomena in the human world back to the psychological 
mechanism of mankind and develop a secular philosophical system. In this way, 
justice, unlike benevolence, which is the product of men’s natural feelings, is the 
result of men’s socialisation after a long process of evolution, thus Hume believes 
that its origin requires a more elaborate account. Since an elaboration of artificial 
virtues is available in the Treatise, in EPM Hume then turns to provide a more 
balanced observation of human nature and virtues, and by doing so he hopes to draw 
the distinction between himself and Hobbes more clearly. From this perspective, it is 
then sensible that the idea of utility is endowed with such a primary role in EPM. It 
must be clear that Hume objects to the philosophical systems founded on a specific 
feature of mankind, for this approach can never provide a comprehensive knowledge 
of human nature, and is thus based on a weak foundation. Hume’s observation of 
human nature is drawn from experiences of daily life; just as one feels the conflicts 
of different feelings occurring in him when he faces a difficult situation, these are 
revealed by Hume as the complexity and changeableness of human nature. When 
interpreters, based on Hume’s theory of justice in the Treatise, regard Hume as 
following Hobbes, this understanding of Hume can only be partial. It is true that, in 
Hume’s view, justice is inseparable from men’s selfishness and is meant to restrain it, 
and so he emphasises how mankind, with the assistance of instrumental reason, 
pursues self-fulfilment in an oblique and peaceful manner. However this does not 
mean that Hume is thus blind to other propensities and passions imbedded in human 
nature: on the one hand, even when one focuses only on the Treatise, this is still a 
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misunderstanding of Hume and intentionally overlooks many other important ideas 
proposed by Hume in that work, such as familial relationships, community, 
reputation, and sympathy, among others; on the other hand, given the fact that the 
partial view of human nature proposed by egoism is incompatible with men’s 
common experience, it would not be endorsed by Hume, since Hume has founded his 
philosophy on the common experience of most people in their daily life.
22
 
Furthermore, the view that Hume is a disciple of Hobbes faces a more critical 
challenge when we turn our attention from the Treatise to EPM. For the importance 
of utility there shows that Hume’s intention is to challenge the selfish-egoist school 
as illustrated by the works of Hobbes and Mandeville, and replace self-love with 
sociability as the foundation of morality. As stated, Hume thinks that men ‘will never 
be wholly indifferent to public good’, but why do we approve of certain acts even if 
we do not benefit from them? The reason lies in our natural sociability. That is to say, 
some acts or characters earn our moral approbation because they have the quality of 
utility, provided that we are not by nature indifferent to what other people are 
experiencing. From this we may discern that utility and men’s natural sociability are 
closely connected in Hume’s theory. However, let us dig deeper. According to 
Hume’s empiricism, perceptions are the very material of mind or consciousness. 
Whether an act is judged to be good or depraved, its moral qualities are endowed by 
our moral feelings, although some of the moral feelings are given by nature and some 
are derived from education and human artifice. Therefore, an act is good because, 
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 As Hume writes in his essay ‘The Epicurean’ that ‘In our cheerful discourses, better than in the 
formal reasonings of the schools, is true wisdom to be found. In our friendly endearments, better than 
in the hollow debates of statesmen and pretended patriots, does true virtue display itself’ (Essays, 142). 
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when we contemplate it, the pleasure it brings about motivates us to praise it. By the 
same token, when an act is described by us as having utility or being useful, that is 
because its property of promoting public interests is discovered by us, thus our minds 
endow it with the quality of utility. Different virtues contribute to the public interest 
by different means. In the case of justice, one single act of justice usually renders 
individuals or the whole of society victims, if the general performance of this virtue 
is wanting. By contrast, the contribution of single act of benevolence to the interest 
of individuals and of society is not lessened by the absence of the general 
performance of it; its utility is visible as the consequence of every single act. This is 
the reason why Hume compares the difference between justice and benevolence to 
developing a vault and a wall: for the former, each stone would fall to the ground if 
the whole fabric is not supported by the mutual assistance and combination of its 
corresponding parts; for the latter, every stone heaped on a wall increases its height 
(EMP, 171).
23
 What is noteworthy is, if men were by nature indifferent to other 
people’s fate, where the altruistic propensity is not implanted in human nature, then 
when an act which contributes to the social welfare is observed by us, we would have 
no feelings about it, not to mention approval of it. Therefore, although utility in EPM 
seems to be taken by Hume as a principle by which various virtues are evaluated, 
what Hume is primarily concerned with is exploring the question ‘Why Utility 
Pleases?’, for in solving this question, Hume may then prove that men are by nature 
socially-oriented and other-regarding, and this is exactly the main thesis of EPM. As 
Professor Frederick Rosen remarks 
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 This is how Hume’s comparison of justice and benevolence to developing vault and wall is 
understood in general. For an alternative interpretation of this comparison, see Chapter Five. 
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The pleasure we obtain from utility is primarily social in nature. We take 
pleasure in practices, events, laws, and institutions, which are useful to 
society not only because we receive a benefit from such practices, etc., 
but also because we are pleased by the pleasure others take in such 
usefulness. Utility and humanity go hand in hand creating a force for 
morality in society. They prevail over selfishness and cruelty, because 
they provide many opportunities for pleasure and happiness (Rosen, 2003: 
39). 
Professor Rosen’s view lends further support to my observation, namely as 
with sympathy in the Treatise, utility in EPM is still primarily a psychological 
conception, thus in neither work Hume has changed his intention of developing a 
descriptive and explanatory theory of morals. Although the idea of utility has played 
a more significant role in Hume’s thought than in ancient and early modern 
philosophers, Hume ‘did not simply assume that we should approve of utility as a 
moral doctrine or imperative’, because it is not his attempt to provide a utilitarian 
ideology (Rosen, 2003: 36; 42). The same view is also endorsed by Ronald Glossop, 
who writes: 
In fact, Hume’s Enquiry is an attempt to empirically substantiate the 
validity of the utilitarian principle. Hume is not maintaining merely that 
spectators should approve of those qualities which tend to promote the 
happiness of humanity. He is trying to show that as a matter of fact those 
qualities which tend to promote the happiness of humanity are approved 
by disinterested spectators (Glossop, 1967: 536, quoted in Rosen, 2003: 
37).24 
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 For Glossop’s observation that Hume is quite aware of the distinction between analyzing what is 
happening when people use moral language and making his own recommendations, and has set 
himself to do the former rather than the latter, see also Glossop, 1976: 363. 
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The view that Hume’s philosophy is descriptive and explanatory is verified by 
Hume himself when he states at the beginning of Section 2 of EPM that 
But I forget, that it is not my present business to recommend generosity 
and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms 
of the social virtues. These, indeed, sufficiently engage every heart, on 
the first apprehension of them; and it is difficult to abstain from some 
sally of panegyric, as often as they occur in discourse or reasoning. But 
our object here being more the speculative, than the practical part of 
morals (EPM, 79, emphasis added). 
Hume’s distinction between the speculative and the practical part of morals is 
just another way of expressing the distinction he draws between anatomist and 
painter at the end of the Treatise. By describing his own role as a moral anatomist 
before the close of the Treatise, Hume hopes to eliminate his readers’ suspicion 
caused by their reading of an unconventional work of moral philosophy which does 
not instruct them in what ought to be performed.
25
 By reaffirming the nature of his 
theory as speculative rather than practical at the beginning of EPM, presumably 
Hume would like to avoid the suspicion roused in his readers by the earlier work and 
to assure his readers that, in this fundamental sense, he has not left his original 
intention behind and is sticking to the standpoint initiated in the Treatise, namely it is 
a scalpel rather than brush that he is holding.
26
 Nevertheless, the Treatise is still the 
                                                 
25
 By a detailed comparison between Hume’s text and that of Hutcheson’s, James Moore points out 
that Hume’s clarification of the difference between painter and anatomist in the Conclusion of the 
Treatise is properly a response to Hutcheson’s criticism (J. Moore, 1994: 38). 
26
 In EHU Hume’s distinction between and description of ‘easy and obvious’ philosophy on the one 
hand, and ‘accurate and abstruse’ philosophy on the other, as well as his attribution of his own system 
to the latter, also verify our observation here (EHU, 87-88). 
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best demonstration of Hume’s moral anatomy. Therefore, having observed the 
development of Hume’s thought between his two major works on morals, in the next 
chapter I will focus on the Treatise and try to defend Hume’s ethical naturalism. 
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Chapter 3 Anatomy of Human Nature 
3.1 Unsympathetic Criticisms of Hume 
Having shown the development of Hume’s thought between the Treatise and 
EPM, from now on I will further my exploration of Hume’s position in the Treatise 
and EPM respectively. By clarifying the implications of Hume’s moral anatomy in 
this chapter and his idea of utility in the next chapter, my purpose is to defend 
Hume’s ethical naturalism against the unsympathetic criticism from scholars such as 
L. A. Selby-Bigge, R. M. Hare, and G. E. Moore. This is part of the endeavour to 
recover the utilitarian interpretation of Hume’s political philosophy and the 
important role of conservative utilitarianism within British liberal political thought. 
A few paragraphs added to his works in order to explain to the readers the task 
of his philosophy were by no means the only cost to Hume for being faithful to a 
humble conception of moral philosophy. There was something more substantial 
Hume was due to pay. Hume is one of the most distinguished philosophers of British 
tradition, but in his life never held a philosophy chair or enjoyed the professional 
philosophical status that would now be accorded to him. It was not because Hume 
did not try, but because his controversial philosophical system as a moral skeptic 
prevented him from being appointed. In 1744 and 1752 respectively Hume applied 
for the Professorship at Edinburgh University and Glasgow University, but in both 
cases the opposition of the zealots such as clergy, William Wishart who was then the 
Principal of Edinburgh University, along with Professor Francis Hutcheson and 
Professor William Leechman of Glasgow University prevented his appointments 
(Mossner, 1980: chap. 12; 246-249). In 1752 Hume’s disappointment was brief, for 
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in the same year he was elected Librarian to the Faculty of Advocates at Edinburgh. 
In contrast, Hume seems to be more directly involved in the campaign for the 
Edinburgh chair. In the tense period of this campaign, Hume even published a 
‘hastily compos’d’ letter named A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in 
Edinburgh. In this letter Hume answered those charges against him since the 
publication of the Treatise, one of which accused him of ‘sapping the Foundations of 
Morality, by denying the natural and essential Difference betwixt Right and 
Wrong…making the Difference only artificial, and to arise from human Conventions 
and Contracts’ (quoted in Mossner, 1980: 630).27 Although Hume was eager for the 
dignified position, in his answer to the charge he only clarified rather than altered the 
arguments of the Treatise, which the zealots found offensive and problematic. In this 
defence of his system of morals, Hume demonstrated the affinity between his theory 
of moral sense and that of Hutcheson, a strategy not without practical consideration. 
Further, he elucidated the implication of drawing the distinction between natural and 
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 The philosophical opposition to Hume in 1744-1745 was spearheaded by Francis Hutcheson is a 
fact that never has been well reconciled with the contemporary view that Hume’s moral philosophy 
was heavily indebted to the sentimentalist theories of Hutcheson. Barry Stroud acknowledges 
Hutcheson’s influence on Hume, he states that Hume ‘agrees with the essential of Hutcheson’s theory 
of morality and aesthetics – in fact his work on morals contains many passages only loosely 
paraphrased from Hutcheson’s own writings’ (Stroud, 1977: 10). Charlotte Brown also regards Hume 
as a follower of Hutcheson in endorsing a spectator component in his theory, as contrast to a privilege 
of the agent component she observes in Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston (Brown, 2008: 219-
239). For a brief sketch of the debate between moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism, see W. D. 
Hudson, 1967: chap. 7. The alignment between Hume and Hutcheson has been contested by other 
scholars. For example, James Moore rejects the view that Hume is a Hutchesonean; he contrasts 
Hutcheson’s strong alliance with Stoic moralists with Hume’s alliance with Epicurean and Skeptic 
traditions (Moore, 1994: 23-57). See also Stephen Darwall, 1994: 58-82. Instead, Annette Baier 
argues that it is Shaftesbury who primarily influenced Hume (Baier, 2010: 214-250). 
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artificial virtues, and explained the reason why justice is categorised amongst the 
latter. 
Hume’s fame as a philosopher fared no better in the 19th century. In his short 
autobiography, My Own Life, Hume’s candid confession that ‘my love of literary 
fame, my ruling passion’ (My Own Life, xl) contributed to shape the general image of 
Hume as a thinker who lacked intellectual integrity, and the trajectory of Hume’s 
writings merely reflected his pursuit of literary fame. For example, T. H. Huxley 
argued that Hume ‘abandoned philosophy’ after the Treatise, ‘turning to those 
political and historical topics which were likely to yield, and did in fact yield a much 
better return of that sort of success which his soul loved’ (quoted in Passmore, 1980: 
3). Even in the 20
th
 century J. H. Randall Jnr. was able to comment sarcastically that 
‘Since he [i.e. Hume] couldn’t shock men by a new theory of science, he would try 
politics and religion’ (quoted in Passmore, 1980: 3). 
These unsympathetic criticisms of Hume provide a basis for my task in this 
chapter, namely to clarify Hume’s position by reflecting on Selby-Bigge’s account of 
Hume which is to be found in the ‘Introduction’ to Enquiries, a work I started to 
explore in the previous chapter. Since Selby-Bigge’s edition of Treatise and 
Enquiries have been a standard text adopted by many Hume scholars, the influence 
of his view should not be underestimated.
28
 Having indicated that Selby-Bigge 
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 John B. Stewart holds the same view in his reflection on Selby-Bigge’s ‘Introduction’, he writes: ‘In 
examining the relation between the Treatise and Enquiry II, I have undertaken to reply to some of the 
comments made by L. A. Selby-Bigge in his edition of the Enquiries. I have done this, not because his 
introduction is notably good, but because for over half a century it has stood as the introduction to the 
standard edition of these works’ (Stewart, 1973: 402 n.8). 
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misunderstood Hume’s idea of utility in EPM, I would like to focus on another 
fundamental question, namely Hume’s idea of justice as an artificial virtue. I will 
argue that an adequate understanding of the implication of Hume’s dichotomy 
between natural and artificial virtues is essential not only for interpreting the Treatise, 
but also for clarifying the relationship between the Treatise and EPM. Regarding this 
question, Selby-Bigge’s observation is as unsympathetic as other early critics of 
Hume, as he writes: 
In the Treatise he [i.e. Hume] insisted vigorously, though not very 
intelligibly, that justice was not a natural but only an artificial virtue, and 
it is pretty plain that he meant to be offensive in doing so. His argument 
in the Treatise was, to say the least, awkward, and he may have been glad 
to get rid of an ungainly and unnecessary discussion. In the Enquiry he 
dismisses the question in a few words as a vain one, and contents himself 
with pointing out the superior sociality of justice as compared with 
benevolence (Selby-Bigge, 1975: xxvii-xxviii). 
Selby-Bigge fails to capture the most significant difference between the 
Treatise and EPM, and due to this misconception, he therefore criticised Hume’s 
idea of justice in the Treatise, quoted above, as being offensive, awkward, and not 
very intelligible, ‘only’ artificial but not natural, and he believes this question was 
dismissed as vain in EPM for Hume may have been glad to avoid so unnecessary and 
ungainly a discussion. At this point I cannot agree with Selby-Bigge, and I will argue 
that had Selby-Bigge grasped Hume’s different intentions in composing the Treatise 
and EPM, then he might have realised that his criticism is unfair and inappropriate to 
the philosopher. 
First let us consider Selby-Bigge’s claim that Hume ‘in the Treatise insisted 
vigorously, though not very intelligibly, that justice was not a natural but only an 
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artificial virtue, and it is pretty plain that he meant to be offensive in doing so’. On 
the surface, it seems that this claim is not so incorrect of itself, as it represents the 
general reaction to Hume’s idea of justice (i.e. the one developed in the Treatise) 
from his general readers, and it has been long lasting from Hume’s time to that of 
Selby-Bigge, and still has impact on many scholars’ understanding of Hume’s 
philosophy today. As stated in Chapter Two, Hume regards his role in the Treatise as 
an anatomist of human nature whose purpose is to observe the constitution and 
operation of human psychology and, at the same time, to reveal the causal 
connections between human nature and moral phenomena. Just like an anatomist 
who faithfully records one’s observation of the structure of human body, the Treatise 
can be taken as Hume’s records of his observation of human psychology.29 As long 
as the rules which determine the operation of human psychology may be found by 
means of experience and observation, Hume can then trace the origins or causes of 
the moral phenomena back to human nature. This is not only the first and perhaps 
most fundamental step in his theoretical scheme of founding morality on a secular 
and empirical basis of human conventions, but also the reason why Hume was so 
proud of his discovery of the three principles of the association of ideas, including 
resemblance, contiguity, and causation.
30
 Based on Hume’s introspection and his 
observation of people’s conduct in their ordinary life, he found that these three rules 
regulate the operation of human imagination, which, according to Hume, is one 
                                                 
29
 J. B. Stewart vividly describes the Treatise as ‘the log-book of a daring voyage of discovery. The 
voyage is often rough, and the log, often terse’ (Stewart, 1973: 328). 
30
 In Abstract, Hume says that ‘if anything can entitle the author [i.e. Hume himself] to so glorious a 
name as that of an inventor, ’tis the use he makes of the principle of the association of ideas, which 
enters into most of his philosophy’ (Abstract, 416). 
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major faculty of human mind along with memory. Given that moral phenomena are 
the reflections of human mind,
31
 then by discovering the rules of the operation of 
human imagination, we find the causes and the rules of the moral world as well. To 
put it in another way, the idea of causation in the Treatise is not only a rule that 
regulates the connection of ideas in human minds, it also symbolises the relationship 
between the three books of the Treatise. That is, Hume takes Book III ‘Of Morals’ as 
the effects of his explanation of human understanding and passions in the first two 
books.
32
 For a wholly secular and naturalistic philosophical system, Hume’s attempt 
is to explain moral phenomena by means of the principles which he discovers 
regulate man’s rational and emotive faculties. As James King writes: 
Treatise III is an endeavour to account for moral distinctions on the basis 
of a theory of human nature. The elements of the explanation are, 
generally, perceptions and, specifically, what Hume calls the passions or 
the ‘springs and motives’; these elements are tied together according to 
dynamic principles, such as sympathy and association, in such a fashion 
                                                 
31
 For example, Hume writes in EPM that, if one is to neglect the difference between the utility of 
justice and the pernicious consequence of religious superstition, in essence they are not of great 
difference. One may lawfully nourish himself from this tree, but may not legally touch another tree of 
the same species ten paces away; a Syrian would rather starve than tasting pigeon and Egyptian would 
not have approached bacon. There is no difference between the nature of the trees, likewise the feature 
of holiness or baseness in not to be found in animals by scientist. In both cases, among many others, 
values are projected (or ‘imposed’, in Pufendorf’s term, see Forbes, 1975: 21) on to objects by human 
minds (EPM, 93-95). 
32
 We should keep in mind the sub-title Hume added to the Treatise which reveals his intention in that 
work, i.e. ‘Being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’. It 
seems that a sub-title like this corresponds to my view on the relation between three Books of the 
Treatise as stated here. On the other hand, the sub-title also implies that Hume always considered 
himself as a moralist and this original intention had never been changed. It is a goal of this thesis to 
justify this view. 
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as to yield a causal account of the moral distinctions or moral sentiments 
(King, 1976: 350).33 
Given the fact that causation is the central idea that pervades the whole book of 
the Treatise, it seems to me that the task which Hume is fulfilling in this work is 
essentially descriptive. This explains why ‘Of Morals’ is founded on the dichotomy 
of natural and artificial virtues. For in Hume’s causal explanation of moral 
phenomena, the natural virtues represent those derived directly from human instinct 
and impulse, while, on the other hand, there remain some virtues which men do not 
naturally perform before they were educated and socialised, like respecting those 
objects which belong to others, being loyal to the government, etc. Therefore, when 
Hume insists that justice is an artificial virtue, his concern is primarily to show that 
justice is not an effect which has a natural cause in human instinct, but the result of a 
process of socialisation and evolution which make men suitable for social life ‘by 
rubbing off those rough corners and untoward affections, which prevent their 
                                                 
33
 Hume’s remarks that ‘In giving a reason…for the pleasure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain 
vice or virtue’ (Treatise, 303) support the view that the purpose of the Treatise is to explain the 
constitution of morality by means of an account of human nature. 
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coalition’ (Treatise, 312).34 I hope this is sufficient to show that, contrary to Selby-
Bigge’s criticism, Hume’s strategy is in fact intelligible enough. 
3.2 Hume’s Anatomy of Human Nature 
Let us continue to consider the remainder of Selby-Bigge’s comments, in 
which he says that Hume’s idea of justice in the Treatise is awkward, and, in this 
way, the same theory did not appear in EPM because Hume would be happy to get 
rid of a theory which had embarrassed himself. In this respect I still cannot agree 
with Selby-Bigge, and it seems to me that the differences between Hume’s two major 
works on morals imply something of genuinely theoretical importance, rather than 
just a sign that the philosopher was forced to save himself from trouble under the 
pressure of social atmosphere or public opinion. To approach the matter obliquely, I 
would like to consider one famous passage in the Treatise that was generally 
believed to reveal Hume’s opinion on the relationship between factual assertions and 
moral judgments, and had caused many disputes among scholars. 
                                                 
34
 Not a few clues in the text show that Hume believes that the development of justice and human 
society reveals a process of human evolutions. For example, he says that ‘the chief impediment to this 
project of society and partnership lies in the avidity and selfishness of their natural temper; to remedy 
which, they enter into a convention for the stability of possession, and for mutual restraint and 
forbearance. I am sensible, that this method of proceeding is not altogether natural; but besides that I 
here only suppose those reflections to be form’d at once, which in fact arise insensibly and by degrees’ 
(Treatise, 322-323). Hume’s evolutionist view is more explicitly expressed at the beginning of an 
essay ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, where he writes that the evolution of man, whether 
psychologically or physiologically, belongs to a part of greater order of nature, and like other species 
of animals and plants, the progress of human history is inseparable with the evolution of nature 
(Essays, 377-378). In this way, Hume is described as a precursor of Darwin in the field of ethics 
(Hardin, 2007: 226). 
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At the end of the Treatise Book III Part I Section 1, after demonstrating that 
morality exists neither in any relations of ideas, nor in any matter of fact, Hume then 
concludes that morality is not an object of reason against the ethical rationalist such 
as Samuel Clark and William Wollaston who explain moral goodness in terms of 
conformity to some abstract rational relation (Buckle, 1991: 256). To verify his 
argument, Hume asks readers to consider a vicious act such as wilful murder. 
According to Hume, vice as a moral judgment exists not in the object, but is 
produced in the spectator when an act such as wilful murder is contemplated. Hume 
view is expressed in an important paragraph which I will quote at length: 
The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You 
never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and 
find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this 
action. Here is a matter of fact; but ’tis the object of feeling, not of reason. 
It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any 
action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the 
constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from 
the contemplation of it. Vice and Virtue, therefore, may be compar’d to 
sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, 
are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this 
discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a 
considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho’, like that too, 
it has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or 
concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; 
and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more 
can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour (Treatise, 
301-302). 
A number of important points are made by Hume in this paragraph, and it 
seems that clarifying them would directly contribute to our understanding of the 
controversial ‘is’ and ‘ought’ paragraph. 
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First, Hume asserts that virtue and vice, unlike solidity, extension, figure, or 
mobility, are not qualities in the objects; instead, they are perceptions produced by 
the objects in man, similar to other qualities such as sounds, colours, heat and tastes. 
In this sense, virtue and vice may be compared to the second qualities, to use Locke’s 
terminology (An Essay concerning Human Understanding bk. II chap. 8, hereafter 
Essay). Virtue and vice are particular kinds of pleasure or pain perceived by man’s 
moral sense. When an object causes ‘a satisfaction of a particular kind’ in man, it 
earns his praise or admiration; on the contrary, when a feeling of pain or uneasiness 
is felt, it becomes an object of man’s moral disapproval. Hume’s intention in 
rejecting the notion that man’s moral judgments are founded on ideas and asserting 
that they are derived from impressions is to assign this important task to man’s 
sentimental rather than rational faculty (Kemp, 1970: 32; Brown, 2008: 223-224). 
However, although morals are a matter of sentiment, Hume saying that the 
experiences man learns from daily life must soon convince him that virtue is based 
on the pleasure and vice on the pain,
35
 what requires a further explanation is the fact 
that the pleasure and pain we discuss here must be of a special kind. For, first, ‘under 
the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations, which are very different from each 
other’ (Treatise, 303). For instance, good music and a good wine both bring us 
pleasure, and the pleasures they produce are the only origins of their goodness. 
However, people do not normally describe the wine as harmonious and the music as 
of good flavour. Such is the proof of the different pleasures they produce. What is 
also noteworthy is that an inanimate object and a person may both bring us 
                                                 
35
 Hume says that ‘pain and pleasure, if not the causes of vice and virtue, are at least inseparable from 
them’ (Treatise, 194). 
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satisfaction, but normally we do not say that an inanimate object is virtuous. This, 
again, is a proof that moral judgments are based on a particular kind of feelings. 
Moreover, Hume goes on to argue that while various actions or characters of men 
cause the sentiment of pleasure or pain in us, not all of them deserve the name ‘moral 
judgments’, because not all of them can stand the test of generalisation. For example, 
in a time of war, the gallantry the enemy show on the field and the loyalty they swear 
to their country are damaging to my country, therefore they cause my condemnation 
when I am concerned only with my own interests. However, Hume would not agree 
that such condemnation equals a moral judgment, since it is derived from the concern 
for particular interest and will inevitably vary once my situation changes. Thus Hume 
concludes that ‘’Tis only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference 
to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it 
morally good or evil’ (Treatise, 303). In other words, only when man’s concern for 
self-interest is overcome by a general moral reflection can a moral judgment be 
reached; as in the case cited above, the loyalty and bravery of the enemy are 
esteemed virtuous by me, for they represent the virtues that every soldier should 
perform in the time of war. 
Second, let us consider the example of wilful murder that Hume cited. A man 
may murder another person for various motives, now here is a matter of fact before 
us: a person was murdered by another due to a dispute between them. When the 
situation is examined more carefully, we may find that the murderer was a worker in 
a factory, his wife and young children being fed by his meagre salary. One day the 
owner of the factory may have fired this worker for a very trivial reason. The worker 
thus may have argued with his employer and tried to fight for his own rights, but the 
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employer turned down his request indifferently. The worker, feeling humiliated and 
anxious for the life of his family, suddenly loses his self-control; he grabs a knife on 
the table and stabs the man who, as he believed, was going to ruin his life. In 
contemplating this case, we may perceive the murderer’s depression, anxiety, and 
anger; meanwhile, we may also perceive the employer’s arrogance, indifference, and 
the pain he suffers before his death. However, no matter how hard we survey the case, 
we can nowhere find the moral quality of vice which is usually ascribed to wilful 
murder. This is so because vice is the result of the moral condemnation which was 
aroused in us by our contemplation of the situation. We are likely to feel sympathetic 
towards the worker and his family, at the same time, we might detest the employer 
for being cold-blooded, but when we contemplate that the worker took the 
employer’s life as revenge, a particular feeling of uneasiness naturally arises in our 
bosoms which drives us to blame such an act and ascribe vice to it. This is precisely 
why Hume says that, in terms of moral quality of virtue or vice, ‘You never can find 
it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of 
disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action’. 
Based on this account of Hume’s theory of moral sentiment,36 here then comes 
a more complicated question, that is, what, if anything, distinguishes facts from 
values? This question is derived from the famous ‘is’ and ‘ought’ passage, however, 
it seems that before we look into the famous passage to clarify Hume’s view on this 
controversial issue, a clue is to be found in the final sentence of the paragraph quoted 
above, where Hume says ‘Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our 
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 For a recent strong defence of Hume’s sentimentalism, see Frazer, 2010. 
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own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and 
unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and 
behaviour’. 
First of all, more than once Hume asserts the fact observed by him in common 
life, namely that man is a natural hedonist and the operation of his mind has pleasure 
and pain as its impetus. For example, Hume says that ‘Nature has implanted in the 
human mind a perception of good or evil, or in other words, of pain and pleasure, as 
the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions’ (Treatise, 81). Similarly, 
Hume remarks in other place that  
The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or 
pain; and when these sensations are remov’d, both from our thought and 
feeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of 
desire or volition (Treatise, 367). 
According to Hume’s empiricist psychology, perceptions are only material of 
the mind. Perceptions may be divided into two kinds: impressions and ideas. 
Impressions still can be separated into two sorts: impressions of sensation and 
impressions of reflection. Impressions of sensation are the direct deliverance of the 
senses: experiences such as heat and cold, thirst and hunger, pleasure and pain, etc. 
(Treatise, 11). When impressions of sensation have faded from the mind, the faint 
copies they leave are what Hume terms ideas. An idea of pleasure or pain (i.e. the 
copy of impressions of sensation), when it again comes into the mind, produces new 
impressions of love and hatred, pride and humility, which are impressions of 
reflection, and are discussed in detail by Hume in Book II of the Treatise. As stated, 
pain and pleasure belong to the impressions of sensation, and what should be noted is 
that Hume regards them as objects of the study of natural rather than moral 
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philosophy, thus claiming that ‘The examination of our sensations belongs more to 
anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present 
be enter’d upon’ (Treatise, 11). Indeed, Hume believes that the impression of 
sensation ‘arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes’, and does not seem to 
express any interest in explaining the process by which these impressions are 
produced. In other words, Hume simply takes them as an instinctive capacity 
intrinsic to human nature. 
From this perspective, let us now return to the sentence quoted above, which 
seems clearly represent a process through which values are derived from facts. In the 
first part of the sentence, Hume says that ‘Nothing can be more real, or concern us 
more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness’. As has been explained, 
this sentence may be understood as meaning that the operation of the mind has 
pleasure and pain as its impetus. Second, in the sentence that follows, Hume says that 
‘and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice’. Again, as has been 
explained, the impressions of pleasure and pain are produced, first and foremost, by 
the physiology of mankind, and they represent a capacity which is implanted in 
human beings by nature. Now, following the functioning of such a capacity, we are 
led to approve an act or character and ascribe virtue to it, or to disapprove an act or 
character and condemn it to be vicious, due to the particular kind of pleasures or 
pains they caused in us. As a result, to combine the above two points, norms are thus 
derived from the feature of human physiology which prescribe human conduct, i.e. 
we perform acts which bring us pleasure and which are thus regarded as virtuous, 
and, meanwhile, we abstain from committing those acts which would produce in us 
pain and, on that account, are vicious to us. This is presumably why Hume ends the 
86 
 
sentence by saying that ‘no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct 
and behaviour’ (emphasis added). In short, according to Hume, men are by nature 
capable of performing moral acts. 
It seems that what is particularly important here is noticing the perspective 
from which Hume makes this observation. As stated, pain and pleasure, like our 
perceptions of heat, colour, and voice are the direct deliverance of the senses. They 
are, as Hume believes, derived directly from the physical constitution of human 
beings. Therefore, to reveal how we perceive pain and pleasure is not unlike a 
research into the constitution of our organs such as ears and eyes, those secrets being 
unveiled by natural philosopher and physical anatomist. From this we may infer that 
‘a man feels pleasure or pain’ is a factual statement, not unlike ‘a man hears a voice’. 
Moreover, as Hume teaches us, men are by nature attracted by pleasure and repelled 
by pain, therefore we are by nature attracted by virtue which cause pleasure in us and 
repelled by vice which make us feel uneasy. So far, Hume is still making a factual 
statement. What, then, is the consequence when we follow our nature as Hume 
observes here? It is the rise of moral distinctions, i.e. the distinction between good 
and evil. That is to say, we naturally approbate an act performed by others which 
raises pleasure in us, and blame others’ act for it makes us feel uncomfortable. What 
is shown here is the process by which a moral judgment is derived from men’s 
natural, physical constitution. When we praise one’s act or character, that means we 
are attracted by the particular pleasure it makes us feel; conversely, when we blame 
one’s act or character, that means the particular pain it causes in us make us detest it. 
Given that Hume believes that pain and pleasure are the chief impetus and moving 
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principles of men’s actions, i.e. men tend to pursue pleasure and avoid pain by nature, 
from this it follows that men naturally pursue virtue and avoid vice. 
One problem is, an act may bring us pleasure but make others feel painful. For 
example, even in a house where a gathering is held for a group of non-smokers, 
smoking brings a smoker pleasure as usual. It is only when the smoker feels the 
uneasiness which the non-smokers feel by means of sympathy that he judges his own 
behaviour to be bad and thus restrains himself from performing it. As Charlotte 
Brown remarks, 
Hume’s theory also has the resources to explain why we try to live up to 
the moral ideal. Sympathy ensures that we will inherit other people’s 
moral judgments about us, which, in turn, pressures us to see ourselves as 
others see us. If we fall short of the moral ideal by having a trait that is 
harmful or disagreeable to others, but not to ourselves, sympathy will get 
us to disapprove of it. Sympathy may go so far as to make us disapprove 
of our own vices, even when they are beneficial to us (Brown, 2008: 237). 
As Stroud notes, men’s passions in Hume’s observation are ‘contagious’ 
(Stroud, 1977: 196), or as Russell Hardin writes ‘It is psychological mirroring that 
leads me to like or dislike something that is done to you, by letting me sense what 
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you enjoy or suffer’ (Hardin, 2007: 42).37  Indeed, the capacity of psychological 
mirroring is a major discovery of Hume, as he notes in the Treatise that 
the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they 
reflect each other’s emotions, but also because those rays of passions, 
sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away 
by insensible degrees (Treatise, 236).  
The conception of sympathy in the Treatise represents a psychological capacity, 
based on which Hume develops general morality from thoroughly secular and 
empirical facts of human nature without appealing to a priori.
38
 It is by means of 
sympathy that men’s sociability and their subjective, individual emotive reactions are 
communicated and influence each other’s thought or even behaviour, and a 
psychological foundation based on intersubjectivity is thus formed for moral 
judgments. In this respect Haakonssen writes that 
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 Hume’s affirmation of men’s psychological mirroring is, in a way, corroborated by the 
contemporary neurophysiological evidence from fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) 
studies of the brain’s reaction to others’ sensation. What is interesting is that neurophysiological 
findings do not seem to do more than Hume already did; they verify Hume’s claim but the mechanism 
is not yet thoroughly clear (See Hardin, 2007: 41-45; Frazer, 2012: 169-170). It is also interesting to 
notice that the obstacle of the development of science had been forecasted by Hume when he says that 
‘tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our 
experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still 
certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate 
original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical’ 
(Treatise, 5). 
38
 For an affirmation of interpersonal communication of feelings by contemporary social psychologist, 
see, for example, Aronson, 1999: chap. 8. Aware or not, the procedure of communication as described 
by Aronson on p. 419 of his work is highly analogous with Hume’s account of the operation of 
sympathy in the Treatise. See, for example, Treatise: 207-208. 
89 
 
On the one hand morality is a matter of the passions, and hence to be 
dealt with within the framework of his [i.e. Hume’s] associationist 
scheme of the human mind. But at the same time the mind is seen not just 
as acting, but as interacting with other minds. For Hume, as well as for 
Smith, morality is not primarily accounted for in terms of the person 
acting and the subject of his action, but in terms of the reaction of the 
observer of men’s dealings with each other. Morality thus arises out of 
such triadic relationships (Haakonssen, 1981: 4). 
The conception of human nature which Hume displays is a pluralist one,
39
 and 
as I have tried to show, this can be viewed as his attempt to find a middle way 
between the selfish school such as Hobbes and Mandeville, and the moral sense 
theory like Hutcheson and Shaftesbury. In Hume’s view, although men are by nature 
benevolent, what is equally obvious is that they love themselves more than anyone 
else. Whether the tendency of men’s selfishness to be stronger or weaker than their 
benevolence is not the most significant issue, the point is that so long as men’s 
selfishness is recognised as a fact, the imperfection or partiality of human nature is 
thus acknowledged. Since men are partial, they tend to be seduced by the immediate 
interests in each particular instance while ignoring the fact that, without a general 
and stable standard of morals, society would never be formed and everyone would 
suffer from that primitive and isolated condition. This presumably is the reason why 
artificial virtues such as justice, allegiance, and fidelity are important, for they are 
invented to suppress the natural defects of mankind and make a decent social life 
possible. To be brief, these virtues exist for men’s natural defects; the consequence 
of the observance of artificial virtues is to bring men’s partiality under control and 
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 See also Darwell, 1994: 67, and Balog, 1990: 198. Elisabeth Radcliffe describes Hume’s Treatise as 
the most systematic presentation of philosophical empiricism (Radcliffe, 2008: 3). 
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prevent them from doing harm to each other. In this way, it is not their purpose to 
give rise to any positive good; Adam Smith famously describes justice as ‘a negative 
virtue’, and remarks that ‘We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still 
and doing nothing’ (Smith, 1982: 82). Moreover, it is not inconceivable that virtues 
such as justice, in a sense, can only emerge artificially, given the fact that the 
impartiality they embody are in conflict with the partiality of human nature, and are 
invented by human artifices to restrain it. 
From the above observation it follows that, on the one hand, Hume’s intention 
of writing that ‘Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own 
sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and 
unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and 
behaviour’, and on the other, more generally, Hume’s intention of composing the 
Treatise, was to provide a naturalistic foundation of morality. Hume indicates that 
the formation of moral judgment involves both a physiological and a psychological 
process; exploration of the former belongs to the work of the natural philosopher and 
physical anatomist, while being a moral philosopher and a moral anatomist such as 
himself, Hume’s mission is to reveal the latter process truthfully. Therefore Hume 
did not deny that the Treatise ‘wants a certain Warmth in the Cause of Virtue’, since, 
as he said, ‘I forbear insisting on this subject’, for ‘Such reflections requires a work 
apart, very different from the genius of the present’ (Treatise, 395). What is more, 
Hume says just few paragraphs earlier that 
Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the 
human mind, may defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority; 
but want the advantage, which those possess, who account for that sense 
by an extensive sympathy with mankind. According to the latter system, 
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not only virtue must be approv’d of, but also the sense of virtue: And not 
only that sense, but also the principles, from whence it is deriv’d. So that 
nothing is presented on any side, but what is laudable and good (Treatise, 
394). 
Hume clearly indicates in this paragraph that to explore the origins of morals 
and to preach morals can be conducted only in two distinct systems. The former 
provides an accurate description of the psychological process from which virtues are 
originated, but its disadvantage lies in that it does not encourage people to be 
virtuous. Whereas the latter, based on the psychological facts provided by the former, 
paints fascinating colours on those facts and contributes to the promotion of virtues. 
For the work of a painter, not only is the beauty of virtues manifested, but also the 
sense of virtue, which is a natural faculty of men, along with the principle on which 
this sense depends, i.e. sympathy, obtaining moral beauty because of their positive 
roles in forming moral judgments.
40
 Now this distinction does not perfectly match 
Hume’s intention of composing the Treatise and EPM, because, as stated, he regards 
his mission in both works as exploring the speculative part of morals. However, the 
point is Hume’s description of the practical enterprise of morals has provided some 
important clues for us to judge how far he has been successful in sticking to the role 
as a moral anatomist in EPM. For example, sympathy in EPM has lost its special 
function as in the Treatise and is treated by Hume as a social feeling not dissimilar 
from benevolence and friendship. Whether this phenomenon matches Hume’s 
description of a normative work, that not only virtues, but also moral sense and the 
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 For a discussion of the connection between moral judgment and sympathy on which the former is 
based, see Frazer, 2010: esp. chap. 2. 
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principle of sympathy are approved of, and that ‘nothing is presented on any side, but 
what is laudable and good’, is worth considering when Hume’s philosophy is 
evaluated. The view advanced here is still that Hume’s EPM, unlike the Treatise, 
implies certain normative tendencies, and this is the price Hume is liable to pay in 
order to distinguish himself from Hobbes or the selfish-egoist school. However, in 
any case, Selby-Bigge’s comments, that Hume did not reassert the artificiality of 
justice in EPM because he would be happy to get rid of a theory and dismiss the 
question as vain which had embarrassed himself, is by no means the most adequate 
reading available to us of Hume’s two works. 
3.3 MacIntyre’s Defence of Hume Ethical Naturalism 
We are now in a position to try to interpret the controversial ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 
passage, and to see if the examination we have done above will contribute to our 
understanding of it. In this section I will concentrate on the passage and introduce a 
debate arising from its interpretation, and in the next section I will provide an 
account of Hume’s intention in that passage by referring to EHU. It seems to me that, 
although the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ passage appears only in the Treatise, Hume’s own view 
on this relevant issue is expressed again in a different but more explicit manner in 
EHU. From his argument in that later work we may discern that the target of Hume’s 
criticism is who he calls religious philosophers, among which John Locke is likely to 
be a target of Hume’s reflection. It will also be shown that the intentions behind the 
controversial passage in the Treatise and behind the two sections on miracles and on 
providence in EHU are identical, i.e. they both reveal Hume’s attempt to secure a 
secular foundation for morals and to confine the role of moral philosopher to its 
proper realm, that is, the speculative part of morals. 
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Now this is what Hume writes in the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ passage: 
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, 
perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, 
which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author 
proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes 
the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; 
when of a sudden I am surpris’d to find, that instead of the usual 
copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that 
is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, 
or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary 
that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a 
reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how 
this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I 
shall presume to recommend it to the reader; and am perswaded, that this 
small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let 
us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the 
relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason (Treatise, 302). 
As Alasdair MacIntyre says, how we take what Hume says about ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ would result in different interpretations of Hume’s moral thought in general 
(MacIntyre, 1968: 264), and it appears that one can derive something from this 
passage to support his view whether it is for or against ethical naturalism. For 
example, R. M. Hare’s view seems to represent a mainstream interpretation of 
Hume’s position in this passage. According to Hare, this passage should be treated as 
representing Hume’s rejection of deriving moral conclusion from non-moral 
premises. Hare thinks that Hume had founded his rejection of such argument on the 
general logical principle that a valid argument cannot proceed from premises to some 
‘new affirmation’ not contained in the premises. This follows that an ‘ought’ cannot 
be derived from an ‘is’ given that moral judgments contain an element which is not 
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equivalent to anything in the conjunction of the premises. Hare describes this as 
‘Hume’s Law’ (Hare, 1972: 43-44; 20). Moreover, Hare argues that the ethical 
theories which challenge this law are known as naturalism. The term ‘naturalism’ has 
been used in a variety of ways,
41
 but here Hare’s usage is appropriate for our purpose: 
‘an ethical theory is naturalistic if, and only if, it holds that moral judgments are 
equivalent in meaning to statements of non-moral fact’ (Hare, 1972: 44).42 In other 
words, Hare takes Hume’s position against naturalism, but this view has not 
convinced MacIntyre. 
MacIntyre indicates that, if Hare’s interpretation of Hume is correct, ‘then the 
first breach of Hume’s law was committed by Hume’, for the development of 
Hume’s own moral theory does not square with what he is taken to assert about ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’ (MacIntyre, 1968: 242). According to MacIntyre, it would be very odd if 
Hume did uphold the logical irrelevance of facts to moral judgments, for the whole 
difference in atmosphere between Hume’s discussions of morality and those of 
Hare’s springs from the former’s interest in the facts of morality. MacIntyre goes on 
to say that Hume’s work is full of anthropological and sociological remarks: ‘so far 
as his moral theory is concerned, the sociological comments have a necessary place 
in the whole structure of argument’ (MacIntyre, 1968: 247). MacIntyre takes Hume’s 
account of justice as example and quotes a passage from the Treatise: 
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 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter Four below. 
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 This corresponds to Jonathan Harrison’s definition of ethical naturalism when he says that ‘The 
view that denies this prima facie distinction between establishing facts about the world as it is and 
making a moral estimate of the facts is called “ethical naturalism”’ (Harrison, 1993 vol.1: 177). 
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But however single acts of justice may be contrary, either to public or to 
private interest, ’tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly 
conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support of society, 
and the well-being of every individual. ’Tis impossible to separate the 
good from the ill. Property must be stable, and must be fix’d by general 
rules. Tho’ in one instance the public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is 
amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the 
peace and order, which it establishes in society (Treatise, 319). 
MacIntyre argues that this passage has three layers: first, Hume is asserting that 
it is logically appropriate to justify the rules of justice in terms of interest; second, 
Hume is also asserting a sociological point that to observe such rules as a matter of 
fact are conducive to public interest; third, such rules are morally justified because 
they are conducive to public interest. If the justification of the rules of justice lies in 
the fact that their observance is to everyone’s long-term interest, then this is to derive 
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. 
However, it may be argued that Hume only appears to contravene his own 
prohibition, because we may suppose that Hume’s argument is defective in the same 
way to Bishop R. C. Mortimer’s, and may attempt to repair it in the way Nowell-
Smith repaired the other. In Ethics, Nowell-Smith quotes from Bishop Mortimer the 
following passage: ‘The first foundation is the doctrine of God the Creator. God 
made us and all the world. Because of that He has an absolute claim on our 
obedience. We do not exist in our own right, but only as His creatures, who ought 
therefore to do and be what He desires’ (Nowell-Smith, 1954: 37-38 n). On this 
Nowell-Smith comments that the inference that ‘God created us, therefore we ought 
to obey him’, is defective unless and until it is supplied with a major premise, ‘We 
ought to obey our creator’. Similarly, when we observe Hare asserting that a moral 
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conclusion is reached syllogistically, the minor premise stating ‘what we should in 
fact be doing if we did one or other of the alternatives open to us’ and the major 
premise stating a principle of conduct, his strategy is no different from Nowell-Smith. 
This view is criticised by MacIntyre in two aspects. On the one hand, 
MacIntyre thinks that it is based on an assumption that arguments must be either 
deductive or defective, but it is due to the same assumption that Hume shows his 
skepticism about induction. For example, we can pass from ‘The kettle has been on 
the fire for ten minutes’ to ‘So it will be boiling by now’ by way of some such major 
premise as ‘When kettles have been on the fire for ten minutes, they boil’. But if our 
problem is that of justifying induction, then this major premise itself embodies an 
inductive assertion that stands in need of justification. If, then, it is pointless to 
present inductive arguments as deductive, there seems to be no special reason in the 
case of moral arguments for attempting to present them as deductive. On the other 
hand, if one somehow ignores the suggestion mentioned above and deems Hume’s 
argument defective in the way that Bishop Mortimer’s is and intends to repair it in 
the way Nowell-Smith repairs the other, then the transition from the minor premise, 
‘Obedience to this rule would be to everyone’s long-term interest’, to the conclusion, 
‘We ought to obey this rule’, would be made by means of the major premise, ‘We 
ought to obey whatever is to everyone’s long-term interest’. However, MacIntyre 
thinks that this is not a proper defence of Hume, and the problem lies in the major 
premise. For in Hume’s theory of justice, the notion of ‘ought’ is equivalent to the 
obedience to certain rules, while the existence of these rules presupposes the 
functioning of the idea of reciprocity, i.e. one is willing to restrain one’s impulsive 
desire for goods and seek to satisfy it in a manner that does not cause clash, provided 
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others will do the same. The idea of reciprocity functions when every member of the 
society recognises that their private interests can be fulfilled only in a stable and 
ordered society framed by the rules of justice. In other words, public interests must 
be secured before each individual could safely pursue their own interests, and this is 
the origin of justice.
43
 In other words, in Hume’s theory of justice, an ‘ought’ 
represents the obedience to certain rules which implies a consensus on a public 
interest. In this way, according to MacIntyre, to say that ‘we ought to do what is in 
the common interest’ would be ‘either to utter an aphoristic and misleading truism or 
else to use the term “ought” in a sense quite other than that understood by Hume’ 
(MacIntyre, 1968: 249). From this it follows that the locution ‘We ought to obey 
whatever is to everyone’s long-term interest’ could not lay down a moral principle 
which might figure as a major premise in the type of syllogism which Hare and 
Nowell-Smith describe. 
The aim of MacIntyre’s essay is to oppose Hare’s formal interpretation of 
Hume’s passage, and to show the prominent feature of Hume’s moral thought which 
is to manifest the connection between morality and men’s factual psychology. 
MacIntyre has provided more evidence to support his view. He says, first, Hume 
does not actually say that one cannot pass from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ but only that it 
‘seems altogether inconceivable’ how this can be done. It would be odd if we take 
Hume to mean that ‘observations concerning human affairs’ could not lead to moral 
judgments, since such observations are so constantly used by Hume himself. Second, 
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 As will be explained in more details in Chapters Five and Six, I will try to suggest that the idea of 
reciprocity does not exhaust the essence of Hume’s theory of justice, and some other important factors 
which seem implicit in Hume’s observation of human nature must also be taken into consideration. 
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the force of the passage as it is commonly taken depends on what seems to be its 
manifest truth: ‘is’ cannot entail ‘ought’. However ‘the notion of entailment is read 
into the passage’, for the word Hume uses is ‘deduction’, and in ordinary 18th 
Century use this was likely to be synonymous with ‘inference’ rather than 
‘entailment’. MacIntyre thus indicates that Hume in the celebrated passage does not 
mention entailment, ‘What he does is to ask how and if moral rules may be inferred 
from factual statements’, and the rest of Book III of the Treatise is to address this 
question (MacIntyre, 1968: 253-254). What, then, is Hume’s answer? According to 
MacIntyre, it is men’s emotional reactions. MacIntyre cites an example to show how 
valid inferences can be made from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’: ‘If I stick a knife in Smith, 
they will send me to jail; but I do not want to go to jail; so I ought not to (had better 
not) stick a knife in him’ (MacIntyre, 1968: 256). One might reply without a doubt 
that this is a valid inference, but it also is a perfectly ordinary entailment relying 
upon the major premise ‘If it is the case that if I do x, the outcome will be y, then if I 
don’t want y to happen, I ought not to do x’. MacIntyre says that there are good 
reasons for not treating the argument in question as entailment; the most important 
one being that by so doing the way in which the transition within the argument is in 
fact made is obscured. For the transition from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ is made in this inference 
by the notion ‘wanting’, other concepts which can form such bridge notions between 
‘is’ and ‘ought’ include: needing, desiring, pleasure, happiness, health, etc., that is, in 
a word, man’s passions. Apart from these concepts, MacIntyre suggests, the moral 
notions are unintelligible. 
To sum up, one point of MacIntyre’s reconstruction of Hume’s famous passage 
is that ‘we can connect the facts of the situation with what we ought to do only by 
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means of one of those concepts which Hume treats under the heading of the 
passions’, and for this reason, Hume should not be understood as trying to say that 
morality lacks a basis, on the contrary, ‘he is trying to point out the nature of that 
basis’ (MacIntyre, 1968: 261).44 MacIntyre’s view agrees with my analysis of the 
important passage preceding the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ paragraph as showed in the last 
section, i.e. Hume has not denied that values can be derived from facts. Later, in 
EHU, Hume put his view in a more explicit manner by arguing that ‘The experienced 
train of events is the great standard, by which we all regulate our conduct’ (EHU, 
194). Indeed Hume attempted to show that whatever norms are observable in human 
society, they all originate from human nature, that is, from the factual mechanism of 
human physiology and psychology, thus the sentence above quoted from EHU 
continues ‘Nothing else can be appealed to in the field, or in the senate. Nothing else 
ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet’ (EHU, 194). This is why 
one-third of the Treatise is devoted to the account of man’s emotional reactions, for 
they are without doubt the factual function of man’s natural constitution, but at the 
same time, they have the effect of regulating man’s behaviours as well. Unless this is 
acknowledged, we would be unable to explain the existence of various social norms 
and institutions in human society. From this viewpoint, the authors of the moral 
systems are criticised by Hume in the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ passage mainly because they 
cannot pass from their observations of human affairs or assertion of the existence of 
God to the moral statements while paying no attention to the psychological process 
which takes place between and thus bridges the two. The point therefore is, this 
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presumably is Hume's intention, so long as the authors took men’s emotional 
reactions into account they would find that any appeal to a supreme being is simply 
redundant, for that contributes nothing significant other than Hume's view that 
human nature is the sole origin of morals, except those derived from imagination and 
conceit. 
3.4 Fountain of the Question: Hume’s Criticism of Religious Philosophy 
The point made at the end of the previous section is implicit in the ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ passage and is the underlying argument of the Treatise, but when EHU was 
published in 1749, it turns out that, this time, Hume’s view is clearly stated in two 
sections named ‘Of Miracles’ and ‘Of a Particular Providence and Of a Future State’. 
When we reflect on the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ passage by referring to these sections, it 
seems Hume’s main concern is obvious to us. That is, he is primarily criticising the 
fallacy committed by the religious authors who, after affirming ‘the being of a God’ 
thence establish a normative moral theory, the purpose of which is to create an order 
in the human world more perfect than the existing one. In EHU Hume’s attack on the 
fallacy of religious philosophers is twofold. On the one hand, Hume challenges the 
credibility of the Christian scripture, a work mainly founded on testimony, by 
showing the weakness of its foundation as incompatible with the experience of 
common people. On the other hand, Hume shows the logical fallacy of religious 
systems. He advances a fundamental principle that ‘The knowledge of the cause 
being derived solely from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted to each other’ 
(EHU, 191). Accordingly, the authors who imagine that the creator ‘must produce 
something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full 
of ill and disorder’ have committed the logical fallacy and have founded their 
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theories on no other foundation than conjecture and hypothesis, which Hume thinks 
is more the work of poets and priests than philosophers. By observing his criticism of 
religious philosophy, we are brought to see the main shortages Hume detects in 
normative theories; in other words, having affirmed that Hume intends his theory to 
be descriptive, we will now explore his reason. 
In Section 10 ‘Of Miracles’ Hume’s strategy is clear. First, Hume deprives 
religion of its holy feature and attributes it to matter of fact, that is, to causal law. 
Given that most religions are established on the basis of testimony, Hume argues that 
testimony, not unlike our other experiences of matter of fact, is also subject to the 
causal law: it is founded on the principle of probability; there is uncertainty implied 
in it and it may not always be true. Second, once the nature of religion that is subject 
to men’s judgment is made clear, Hume then strengthens his attack by indicating that 
the testimony which involves miracles can by no means be accepted by most people 
to be true so long as they are evaluated against their ‘regular experience and 
observation’ as accumulated in the daily life. The reason why many people are 
convinced of the truth of such testimony is because of the weakness of human nature. 
To observe how this weakness and its connection with religious superstition are 
exposed by Hume would help us to realise Hume’s optimistic attitude towards the 
progress of civilisation and the development of trade and art as expressed in Essays. 
For Hume, the progress of human civilisation and the prosperity of trade, knowledge, 
and art of a society are the most ideal and natural way of liberating men from 
ignorance and superstition. On such issues, the progressivism implied in Hume’s 
view on human history seems clear. The essence of human nature has not changed 
under different historical conditions, as Hume believes the essence of human nature 
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to be constant and general. It is just that different social and economic circumstances 
tend to elicit and moderate different attributes of human nature. For example, were 
natural resources not scarce relative to men’s endless desires, perhaps the selfishness 
of human nature would have been much less obvious to us, since the competition for 
resources would no longer be necessary for men’s survival. Likewise the 
development of art and knowledge does not have the effect of eliminating men’s 
fancy for the miraculous, but it could reduce this tendency to the lowest degree by 
enlightening men and by making them incredulous. The progress of human history in 
this direction is, for Hume, the consequence compatible with and motivated by the 
natural sociability of mankind. This is an important reason why the idea of 
sociability is crucial to my interpretation of Hume. 
Hume observes that the nature of most religion is the testimony of barbarians 
in ancient ages, and he is surprised to find that, even in court the judges with most 
authority, accuracy, and judgment often find themselves at a loss to distinguish 
between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions (EHU, 183), however, people 
never entertain any suspicion that the miraculous testimony derived from ancient age 
can ever be false, since their passions have been engaged in these ‘forged miracles, 
and prophecies, and supernatural events’. Of this phenomenon, Hume provides a 
series of analyses and powerful criticism. First, Hume argues that, when we are 
judging the truth of other people’s testimony and reports, there are several factors we 
normally take into account, such as ‘the opposition of contrary testimony’, ‘the 
manner of their delivering their testimony’, ‘the character or number of the witness’, 
etc. In other words, when the witnesses contradict each other, when their number is 
too small and their character doubtful, and when they deliver their testimony either 
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with hesitation or with too violent assertions, we entertain suspicion concerning the 
testimony. None of these factors requisite for giving us full assurance in the 
testimony of men, according to Hume’s investigation, is available in history. 
Secondly, Hume points out the weaknesses of human nature which are closely 
connected with religious superstition and frequently serve to strengthen each other, a 
phenomenon that constitutes the origin of Hume’s detest of superstition and 
regarding it more pernicious than factional enthusiasm. For unlike the latter, which 
promotes men’s boldness and ambition and is naturally accompanied by a spirit of 
liberty, the former renders men tame and abject and fits them for slavery, thus is an 
enemy to civil liberty (Essays, 78). The weaknesses enumerated by Hume as 
inseparable from superstition are many, such as fear, melancholy, ignorance (Essays, 
74), inclination to lie, and so on, among which, the agreeable ‘passion of surprise 
and wonder’, or as Hume sometimes puts it, the strong propensity to the 
extraordinary and the marvellous, motivates men to receive and spread intelligence 
without reflection. When this passion is combined with the spirit of religion, ‘there is 
an end of common sense’ and human testimony has lost all its authority (EHU, 175). 
Hume’s highly cautious attitude towards religious and normative philosophical 
doctrines, and the role of his skepticism as meant by him as a weapon with which to 
overthrow those philosophical systems based on men’s tendency of credulity – after 
which a descriptive theory founded on human nature is provided by him – is explicit 
in his criticism of religion: 
A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no 
reality: He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, 
with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a 
cause: Or even where this delusion has no place, vanity, excited by so 
strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of 
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mankind in any other circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. 
His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment 
to canvass his evidence: What judgment they have, they renounce by 
principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects: Or if they were ever 
so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the 
regularity of its operations. Their credulity encreases his impudence: And 
his impudence overpowers their credulity (EHU, 175). 
Thirdly, Hume's progressivism is revealed by his contrasting the ancient with 
the enlightened ages, and attributing the origin of miracles to men’s ‘ignorance and 
stupidity’ in the former during which time they were ‘ready to swallow even the 
grossest delusion’ (EHU, 177). According to Hume, that all supernatural and 
miraculous events chiefly abounded among ignorant and barbarous nations is strong 
evidence against the truthfulness of testimony. Even if they were received by 
civilised people, these people usually received them from ignorant and barbarous 
ancestors with the inviolable sanction which always attend established opinions. To 
judge from the fact that ‘Prodigies, omens, oracles, judgments…grow thinner every 
page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages’, we learn that ‘there 
is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case’, but are all derived from ‘the usual 
propensity of mankind towards the marvellous’ (EHU, 176). As we will see more 
clearly in the following chapters, Hume’s objection to taking traditional values for 
granted poses a challenge to scholars who interpret him as a conservative. Against 
the traditionalist interpretation, I will try to show that it is moral conventionalism 
which Hume inherited from Locke that represents his views more accurately. In the 
remainder of the same section, Hume then introduces several well-known miracles in 
the profane history and indicates that no matter how reliable the source and content 
of the testimony are, he would nevertheless stick to the view that ‘the knavery and 
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folly of men are such common phenomena’. In this way, the falsehood of the 
testimony can hardly be more miraculous than the miracle itself, so after weighing its 
probability, Hume would reject almost all violations of the course of nature. Before 
the end of the section Hume turns his criticism to the Christian religion. He describes 
the scripture as a book presented by ‘a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an 
age when they were still more barbarous’. After enumerating some of the prodigies 
and miracles the scripture contains, such as an account of a state of the world and of 
human nature entirely different from the present, of men’s fall from that state, and of 
the destruction of the world by deluge, he then asks the readers to ‘lay his hand upon 
his heart’ and consider seriously whether the falsehood of such a book would be 
more miraculous than all the miracles it relates. 
In Section 11 ‘Of a Particular Providence and Of a Future State’ Hume’s attack 
on religion continues, and the main argument is to defend a secular moral theory by 
pointing out the logical fallacy of religious systems. That is, their account of the 
cause has not been proportioned to the effect, as a consequence, they illegally add 
something to the effect which is nothing but conjecture and hypothesis. What worries 
Hume is that some religionists regard themselves as controlling the only path to the 
truth and perfection, and thus mean to dominate the vulgar’s moral life. For Hume, it 
makes no difference whether religionists are motivated by greediness, vanity, or faith, 
because the price the society is due to pay for this blind and flaming superstition is 
inevitably enormous. In the sphere of morals, no one may rightfully claim to be 
superior to the rest. Every practical individual should learn and is free to paint his 
own ideal moral landscape; the consequence of men’s superstition along with 
religionist’s regarding their painting as the only one worth living is usually 
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catastrophic. Motivated by his concern, Hume points out in this section that, so long 
as the logical fallacy of inferring a cause which is not in proportion to an effect and 
further ascribing those extravagant qualities to the effect is to be prevented, the 
religious system is in no way more advantageous than a secular moral system, except 
vainly ‘tortur[ing] one’s brain’ to justify the course of nature upon suppositions and 
hypotheses. In this way, Hume’s attack on the religious systems is consequentialist, 
and this challenges Hare’s formal interpretation of the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ passage. That 
is to say, Hume has no intention of denying the freedom of thought that an individual 
has of tracing the existing social order to whatever cause he finds suitable and 
convincing, since this freedom is indispensable to a liberal and plural society in 
which Hume’s own though is cultivated. What Hume is arguing is that when one 
regards his work as philosophical rather than poetical, when he intends his reasoning 
to be just, then the cause he provides must be proportioned to the effect that he 
observes. Therefore, Hume writes: ‘A body of ten ounces raised in any scale may 
serve as a proof, that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never 
afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred’ (EHU, 190). To the extent that this 
principle is observed, religionists ought not and need not come backward from the 
inferred causes to the effects, ‘since it is impossible for you to know any thing of the 
cause, but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the 
effect’ (EHU, 193). Accordingly, a science of human nature is a philosophical 
system with most utility, for it wastes no time and spirits on those subjects purely 
hypothetical and imaginary. This is why Hume attacks religious systems primarily 
for their being uncertain, as the subject lies beyond human experience; and for their 
being useless, as no matter how perfect the supreme being is presumed to be, 
religionists can never trace back from the cause to the effect and make additions to 
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the experienced course of nature or ‘establish any new principles of conduct and 
behaviour’ (EHU, 194). 
Another important clue concerning Hume’s position that can be drawn from 
this section is Hume again confirming the speculative nature of philosophy and 
objecting to the attempt which regards philosophy as the servant of practical 
enterprise, whether political or religious. The section was skilfully written in the 
style of dialogue between Hume and a friend, and the question they are discussing 
lies in: whether Epicurus deserves criticism for loosening the ties of morality, and 
should he be seen as pernicious to civil society because of his denial of providence 
and a future state. Hume’s friend then presents himself as Epicurus and delivers a 
harangue to the Athenian people as presented by Hume. In this supposed self-defence 
of Epicurus, Hume makes his point fairly clear: that philosopher’s denial of a divine 
being poses not a tincture of threat to public morality for a fundamental reason, 
namely his philosophy is meant to be speculative and is not intended to have such a 
practical implication. The accusation of atheist against philosopher reveals religion’s 
ambition to develop its doctrine, once based on faith, now on reason. This ambitious 
enterprise is not only a distortion of the nature of philosophy and meant to render it a 
servant of religion, but also exposed the internal contradiction of religious 
philosophy. That is, religion’s ambitious enterprise of absorbing philosophy can 
never be successful, for in fulfilling its ambition, it must take just philosophical 
reasoning into account, and when this is the case, religion is going to ruin itself, 
because a religion which aims to provide a precise causal explanation of the world is 
not religion any more. This contradiction, fatal to the ambition of religionists, is 
pointed out by the pretended Epicurus: 
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The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the tradition of your 
forefathers, and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly acquiesce), 
indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can establish religion 
upon the principles of reason; and they thereby excite, instead of 
satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent and 
scrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order, 
beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and then ask, if such a 
glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous 
concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius 
can never sufficiently admire (EHU, 189 emphasis added). 
Neither ‘sapping the Foundations of Morality’ (as quoted at the outset of this 
chapter) nor ‘loosening the ties of morality’ are criticisms that Hume or Epicurus 
deserve, for that is to misunderstand the nature of their works. For both, philosophy 
is the speculative enterprise which provides an inductive reasoning of human affairs 
and of social order rather than constructing perfect models of both. It would be a 
mistake to accuse them of moral skepticism, unless a stable moral consensus is 
unavailable in the society observed by them. As Epicurus and as Hume says: 
I acknowledge, that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with 
more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable 
reception from the world. I am sensible, that, according to the past 
experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, and 
moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance 
between the virtuous and the vicious course of life; but am sensible, that, 
to a well disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. 
And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and 
reasonings (EHU, 192-193)? 
Indeed, no more it seems can be said so long as a just principle of reasoning is 
not to be violated. It is by this philosophical reasoning that Hume frustrates the 
ambition of religionists and secures the independent status of philosophy from its 
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erosion. Nevertheless it must be clear that Hume’s task in the two sections discussed 
here is a philosophical one as a means of exposing the weakness of religious 
philosophy in terms of its origin and internal logic, for his evaluative judgement of 
the latter, one will have to turn to Hume’s Essays and History. 
Having defended Hume’s theory in the Treatise in this chapter, in the next 
chapter I will focus on EPM, and my purpose is still to defend Hume’s ethical 
naturalism. Both of these arguments are important for recovering Hume’s 
contribution to the development of conservative utilitarianism. 
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Chapter 4 Descriptive Naturalism and Utility 
4.1 Ethics: Normative and Metaethical 
When we focus on Hume’s political theory in the second part of the 
dissertation, we will be in a better position to discuss Hume’s normative views as 
expressed in a number of important essays and History. For now, in order to 
complete our investigation of Hume’s moral psychology, the purpose of this chapter 
is to deepen the discussion of Hume’s moral theory as elaborated on above and 
define its specific features by reflecting on, first, a debate among contemporary 
Hume scholars on the feature of Hume’s naturalism and, second, within a broader 
background, on an ongoing philosophical debate in which ethical naturalism has 
faced so much harsh criticism.  
Philosophers writing about ethics usually draw a distinction between first-order 
and second-order questions. First-order, or normative, issues are about which actions 
are right or wrong, which actions, character traits, and institutions, are good or bad, 
and the like. One further distinction has been drawn within normative ethics between 
questions of moral theory or principle and particular moral issues. The first kind of 
question concerns the theoretical structure of morality. How is goodness defined and 
related to rightness? What is the feature of impartiality or universality that a moral 
theory usually pursues? Does the maximisation of social welfare reveal impartiality, 
and is maximising aggregate welfare incompatible with distributive justice? On the 
other hand, substantive moral questions comprehend more specific moral issues. For 
example, is self-suicide ever justified and on what grounds? Does the state have right 
to deprive the subjects of their lives in order to punish the crime they commit? Do 
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animals exist for our pleasure and convenience so we are justified in killing them for 
the purpose of food, laboratory experiments, or the fur trade? Second-order or 
metaethical issues, however, deal not directly with the content of first-order 
questions but focuses on their ‘status’, and typically take the form of metaphysical, 
epistemological, semantic, or psychological issues about morality. What is the origin 
and nature of morality? Does it exist in the form of facts or truths like those which 
natural science examine? If it does, what is the feature which marks its difference 
with other facts, and on what basis can it be tested (Brink, 1989: 1-2)? In what 
follows I hope to show that it is the metaethical issues that Hume’s philosophy is 
primarily concerned with, therefore one might feel frustrated if his purpose of 
reflecting on Hume’s philosophy is to draw a free-standing normative doctrine. 
Moreover, I will also suggest that Hume’s metaethical theory may be depicted as 
descriptive naturalism to which criticism from intuitionists like G. E. Moore pose no 
direct threat. 
4.2 Varieties of Naturalism 
Let us start with a debate occurring among contemporary Hume scholars. As 
has been said in previous chapters, Hume's philosophy has been controversial since 
the publication of the Treatise, and a large proportion of interpretations of Hume’s 
thought from then on are rather unsympathetic criticisms inseparable from 
misunderstandings. From one mistaken viewpoint, the purpose of Hume’s 
philosophy is solely negative, that is, it is a skeptical denial of man’s knowledge of 
truth and value. As David Fate Norton indicates, the first published comments of 
Hume’s Treatise described it as the work of a ‘new free-thinker’ with ‘evil intentions’ 
(Norton, 1982: 3). In addition, Hume’s kinsman Henry Home (later Lord Kames) 
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launched his attack on moral and epistemological skepticism, of which Hume is a 
main target. For Lord Kames, Hume is not only skeptical about the real existence of 
external objects, but also man’s perceptions and even man’s existence. This negative 
interpretation was then taken over by another Scottish contemporary of Hume, 
Thomas Reid. Reid argued that, having inherited the theory of ideas of Descartes and 
Locke, Hume leads it to its logical conclusion, namely Hume has denied genuine 
knowledge and real values. In Reid’s view, Hume was ‘a dangerous skeptic who 
represented mankind as mere Yahoos and undermined both natural and moral 
philosophy’ (Norton, 1982: 4). With the promotion of another Scottish contemporary 
and strict critic of Hume, James Beattie, this account of Hume’s philosophy was 
widely accepted among the learned and subsequently became the orthodoxy. As 
Norton notes, in the next two centuries that followed, ‘Hume as a philosopher was 
Hume the universal skeptic who dogmatically denied the existence of knowledge, 
causes, substances, freedom, values, and God’ (Norton, 1982: 3-4). 
But in contemporary studies of Hume, the view that Hume is a purely negative 
and destructive skeptic has lost most of its credit, this reverse of the trend having 
much to do with the naturalistic interpretation of Hume to which Norman Kemp-
Smith is an important contributor. In 1905, Kemp-Smith’s article ‘The Naturalism of 
Hume’ was published in Mind, and later on the thesis was expanded into The 
Philosophy of David Hume published in 1941. The earlier paper is composed of two 
parts, one focusing on Hume’s philosophy of knowledge, and the other on Hume’s 
ethics. There is, however, a central argument that penetrates the whole paper, namely 
that Kemp-Smith thinks that either dimension of Hume’s philosophy culminates in a 
novel positive theory of belief. Confronting the time-honoured view of Hume as a 
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great destructive skeptic, Kemp-Smith aims to show that Hume’s overriding aim is 
positive. The positive theory is a naturalistic one, for it is to explain how certain 
fundamental beliefs arise by reference to specific natural features of the human mind, 
such as instincts, propensities, passions, or sentiments. According to Kemp-Smith, 
‘the establishment of a purely naturalistic conception of human nature by the 
thorough subordination of reason to feeling and instinct’ is the ‘determining factor’ 
in Hume’s philosophy. In this way, Kemp-Smith indicates that the maxim central to 
Hume’s ethics, namely ‘Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions’, is 
likewise central to his theory of knowledge and can be expressed as ‘Reason is and 
ought to be subordinate to our natural beliefs’ (1905b: 339; 1941: 11). By advocating 
a naturalistic interpretation of Hume’s philosophy, Kemp-Smith’s work has been 
deemed a landmark in Hume studies; it defines the important questions of the subject 
and inspires many Hume scholars.
45
 Kemp-Smith does not, however, provide a 
specific definition of his use of naturalism, and, at the same time, not much help is 
directly derived from Hume’s works, for, as Heiner Klemme rightly remarks, 
naturalism is a term never used by Hume himself (Klemme, 2003: 130). As a result, 
although the main stream of Hume research has shifted from the negative view to the 
positive and naturalistic one, a new debate arises concerning the implication of 
Hume’s naturalism. 
Robert Fogelin and Don Garrett, for example, hold that Hume’s naturalism is 
simply ‘a naturalistic program intended to offer causal explanations of mental 
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 For the influence of Kemp-Smith’s works, see Don Garrett’s ‘Introduction’ to The Philosophy of 
David Hume (2005: xxv-xl). 
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phenomena’ (Fogelin, 1985: 2, quoted in Garrett, 2005: xxxix n.16, see also Garrett, 
2004: 68). For Terence Penelhum, Hume’s naturalism is more specifically the 
programme of trying to show 
how human nature provides us with resources, mostly non-intellectual, 
which enable us to interpret and respond to our experience in ways which 
rationalist philosophers had vainly tried to justify by argument 
(Penelhum, 1975: 17, quoted in Garrett, 2005: xxxix n.16). 
A naturalistic interpretation of Hume is likewise recognised by Norton. 
According to him, Kemp-Smith’s naturalistic interpretation does seem to capture the 
essence of Hume’s philosophy on the following two occasions. First, when 
naturalism is understood as holding (Norton adopting John Dewey’s definition) ‘that 
the whole of the universe or experience may be accounted for by a method like that 
of physical sciences’, then, Norton says, ‘Hume must certainly be called a naturalist’ 
for his attempt to extend the ‘experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’ 
as showed on the title page of the Treatise or for his attempt to explain mental 
phenomena by the principles and techniques of natural philosophy.
46
 Second, Norton 
thinks that Hume may also be viewed as a naturalist for he has developed his 
philosophical system on a thoroughly non-religious basis. In other words, Hume has 
attempted to explain moral values ‘from human beings as constituted and active in 
the world’ (Norton, 1982: 15-16). Although Kemp-Smith’s view does not seem 
problematic to Norton, he thinks that the trivial role which Kemp-Smith assigned to 
reason as thoroughly subject to feeling, instinct, or natural belief is rather misleading 
and does not contribute to a proper understanding of Hume’s position. Norton 
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 See, for example, Hume’s Introduction to the Treatise. 
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describes the core of Kemp-Smith’s argument as the ‘subordination thesis’, and to 
reject it constitutes a main theme of Norton’s David Hume: Common-sense Moralist, 
Skeptical Metaphysician (1982: 5-6, 9, and passim). It should be noted that in 
objecting to what he calls the subordination thesis, Norton does not reject that Hume 
does provide a naturalistic theory of belief. His point is rather that Hume does not 
provide an irrational theory of belief, thus Norton writes: ‘We may wish to say that 
for Hume belief arises naturally, but the activities of reason constitute one of its 
determining influences or causes’ (Norton, 1982: 17). 
The debate on the implication of Hume’s naturalism does not end here. In 
Hume’s Naturalism (1999) H. O. Mounce rejects both views of Kemp-Smith and of 
Norton. On the one hand, Mounce points out two defects of Kemp-Smith’s argument. 
First, Mounce thinks that Kemp-Smith fails to realise the tension between Hume’s 
empiricism and naturalism. According to Mounce, Kemp-Smith recognises the 
opening sections of the Treatise as empiricist in their tendency, meanwhile Kemp-
Smith also argues that these views are only provisional and that they can properly be 
understood only when they are supplemented with the naturalistic view which occurs 
later in the same work. However, for Mounce, empiricism and naturalism in Hume’s 
thought are not simply different but incompatible, making it difficult to see how one 
can arrive at the latter simply by supplementing the former. Mounce indicates that 
Scottish naturalism, to which he thinks Hume belongs, is religious in spirit; it holds 
that the mind is to be understood in relation to a world that transcends it. However, in 
stark contrast, for the 18
th
 century empiricist, the world is to be understood through 
its reflections in the mind. In this way, Mounce argues that it is impossible to 
combine these conflicting views in a coherent philosophy. What the Treatise does 
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present us, and what Mounce takes Kemp-Smith as failing to grasp, is an acute 
tension between two incompatible philosophical doctrines (Mounce, 1999: 6-7).  
Secondly, Mounce thinks that Kemp-Smith fails to distinguish clearly between 
two different types of naturalism and sometimes treats them as interchangeable. One 
type of naturalism which Mounce thinks represents Hume’s view is the Scottish 
naturalism featured by its religious spirit. By contrast, Mounce identifies another 
type of naturalism which he takes as incompatible with Hume’s position, namely 
scientific naturalism. This doctrine holds that reality is co-existent with nature, and 
nature itself is defined as that which falls under the categories of physical science. 
Since nature falls within those categories and since it is co-existent with reality, the 
whole of reality may be revealed by scientific inquiry. Science therefore embraces all 
knowledge. Like Norton, Mounce also cites John Dewey’s definition of naturalism as 
an example, but, contrary to Norton, he takes it as an extreme form of scientific 
naturalism and as in conflict with Hume’s philosophy (Mounce, 1999: 9). Scientific 
and Scottish naturalism, Mounce argues, are in such stark contrast, that they are 
confused because of the increasing domination of scientific naturalism, which ‘has 
become the spectacles on the nose of the commentator and turned everything into 
positivism or empiricism’ (Mounce, 1999: 11). Mounce thinks that the work of 
Norton has illustrated this point. For Mounce, the contrast Norton draws between 
Hume and the Scottish naturalists such as George Turnbull and Lord Kames is not 
convincing at all. Norton thinks that the naturalism of the Scottish school is not 
comprehensive, because up to a point, naturalists depend ultimately on their religious 
belief. Hence Norton refers to their view as providential naturalism or as a ‘curious 
supernatural naturalism’. For Mounce, however, this shows that Norton identifies 
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naturalism with the scientific naturalism prevalent in our time (Mounce, 1999: 11). 
Moreover, Mounce argues that Hume never rid himself of his belief in God (Mounce, 
1999: 14); therefore Hume belongs to the camp of the Scottish naturalism and is, 
contrary to Norton’s view, incompatible with the spirit of the scientific naturalism. 
Mounce’s attributing Hume to the Scottish naturalism and his view that there is 
a religious tendency underlying Hume’s position are not accepted in this thesis. 
Nevertheless the debate goes on as Mounce is not the only interpreter who challenges 
the view held by Norton. In Ethical Naturalism: Hobbes and Hume (1970) Jonathan 
Kemp, though motivated by a concern quite distinct from Mounce’s, likewise 
questions the validity of Hume’s scientific naturalism. Although on the title-page of 
the Treatise Hume declares his ambition of adopting experimental method in moral 
inquiry as inspired by the achievements of Isaac Newton in natural philosophy, 
Kemp thinks that the relation between Hume and Newton is not as straightforward as 
Hobbes and Galileo. For one thing, ‘Hume at no times sets out to demonstrate his 
conclusions in the manner of a geometrical or strictly logical system’, starting with 
‘definitions’ and proceeding to ‘regularly proved theorems’ (Kemp, 1970: 29). In 
addition, Kemp describes Hume’s naturalism as ‘human naturalism’, for in spite of 
his admiration of Newton, Hume does not try to connect phenomena with a 
systematic metaphysical account of the nature of the universe, but adopts scientific 
method in his anatomy of human nature. Moreover, Hume, unlike Hobbes, does not 
aim to draw practical conclusions from a scientific account of human nature 
regarding what men ought to perform. On the contrary, what Hume attempts to do is 
to explain the facts of human nature by a few general principles, and in this respect 
Hume was inspired by Newton’s explanation of the behaviour of matter by the three 
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laws of gravitation. For Hume, the way in which, and the reasons for which, men do 
actually praise and condemn certain kinds of act or character form part of the facts to 
be examined (Kemp, 1970: 29-30). Thus Kemp concludes by describing Hume as a 
‘descriptive moralist’ and remarks that 
[Hume] is a naturalist, not because he does something that hostile critics 
can condemn as committing the naturalistic fallacy in some form or other, 
but, quite simply, because he finds the key to the description and 
explanation of the moral judgments men actually make in the basic facts 
of human nature, not in the supernatural realms of theology nor in the a 
priori categories of rationally determined fitness and unfitness of things 
(Kemp, 1970: 52). 
Though being more cautious about applying the notion of scientific naturalism 
to Hume, Kemp’s account of Hume’s naturalism is not entirely incompatible with 
that of Norton’s. His use of descriptive naturalism and the contrast he draws between 
Hume and Hobbes as two distinct philosophical paradigms agree with my argument, 
and in later chapters, I will try to refute the view which treats Hume as a successor of 
Hobbes. For now, based on the survey above, what I would like to show is that 
although not a few scholars agree that Hume could be viewed as a naturalistic 
philosopher, a consensus has not yet been reached among them about what the 
specific features of Hume’s naturalism are. Indeed, Hume himself says of the term 
‘natural’ that ‘there is none more ambiguous and equivocal’ (Treatise, 304). In the 
remainder of this chapter I shall try to clarify the features of Hume’s naturalism, and 
to defend it by locating it within an ongoing philosophical debate in which ethical 
naturalism is the main target of scholars’ criticism. 
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4.3 Features of Hume’s Descriptive Naturalism 
To find a way out of the debate on the features of Hume’s naturalism, it might 
be helpful to consider the views of Heiner Klemme and Peter Railton. Klemme 
argues that two different versions of naturalism exist in Hume’s thought. First, he 
considers Hume a descriptive naturalist, for Hume attempts to describe the working 
of our faculties in belief formation (Klemme, 2003: 130). Second, according to 
Klemme, Hume is also a normative naturalist, because he claims that we have good 
reasons to believe certain things, such as the sun rising again tomorrow. These good 
reasons are based on custom and habit, and they may also be called justifying reasons 
because they are reasons for which we place our trust in science and in our daily life 
(Klemme, 2003: 130-131). It seems that Klemme’s view cannot be accepted without 
qualification, for although the conception of belief or natural belief has normative 
force and may prescribe men’s conduct; it is in people’s common affairs of life that 
this normativity is demonstrated rather than in Hume’s philosophy. To put it 
differently, what we should always bear in mind is that Hume regards himself as an 
anatomist of human nature rather than a painter when composing the Treatise and 
Enquiries. In this way, although we find in these philosophical works Hume’s 
comments that natural belief is sufficient to cure men of ‘philosophical melancholy 
and delirium’ and to save us from ‘the deepest darkness’ of pyrrhonism, Hume by no 
means attempts to instruct us that we ought to follow our natural beliefs which may 
‘dispel these clouds’ and ‘obliterate all these chimeras’ (Treatise, 175). Instead, he is 
just describing what men, Hume himself included, are already performing in the 
everyday life, and this is why these beliefs are ‘natural’. As Hume writes: 
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I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my 
friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I would return to 
these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I 
cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther (Treatise, 175). 
This then makes sensible Hume’s comments in the Introduction to the Treatise 
that ‘we ourselves are not the only beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, 
concerning which we reason’ (Treatise, 4). 47  In other words, a significant 
contribution from Hume’s philosophy consists in this discovery rather than in the 
construction of the crucial role which natural belief plays in our everyday life; were 
human nature not as it is, were habit and custom not the second nature of men, it is 
conceivable that natural belief would not have had its importance in Hume’s 
philosophy. Accordingly, although Klemme’s distinction between Hume’s 
descriptive and normative naturalism seems sensible, it should be added that the 
relationship between these forms of naturalism in Hume’s philosophy may be 
compared to concentric circles: the centre is human nature, and the normative 
naturalism is a smaller circle surrounded by the bigger one of the descriptive 
naturalism that underlies Hume’s philosophy. If this is the case, one may go on to ask, 
what are the features of Hume’s descriptive naturalism? In replying to this important 
question, let us consider Peter Railton’s analysis of naturalism. 
According to Railton, naturalism can be a doctrine about either method or 
substance. In terms of methodological naturalism, it holds that ‘philosophy does not 
possess a distinctive, a priori method able to yield substantive truths that, in principle, 
are not subject to any sort of empirical test’ (Railton, 1989: 155). A methodological 
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naturalist believes that, not dissimilar from the empirical research conducted in the 
natural and social sciences, philosophical investigation should employ a posteriori 
method (Railton, 1989: 155-156). On the other hand, substantive naturalism is not 
primarily concerned with philosophical method, but with philosophical conclusions. 
A substantive naturalist puts forward ‘a philosophical account of some domain of 
human language or practice that provides an interpretation of its central concepts in 
terms amenable to empirical inquiry’ (Railton, 1989: 156). It is worth noting that, as 
Railton indicates, these two forms of naturalism are not essentially connected: it is 
not unlikely that we arrive at a substantive naturalistic interpretation by a priori 
conceptual analysis; likewise, a methodological naturalist needs not arrive at 
substantive naturalistic conclusions (Railton, 1989: 156). Now let us consider 
whether Hume’s philosophy is naturalistic in either of these senses. 
First, it seems that the way in which Hume develops his science of human 
nature effectively illustrates the essence of methodological naturalism. Hume 
expressed his thought in a letter when he was only twenty-three: 
I found that the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labor’d 
under the same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural 
Philosophy, of being entirely Hypothetical, & depending more upon 
Invention than Experience. Every one consulted his Fancy in erecting 
Schemes of Virtue & of Happiness, without regarding human Nature, 
upon which every moral Conclusion must depend. This therefore I 
resolved to make my principal Study, & the Source from which I wou’d 
derive every Truth in Criticism as well as Morality (Letters vol.1: 16). 
As Passmore remarks, what is implied in this passage is Hume’s belief that 
‘moral science had yet to experience its Newtonian revolution’, and Hume’s main 
task was to show that the ‘Newtonian methods of philosophising’ are as applicable in 
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the moral as they are in natural philosophy (Passmore, 1980: 8). This intention of 
Hume has been made fairly clear in the Introduction to the Treatise. There Hume 
first declares that the importance of the study of human nature lies in its being the 
capital of all sciences, thus not only moral subjects, even mathematics, natural 
philosophy, and natural religion, are all in some measure dependent on it. In this way, 
by bringing human nature into focus, Hume regards himself as helping to ‘propose a 
compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the 
only one upon which they can stand with any security’ (Treatise, 4). Having 
identified the subject matter of his research, Hume goes on to introduce his research 
method. His science of human nature reveals ‘the application of experimental 
philosophy to moral subject’, so it can only be conducted by means of experiments 
and observation within the boundary of experience. It is not the purpose of Hume’s 
moral philosophy to reveal the ultimate principle of human nature; on the contrary, 
he believes that those who went beyond experience were simply imposing their 
conjectures and hypotheses on readers, which for Hume must be an error and no 
reliable knowledge can be derived from it. However, Hume notices a difference 
between natural and moral philosophy. Unlike natural philosophy, observation and 
experiment in moral philosophy cannot be carried out purposely, because this will 
influence the psychology of the observed and bias will be inevitable. To avoid this, 
Hume suggests that 
We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a 
cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the 
common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, 
and in their pleasures (Treatise, 6). 
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Hume’s disapproval of a priori knowledge and his stringent adherence to a 
posteriori approach in his science of men aligns with Railton’s definition of 
methodological naturalism. To strengthen this observation, let us turn to Section 1 of 
EPM ‘Of the General Principles of Morals’, in which Hume again introduces his 
research method and shows the substantive rather than formal feature of it, which is 
not different from what a methodological naturalist would hold (Railton, 1989: 156). 
First, Hume claims that his goal in EPM is to ‘discover the true origin of morals’ 
(EPM, 76); by this he means that he will explore the origin of moral phenomena in 
human psychology, and provide an account of how the constitution of human nature 
and its interaction with external circumstances gives rise to various virtues and vices. 
In other words, what Hume is concerned with is not prescribing what ought to be 
performed by a virtuous man; instead, he attempts to provide a psychological 
explanation of the status of our moral values and the nature of moral evaluation. This 
corresponds to what has been argued above, namely, to apply the terms of present-
day, that they are not normative but metaethical questions that Hume is addressing in 
his philosophy. Moreover, Hume distinguishes between two different methods of 
conducting moral inquiry. For the first method, a general abstract principle is 
established beforehand and ‘is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences 
and conclusions’ (EPM, 77). Of this Hume comments that, ostensibly, it may be a 
more perfect approach, yet it should be rejected for not being founded on fact and 
observation, and thus is usually a common source of illusion and mistake in morals 
as well as in other subjects (EPM, 77). Alternatively, the other method which Hume 
calls ‘a very simple method’ is based on observation. In adopting this method, the 
philosopher has to consider every attribute of the mind which renders a man an 
object of esteem or contempt, and by doing so he aims to ‘collect and arrange the 
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estimable or blameable qualities of men’ (EPM, 76). The function of reason is to 
discover the circumstances on both sides, to reveal the particular feature commonly 
shared by the estimable qualities on the one hand, and by the blameable on the other, 
‘thence to reach the foundation of ethics’ and ‘find those universal principles, from 
which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived’ (EPM, 76-77). In brief, Hume 
concludes, for the moral inquiry concerning the question of ‘fact’ rather than of 
‘abstract science’, experimental method is the only way to success (EPM, 77). 
If this is sufficient to show that methodological naturalism is a feature of 
Hume’s philosophy, let us continue to consider whether it is also substantive 
naturalism. To clarify this, it might be helpful to locate Hume’s philosophy in an 
ongoing philosophical debate. First let us recall briefly some of this debate, and 
ethical naturalism, being our main concern here, may be a good place to start. 
According to Richard Brandt’s definition, 
The essential thesis of naturalism is the proposal that ethical statements 
can, after all, be confirmed, ethical questions answered, by observation 
and inductive reasoning of the very sort that we use to confirm 
statements in the empirical science…because of what ethical statements 
mean (Brandt, 1959: 152). 
Brandt’s definition agrees with Railton’s when its two components are 
observed. The one is methodological, i.e. ethical naturalism asserts that ‘ethical 
statements can be confirmed or verified’ in a way parallel to that ‘in which the 
statements of the empirical sciences can be confirmed’, for ethics is a department of 
empirical science (Brandt, 1959: 155). Another is about the substantive meaning of 
ethical statements: ‘naturalists hold that any ethical statement can be translated, 
without any change of meaning, into a statement in the language of empirical science’ 
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(Brandt, 1959: 155). An example of this is Bentham’s view that something being 
‘morally right’ means it ‘will contribute maximally to the happiness of sentient 
creatures’ (quoted in Brandt, 1996: 2). During the first thirty years of the last century, 
a dominant position known as nonnaturalism or intuitionism was critical of 
naturalism. Intuitionist philosophers such as Henry Sidgwick, G. E. Moore, and W. 
D. Ross, admit the existence of moral facts and moral truths, but they do not agree 
with the naturalist’s proposal about the meaning of ethical statements. As a 
consequence, they reject the naturalist’s view that moral facts are verifiable by 
observation. For intuitionists, one can know that ethical statements are true; however 
the way one knows this is not by observation but by ‘intuition’ or ‘rational insight’ 
(Brandt, 1959: 152; Brink, 1989: 2-3). Afterwards, in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, 
the rise of one philosophical school in response to intuitionism was known as 
noncognitivism. Noncognitivists such as C. L. Stevenson, A. J. Ayer, R. M. Hare, 
and Patrick Nowell-Smith, reject the thesis held by both naturalism and intuitionism. 
They think that moral claims are fundamentally noncognitive in character. From this 
viewpoint, moral claims do not make assertions of facts, but are used to express 
attitudes or issue the commands of the moral agent. Therefore, moral claims are not 
used primarily to tell us that something is the case, and moral knowledge is not 
possible (Brandt, 1959: 152; Brink, 1989: 3). 
The sketch of this contemporary philosophical debate is oversimplified, not to 
mention that nothing has been said about the philosophers who returned to first-order 
moral issues in the 1960s and 1970s, the most remarkable, among others, being Brian 
Barry’s Political Argument in 1965 and John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971 
(Kelly, 2000a: 3). However, it might be sufficient for our purpose here, for one way 
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to defend our interpretation of Hume’s philosophy as descriptive naturalism is to 
consider whether it can stand the attack from intuitionists such as G. E. Moore, 
whose argument is influential and requires attention from those interested in the 
debate about naturalism (Simpson, 1987: 11). Another benefit of relating our account 
of Hume to the contemporary debate is that the features of his descriptive naturalism 
will become more explicit. In examining Hume’s philosophy, by reflecting on 
Moore’s criticism of naturalism, the question as to whether substantive naturalism is 
applicable to Hume is also taken in to account, for what is crucial in both cases is 
determining whether Hume has attempted to define the idea of good and, if he has, 
how? 
4.4 Utility and Good 
A substantive naturalist, as defined by Railton, proposes an ‘account of some 
domain of language or practice that provides an interpretation of its concepts in terms 
amenable to empirical inquiry’. Along with the example of Bentham, others such as 
Edward Westermarck who argues that to say an action is reprehensible is essentially 
to say ‘I have a tendency to feel moral disapproval toward the agents of all acts like 
this one’ (quoted in Brandt, 1959: 166), also like Herbert Spencer who argues that 
we call ‘good the acts conducive to life, in self or others, and bad those which 
directly or indirectly tend towards death, special or general’ (quoted in Moore, 1993: 
102), are also committed to a naturalistic view. In Principia Ethica, Moore 
introduces the expression ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ for the mistake that he supposes 
all proponents of ethical naturalism to have made. Moore thinks that goodness is a 
unique, unanalysable, and nonnatural property; therefore any attempt to define 
goodness in terms of natural property must be a mistake. Moore’s proposal is 
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founded on two grounds. First, he thinks that those who try to define ‘good’ in terms 
of natural property have confused the question of ‘what sorts of things are good’ with 
the question of ‘what goodness itself is’ (Mackie, 1990: 50-51). We may answer the 
former in naturalistic and descriptive terms, but unlike the latter, it does not provide a 
definition of ‘good’ per se. Second, Moore appeals to what is known as the ‘open 
question’ argument. Suppose a naturalist defines ‘good’ as ‘conducive to pleasure’; 
in that case it is not absurd for a person who understands the meanings of both to ask 
‘is good conducive to pleasure?’. When we substitute ‘conducive to pleasure’ any 
other definition, for example, ‘conducive to evolutionary survival’, it is still sensible 
to ask ‘is good conducive to evolutionary survival?’, so the question remains open. 
However, Moore's point is that, if the proposed definition of ‘good’ is a correct one, 
the question would not still be open, for it is absurd to ask a question like ‘is good 
identical with good?’ (Mackie, 1990: 51) 
To see if Moore’s open question argument poses a challenge to Hume’s theory, 
we must first decide whether, or in what sense, Hume is a substantive naturalist. In 
EPM Hume argues that, in comparison with the development of natural philosophy 
that ‘bulk and figure of the earth have been measured and delineated’, and ‘the order 
and economy of the heavenly bodies’ have been subjected to the proper laws of 
natural philosophers, it is regrettable that the principle of morals derived from 
observation and inductive reasoning, i.e. ‘personal merits consists entirely in the 
usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the person himself possessed of them, or 
to others’ (EPM, 152), has not yet been recognised. In this way, Hume says he 
cannot help but suspect the truth of the principle. This statement, of course, is rather 
an oblique confirmation of the validity of that principle, on which Hume founds his 
128 
 
moral theory both in the Treatise and EPM. It is interesting to notice that, as Ronald 
Glossop argues, ‘although this groupings form the outline for the organisation of the 
Enquiry [and the Treatise], Hume wants us to view them as arising out of an original 
unorganised list of virtues’, because ‘his grouping is arrived at inductively’ (Glossop, 
1967: 534).
48
 A large proportion of Hume’s moral theory is about how men’s acts are 
perceived by an impartial observer (see also Frazer, 2010: 44). Egoists would object 
that this is implausible, for man evaluates things simply by his concern for self-
interest. But the view of egoistic hedonism is exactly what Hume rejects in his theory, 
the reason being that it is in conflict with men’s experience in daily life, as they do 
not approve or disapprove of characters and acts simply because they are or are not 
beneficial to themselves (Plamenatz, 1958: 25, 30). In other words, Hume does not 
take the impartial observer as a hypothetical character who exists only theoretically. 
On the contrary, based on the fact that Hume’s moral theory is founded on induction 
and observation, we may infer that for Hume the impartial observer is a character 
empirically implanted in human nature. Also, by appealing to this character, Hume 
intends to show that it is public utility instead of self-interest that underlies the 
fourfold catalogue of virtues mentioned above, and thus underlies morality. In this 
way, it seems that Hume identifies ‘good’ with what brings man pleasure through 
disinterested contemplation: whatever quality causes pleasure in an impartial 
observer, it will turn out to fit into at least one of four catalogues, utility being an 
                                                 
48
 Glossop goes on to point out that an impartial spectator would approve of those qualities of 
character which are ‘useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others’ (EPM, 145) is ‘not true by 
definition’, but is ‘a synthetic proposition whose truth is discovered by empirical methods’ (Glossop, 
1967: 534-535). 
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ingredient shared by all of the acts or characters comprehended under the 
catalogues.
49
 From this it follows that Hume identifies ‘good’ with his idea of utility, 
or to put it differently, it is because the character traits, which are useful or agreeable 
either to the possessor of them or to others, touch our humanity and earn our 
approval that they are esteemed good. For instance, at the end of his discussion of 
character traits that are ‘immediately agreeable to the possessor’, such as courage, 
philosophical tranquillity, and the tenderness of the sentiment, Hume writes that 
No views of utility or of future beneficial consequences enter into this 
sentiment of approbation; yet is it of a kind similar to that other 
sentiment, which arises from views of a public or private utility. The 
same social sympathy, we may observe, or fellow-feeling with human 
happiness or misery, gives rise to both (EPM, 138 emphases added). 
Hume’s point here is that it is the passions of similar nature that motivate us to 
approve of those useful and agreeable qualities whether we benefit from them or not. 
In concluding his discussion of qualities ‘immediately agreeable to others’, Hume 
again confirms this by saying that: 
We approve of another, because of his wit, politeness, modesty, decency, 
or any agreeable quality which he possesses; although he be not of our 
acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of these 
accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his 
acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives 
us the sentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the 
                                                 
49
 Glossop thinks that the principle ‘useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others’ can be 
viewed as equivalent to the phrase ‘tending to promote the happiness of humanity’, for even those 
qualities which are useful or agreeable to one’s own also tend to promote the general happiness of 
society, ‘since the person himself is a member of society’ (Glossop, 1967: 535). 
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judgments, which we form concerning manners and characters (EPM, 
143-144 emphasis added). 
Accordingly, Hume presumably would not mind if his fourfold catalogue of 
virtues is described as being united by the principle of utility. What should be noted 
is that utility was not taken by Hume as an objectified moral principle that prescribes 
what man ought to perform when facing moral dilemmas. Instead, it is because utility 
already plays a significant part in our daily social life that Hume manifests it in his 
philosophy and uses it to demonstrate the socially-oriented nature of human beings. 
In other words, what Hume hopes to reveal by manifesting utility is its connection 
with the natural sociability of mankind, thus he says: ‘we resolve the pleasure, which 
arises from views of utility, into the sentiments of humanity and sympathy’ (EPM, 
151). From this perspective, the publication of EPM was not intended by Hume as a 
deviation from the Treatise, for it still adheres to the psychological scheme which 
Hume commenced in his first work, and utility is meant to be the supplement to the 
central idea of that scheme, i.e. sympathy. 
To clarify Hume’s definition of good, let us say something more about Hume’s 
theory of the impartial observer. As stated, the impartial observer for Hume is not 
just a philosophical device but a tendency of human nature, therefore it is not a 
hypothetical conception used by Hume to create a universal moral criterion, but a 
psychological status man actually enters when a moral judgment is to be made. 
However, the psychological status man creates in his mind is indeed a hypothetical 
situation primarily based on imagination. In our daily life, we make various moral 
judgments in many of which we are merely observers and which we may have no 
similar experience of beforehand. For example, we do not need to have been the 
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victims of war in order to acquire a sense of its cruelty.
50
 Despite this, we may still 
reach moral consensus with other fellows of the society with the aid of imagination 
and sympathy. I am not sure whether it is appropriate to describe this psychological 
mechanism, like Ronald Glossop does, as the ‘analytic part’ of Hume’s ethical theory 
(Glossop, 1967). Yet Glossop does address a number of important questions which 
are helpful in grasping the essence of Hume’s moral theory. For example, as stated, 
Hume’s moral theory provides a description of how various mental qualities are 
evaluated by an impartial observer, and by describing an observer as ‘impartial’, 
Hume means, first and foremost, a man who is informed about the circumstances of 
the matter which he is contemplating, and this being the first step towards making a 
‘moral’ judgment. Here reason performs its instrumental function of conveying 
relevant circumstances before a judgment is formed. Hume writes: 
in moral deliberations, we must be acquainted, before-hand, with all the 
objects, and all their relations to each other; and from a comparison of 
the whole, fix our choice or approbation. No new fact to be ascertained: 
No new relation to be discovered. All the circumstances of the case are 
supposed to be laid before us, ere we can fix any sentence of blame or 
approbation. If any material circumstance be yet unknown or doubtful, 
we must first employ our enquiry or intellectual faculties to assure us of 
it; and must suspend for a time all moral decision or sentiment. While we 
are ignorant, whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we 
determine whether the person, who killed him, be criminal or innocent 
(EPM, 160)? 
                                                 
50
 As Stroud writes that ‘we can sometimes make ourselves feel sick or afraid just by thinking about 
certain things; a thought leads to a feeling. In Hume’s terms, an idea is converted into an impression. 
That is just what happens when we observe or contemplate other people who are feeling certain things, 
and this is how we can be affected and moved by their feeling what they do’ (Stroud, 1977: 196). 
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It is in this way that reason functions as the slave of the passions (Treatise, 
266). However, being well-informed has no necessary connection with a just 
judgment; the reason lying in the partiality of human nature. It is not inconceivable 
that, even if one is familiar with the context of a certain event in which his relative 
and other strangers are involved, a sentiment in favour of his relative would arise in 
him because of the private connection between them. To solve this problem, Glossop 
indicates that one must distinguish between a ‘sentiment of approval’ and a 
‘judgment of approval’ (Glossop, 1967: 529-531). As stated, it is with the aid of 
imagination and sympathy that man is able to judge as an observer. Although 
sympathy is described by Hume as the most remarkable quality of human nature, and 
as a principle ‘by which we enter into the sentiments’ of others to ‘partake of their 
pleasure and uneasiness’ (Treatise, 206; 234), it cannot entirely eliminate the 
partiality rooted in human nature. Therefore, when the objects are related to us in one 
way or another, it would be easier for us to conceive of the feelings they entertain, as 
Hume says 
The sentiments of others have little influence, when far remov’d from us, 
and require the relation of contiguity, to make them communicate 
themselves entirely. The relations of blood, being a species of causation, 
may sometimes contribute to the same effect; as also acquaintance, which 
operates in the same manner with education and custom…All these 
relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness 
of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and 
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makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner 
(Treatise, 207).51 
Clearly a partial sentiment of approval derived from sympathy cannot be the 
foundation of morals, thus Glossop suggests, instead of actual sympathy, we should 
appeal to ideal sympathy which give rise to a judgment of approval featured by its 
disinterestedness. This means that to make a moral judgment, ‘we must be equally 
concerned about the interests of each and every human being’; whenever we do not 
actually have such concern, we create one with imagination (Glossop, 1967: 530). 
What Hume says seems to verify this account of him: 
’Tis only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference to 
our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as 
denominates it morally good or evil (Treatise, 303; quoted in Glossop, 
1967: 531). 
Accordingly, Glossop thinks that Hume’s definition of virtue as ‘whatever 
mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; 
and vice the contrary’ (EPM, 160), could be restated as ‘A virtue is whatever mental 
action or quality evokes a judgment of approval in a fully-informed spectator’ 
                                                 
51
 Although Glossop tends to think that sympathy shares the partiality of human nature, therefore a 
reflection is required before a moral judgment arises, he, mainly due to the ambiguity of Hume’s 
language, does not rule out the view that sympathy may produce disinterested sentiments of 
approbation which need no correcting (Glossop, 1967: 530-531). The passage quoted above supports 
the first view, and that is also the view I endorse here. See also Michael Frazer, 2010 where Hume’s 
position is described as ‘reflective sentimentalism’, and Jonathan Harrison, 1981: 271. For the account 
of sympathy which bears affinity with the second view, see Craig Taylor, 2002 where sympathy is 
described as an unreflective, ‘primitive’ response to the suffering of another, Gordon holds the same 
view in Gordon, 1995: 728. 
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(Glossop, 1967: 531). If this is an adequate modification of Hume’s definition of 
virtue, and when the generality of human nature also taken into account, Glossop 
concludes that Hume’s definition of virtue implies the universality of morals, for 
with these elements, a moral judgment made by a spectator will also be endorsed by 
everyone else who takes the same view. The following passage quoted from EPM 
supports this: 
The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, 
which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes 
every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision 
concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and 
comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and 
conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or 
censure, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which 
is established. These two requisite circumstances belong alone to the 
sentiment of humanity here insisted on (EPM, 147-148). 
On the basis of the interpretation of Hume’s theory as stated above, does his 
definition of virtue identify ‘good’ with natural property? It seems it does, for it is 
pleasure, though of a disinterested and imaginatory kind, that constitutes the main 
ingredient of moral judgment. That is to say, Hume thinks that ‘good’ denotes a 
particular kind of sentiment. From this it follows that Hume is a substantive 
naturalist as Railton defines it. What we must go on to ask is, to use Moore’s 
expression, does Hume thus commit naturalistic fallacy? I think probably not. The 
reason lies in the particular relation between Hume’s methodological and substantive 
naturalism, or, to put it in different terms, in the underlying feature of Hume’s 
descriptive naturalism. 
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4.5 Moore’s Question 
It has been mentioned that, according to Railton, methodological naturalism 
and substantive naturalism are not necessarily connected, however, after the 
discussion above, it seems that Hume’s descriptive naturalism is featured by both. 
What needs to be clarified is how methodological and substantive naturalism are 
connected in Hume’s philosophy. To explore this, Railton’s essay provides an 
important clue. As Railton indicates, there is a type of naturalism, although being 
both methodological and substantive, owes its primary allegiance to methodological 
naturalism (Railton, 1989: 156). Such a naturalist, Railton goes on to explain, is 
impressed by the fact that those philosophical claims which seemed logically or 
conceptually true could nonetheless come to be empirically false as a consequence of 
the endeavour to develop ‘powerful explanatory empirical theories’ (Railton, 1989: 
156). The claims about the world which have historically been proven to be true by 
philosophers with a priori method, such as the Euclidean structure of space, the 
nonexistence of vacua, the principle of sufficient reason, etc., have either been 
revised or abandoned by the emerging scientific theory. Bearing this in mind, the 
methodological naturalist believes that those philosophers who can see the ‘danger of 
becoming entrapped by treating evolving linguistic categories as fixed’ should 
abandon the a priori approach and try their best to ‘integrate their work with the 
ongoing development of empirical theory’ (Railton, 1989: 157). Thus, while the 
naturalism which Railton considers proposes substantive naturalistic theory of value, 
this dimension is integrated into a greater scheme, that is, ‘to develop a good 
explanatory account of what is going on in an evaluative practices’ which involves 
claims about good (Railton, 1989: 157). 
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It is interesting to observe that this type of naturalism, the attempt of which is 
to develop a worthwhile explanatory theory and take substantive naturalism as an 
instrument for serving this end, provides a reforming definition of moral concept or a 
posteriori statement of property identity (Railton, 1989: 157). The main theme of 
such naturalism is synthetic rather than analytic, i.e. it is based on experience and 
presents itself as open to further challenges. As Railton points out, one consequence 
of this is that Moore’s ‘open question’ argument poses no challenge to this type of 
naturalism, since it does not purport to be analytically true or utterly incontestable. 
For example, the scientific identification of water with H2O is an instance of 
reforming definition, for the rise of this definition represents an important revision in 
thinking about water, such as denying water the status of an element, and introducing 
the principle of distinguishing chemicals by their molecular composition rather than 
their macroscopic features (Railton, 1989: 157). A man who were to be introduced 
the new meaning of water as H2O could still find the question as to whether water is 
H2O conceptually open. In this way it fails Moore’s ‘open question’ test. However, it 
fails this test not because H2O is not identical with water, but because scientists did 
not attempt to provide a conceptual truth. Moore’s argument simply poses no 
challenge to them. A feature of empirical science is that it takes scientific research as 
dynamic; although the definition of water as H2O is conceptually closed in the sense 
that ‘Water is H2O’ is true-by-virtue-of-meaning, it does not rule out the possibility 
that this definition will be challenged or even dropped in the future under the 
pressure of further empirical discoveries or theoretical developments (Railton, 1989: 
157-158). 
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Although Railton declares that the theory that he considers is contemporary 
naturalism, nevertheless his discussion provides an important clue in identifying the 
features of Hume’s moral theory. First, it seems that the naturalism Railton considers 
is consistent with Hume’s position as regards the ambition to construct an 
explanatory theory by means of scientific method. As stated, it is a goal of Hume’s 
science of human nature to introduce scientific methods into moral subjects, this 
Newtonian dimension of Hume’s philosophy having been recognised by many Hume 
scholars.
52
 Second, what is also similar to the naturalism as elaborated by Railton is 
that, in Hume’s philosophy, methodological naturalism plays a role more 
fundamental than that of substantive naturalism. A main reason lies in that, in 
composing the Treatise and Enquiries, Hume clearly regards himself as an anatomist 
whose concern is to provide a theory which describes and explains the status of 
morals, and in this way, Hume has only metaethics but not a normative moral theory. 
This is the reason Hume takes pride in his explanation of human psychology by 
means of the three principles of the association of ideas, which to Hume represent the 
Newtonian ‘method of philosophising’, i.e. to explain most phenomena with fewest 
principles (Passmore, 1980: 8). The same concern also influences Hume’s thinking 
of morals and, for instance, is demonstrated by the crucial role of utility in EPM. In 
general, we may take utility as comprehending four categories of virtues, namely 
‘useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others’. Moreover, for Hume, utility 
is not only a principle that explains the existence of various virtues in his time, but 
provides a perspective from which he can observe the ongoing transformation of 
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 But see a refutation of it in Forbes, 1975: 3-18. 
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moral standards from ancient time till his own without being trapped in the views 
remote from and inevitably arbitrary to an 18
th
 century English gentleman. A good 
example of this is Hume’s opinion expressed in ‘A Dialogue’ usually attached to 
EPM, where Hume writes 
It appears, that there never was any quality recommended by any one, as 
a virtue or moral excellence, but on account of its being useful, or 
agreeable to a man himself, or to others. For what other reason can ever 
be assigned for praise or approbation? Or where would be the sense of 
extolling a good character or action, which, at the same time, is allowed 
to be good for nothing? All the differences, therefore, in morals, may be 
reduced to this one general foundation, and may be accounted for by the 
different views, which people take of these circumstances (EPM, 194). 
In this passage it not only shows that utility is regarded by Hume as an 
ingredient shared by various virtues popular in different times and places according 
to his historical investigation, moreover, it also reveals that Hume’s theory has an 
important feature attributed by Railton to naturalism, namely a ‘revisionist definition’ 
of moral concepts. To elaborate: the distinction between reformation and revision 
must be made clear. An example of the former is the definition of water as cited 
above. The definition of water as H2O is only temporarily instead of eternally closed, 
for natural scientists do not exclude the possibility that a significant progress will be 
made in chemistry in the future and, as a result, this definition could be replaced and 
dropped. I do not intend to suggest that a drastic transformation of the definition of 
concept, as the reformationist approach stands for, may properly be applied to 
Hume’s definition of ‘good’. For, presumably, Hume would hold that so 
comprehensive a reformation of the definition of moral concepts is unlikely, if not 
impossible, to take place. The reason is that Hume almost equates morals with 
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human nature. He defines virtues in terms of utility, and utility here is not abstract 
but based on his inductive reasoning of human affairs, implying that utility has its 
origin in human nature and corresponds to men’s social nature. Almost all virtues are, 
to a larger or lesser extent, connected with men’s sociability. Justice becomes a 
virtue because men are motivated by their sociability to reconcile the conflict 
between their selfishness and the scarcity of natural resources; benevolence and 
humanity are regarded by Hume as synonymous with sociability; other virtues which 
are useful or agreeable to their possessors are praised by us because sociability make 
us share other people’s pleasure. In this way, Hume’s definition of virtue as utility 
will be abandoned only when human nature and/or external circumstances go 
through a dramatic change, which seems unlikely to happen although Hume does not 
deny its possibility. 
What is more applicable to Hume’s naturalism is a moderately revisionist 
definition of good. In ‘A Dialogue’ Hume argues that utility is a general feature of 
virtues, however, exactly what virtues are esteemed as useful or agreeable vary from 
time to time and from place to place. Hume writes that 
Sometimes men differ in their judgment about the usefulness of any habit 
or action: Sometimes also the peculiar circumstances of things render one 
moral quality more useful than others, and give it a peculiar preference 
(EPM, 194). 
In time of war and disorder, ‘the military virtues should be more celebrated 
than the pacific, and attract more the admiration and attention of mankind’ (EPM, 
194). Different countries also have different ideas of utility: in Switzerland, a degree 
of luxury may be ruinous and pernicious, whereas in France and England, it only 
fosters the arts and encourages industry (EPM, 195). Moreover, in a nation where the 
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men live much apart, they will naturally approve more of prudence, while another 
will approve of gaiety; one nation will distinguish themselves by good sense and 
judgment, while another will do so by taste and delicacy. Not to mention those social 
norms which were highly esteemed in ancient Greece and Rome but were forbidden 
in Hume’s time, such as incest and tyrannicide (EPM, 81). In addition, what people 
deemed useful and agreeable does not only diverse spatially and temporally; other 
variables like political institution, custom, and chance, i.e. what Hume calls moral 
causes, have an equal impact on the shaping of moral standards in a particular society. 
Even when our observation is narrowed down, it still appears to us as natural that a 
person has different preferences at different ages in his life: a young person may be 
more attracted by the pleasure brought about by certain virtues, while a mature 
person usually demonstrates qualities that are more solid and useful. To conclude, 
what is to be discerned from this is, although Hume sticks to his definition of good in 
terms of utility unless human nature changes drastically, he nevertheless leaves the 
substantive content of utility open and lets it be determined by the milieu of 
society.
53
 By doing so, Hume, first of all, falls not into the abyss of moral skepticism, 
for ‘good’ is equal to the concrete nature of human beings. Secondly, the explanatory 
force of Hume’s moral theory is maintained all the time, for while he defines ‘good’ 
as utility, the specific implication of utility depends on social conventions which are 
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 As John Rawls’s characterisation of utilitarianism: ‘It is simply a feature of utilitarian doctrine that 
it relies very heavily upon the natural facts and contingencies of human life in determining what forms 
of moral character are to be encouraged in a just society’ (Rawls, 1999: 28). Although this 
characterisation matches the diversity of human moral landscape as observed by Hume, it only serve 
to prove that, for Hume, utility is a tendency of human nature rather than that Hume has developed a 
utilitarian doctrine. 
141 
 
empirical facts rather than a priori philosophical statements. Finally, Moore’s 
question poses no threat to Hume’s philosophy, because although he defines good in 
terms of utility, Hume does not intend it to be conceptually incontestable but is 
expressing an empirical discovery. Moreover, the revisionist definition of utility 
shows that Hume’s naturalism is primarily characterised by its methodological rather 
than substantive dimension, to which Moore’s question does not seem to mount a 
direct challenge. 
At the end of the first part of the thesis, it may be helpful to summarise what 
has been done. My purpose in this part is to defend Hume’s ethical naturalism. In 
order to do so, an account of Hume’s theory of moral psychology has been provided 
after a comparison between the Treatise and EPM. In Chapters Three and Four I 
defended Hume’s naturalism against the criticism from the advocates of 
prescriptivism such R. M. Hare and intuitionism such as G. E. Moore. All of these 
are endeavours to recover a traditional interpretation of Hume’s political philosophy, 
because both Moore and Hare represent a tendency as part of the reaction against 
utilitarianism and the important role of conservative utilitarianism in the tradition of 
British liberal thought. In the second part of the thesis, I will concentrate more 
specifically on Hume’s political philosophy, and the purpose is to demonstrate that 
Hume is best interpreted as a conservative utilitarian by revealing what important 
elements of Hume’s thought are sacrificed when he is interpreted as a conventionalist 
contractarian or a conservative. 
  
142 
 
Chapter 5 Hume’s Non-Instrumental Public Utility 
5.1 A Third Theory of Justice 
My purpose in this chapter is to clarify Hume’s position in the history of 
political thought by challenging a view prevalent in Hume studies nowadays, namely 
that Hume is regarded as a follower of Hobbes and as expressing the latter’s view in 
a more systematic, concise manner. I hope to show that this interpretation of Hume is 
inadequate; instead, I suggest that it is some important elements of Locke’s 
philosophy that is represented in Hume’s thought after amendments, and a number of 
significant resemblances and differences between two philosophers will be revealed. 
In comparing their theories of property and of government, I suggest that Hume is a 
sympathetic reader of Locke; this is so because the main theme of Hume’s political 
theory may well be taken as developing a secular and naturalistic foundation for 
Locke’s theory. By doing so, Hume’s intention was to solve the conflict between 
Locke’s moral conventionalism and the universalism implied in the will of God 
which is the first principle of Locke’s political theory, and to show that even without 
God’s sanction, moral disorder is not the natural consequence to be expected, for 
other important conceptions proposed in Locke’s theory, including family, society, 
convention, and natural sociability, are already sufficient – not in a deductive sense 
but in that they have been empirically verified in human history – to create a decent 
social life. To put it differently, universalism of religious sanction in Locke’s theory 
was dropped by Hume, and the mission originally fulfilled by God as to prevent 
moral relativism or moral skepticism was taken over by the universal moral 
propensity implanted in human nature. In Hume’s secularisation of morals, the 
normative premise of Locke’s political theory was removed. Hume’s intentions was 
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to show that the social order as depicted in Locke’s political theory could be derived 
from human psychology alone without appealing to religious sanction. As a result, 
political philosophy for Hume became a psychological project, and its functions of 
justification and prescription have been turned into explanation and description. 
What is connected with the naturalisation and secularisation of Locke’s 
political theory is a viewpoint Hume inherited from Locke, i.e. the order of human 
society may grow out among its members spontaneously without external sanctions, 
political in Locke’s theory and both political and religious in Hume’s. A common 
view shared by Locke and Hume is that they both regard society as a product of 
human nature, the state or political authority being subordinate to society and created 
as a device that may effectively preserve the morality that already binds men in pre-
political society. In other words, the legitimacy of the state is derived from the 
morality of society. Therefore, unlike Hobbes, neither Locke nor Hume regards 
sociability and morality as artificially created by rational egoism and the state. On 
the contrary, Locke and Hume both recognise that sociability is a propensity 
implanted in human nature, and family, being the basic unit of society, is the first 
occasion for men’s socialisation. Therefore, Hobbes’s natural state of all against all 
is indeed a philosophical fiction and is incompatible with the position of Locke and 
Hume, which is known as empiricism. 
In order to refute the view that Hume is a disciple of Hobbes, in this chapter I 
concentrate on an important essay of David Gauthier: ‘David Hume, Contractarian’. 
The main thesis of Gauthier’s essay is, as he states, ‘What is perhaps controversial 
about these comparisons [i.e. among Hobbes, Locke, and Hume], and so about my 
interpretation, is that with respect to property and justice, Hume is in essence a 
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Hobbist’ (Gauthier, 1998: 28). I will reject Gauthier’s interpretation of Hume by 
considering a question addressed by Gauthier in his essay, namely Hume’s account 
of the origin of man’s duty to observe justice. Hume’s view on this question is to be 
found in Book III of the Treatise, EPM, and in a number of essays. Although it 
seems to me that the perspective from which Hume observes the question is not 
exactly the same in these works, what is common to them is that Hume approaches 
the question by first considering the possibility of the rise of moral distinctions in 
society. After affirming that social order may be secured among its members without 
relying on external sanctions, the state is then brought in to dispose of some 
inconveniences that would inevitably occur along with the enlargement of society. 
The establishment of the state, the origin of its legitimacy, and the measure of man’s 
allegiance is the topic of a later chapter, for here I focus primarily on the first part of 
the story by considering the conception of the person and its impact on the internal 
structure of the interaction among members of a society. It is the different views held 
by interpreters on this question that give rise to a debate concerning the features of 
Hume’s political theory and thus his position in the tradition of political thought.  
In that debate political theorists including David Gauthier, Brian Barry, Russell 
Hardin, Jonathan Harrison, and Paul Kelly are all important participants and stand 
for different philosophical approaches respectively. The view elaborated by Gauthier 
in Morals by Agreement (1986) is known as ‘justice as mutual advantage’. According 
to this view, self-interest is the only motive for man to participate in social 
cooperation; hence man’s duty of being just derives from this. In Treatise on Social 
Justice (1989) Brian Barry criticises Gauthier’s view by providing an alternative 
approach known as ‘justice as impartiality’. Barry is not happy with Gauthier’s view 
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that man’s reason for behaving justly is reducible to a sophisticated and indirect 
pursuit of self-interest. In the hypothetical contract that Gauthier conceives, its 
participants are determinate individuals with full knowledge of their talents, abilities 
and strengths. It is bound to do this because it appeals to self-interest as the motive 
for observing justice, thus ‘if the terms of agreement failed to reflect differential 
bargaining power, those whose power was disproportionate to their share under the 
agreement would have an incentive to seek to upset it’ (Barry, 1989: 7; see also 
Moore, 1994: 212). Instead, Barry’s strategy is to ground justice as impartiality on T. 
M. Scanlon’s contractualist thesis, which saves him the trouble of appealing to 
Rawls’s original position. In ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ Scanlon provides a 
definition of morality as follows: 
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour 
which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement (Scanlon, 1982: 110). 
The moral motive provided by contractualist morality is ‘The desire to be able 
to justify one’s actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject’, and 
the basis on which others decide whether they can reasonably reject the grounds one 
offers is given by their ‘desire to find principles which others similarly motivated 
could not reasonably reject’ (Scanlon, 1982: 116 n.12). Barry’s view coincides with 
Scanlon’s in affirming that 
The desire to be able to justify our actions to ourselves and others on a 
basis capable of eliciting free agreement is, as common experience attests, 
widely shared and deeply grounded (Barry, 1989: 284). 
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For the purpose of this chapter, what should be noted is the marginal role of 
utilitarianism in this contemporary debate. It is true that since Political Argument 
(1965) Barry has involved a debate with utilitarianism, but in his view utilitarianism 
is excluded from being a genuine third theory that contrasts with justice as mutual 
advantage and justice as impartiality (Kelly, 2000b: 44-45). Likewise, in Gauthier’s 
essay, which I would like to reflect on here, his purpose ostensibly is to challenge the 
view that Hume is an important critic of contractarianism by showing the 
contractarian feature of Hume’s theory of justice and government; along with this his 
subordinate thesis is to reject Hume as a proto-utilitarian. However, Gauthier’s 
engagement with utilitarianism in his essay is indirect; he refutes the utilitarian 
interpretation of Hume by considering the circumstances in which justice does not 
exist or is suspended, and the really important implications of his essay are using 
Hume in support of his own justice as mutual advantage by demonstrating the 
seeming absence of distributive justice in Hume’s theory, and challenging the 
egalitarian outcome of justice as impartiality (Kelly and Boucher, 1998: 4-5). Both of 
these implications in Gauthier’s essay will be criticised in this chapter for the reasons 
showed below. 
When reading Gauthier in this way, I am inspired by Professor Paul Kelly’s 
insight that utilitarianism has not been taken seriously by major participants of this 
contemporary debate on justice (Kelly, 2000b). My aim in this chapter is to challenge 
Gauthier by showing that, first, in Hume’s account of the origin of justice and social 
order, Gauthier's hypothetical contract is redundant, because what the hypothetical 
contract is meant to create, namely man’s sociability, is already implanted in men by 
nature and drives them to seek peace and order with one another; second, the feature 
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of Hume’s theory of justice agrees with a form of utilitarianism as elaborated by 
Jonathan Harrison, namely cumulative-effect utilitarianism; third, Gauthier’s 
conservative account of Hume’s theory of justice is a consequence of his failure to 
distinguish Hume’s descriptive theory of psychology from Hume’s normative moral 
standpoints. I shall suggest that, although a conservative tendency is recognisable in 
Hume’s major philosophical works, this should be viewed as a psychological 
tendency observed by Hume in human nature. That is, that man’s desire for a 
property system that secures his possessions is stronger than his need for a just 
distribution of resources, but this may not be viewed properly as Hume’s 
conservative defence of the status quo. Instead, when one turns attention to Hume’s 
economic essays, his egalitarian concern is evident in the discussion of economic 
issues and is thus incompatible with Gauthier’s theory of justice as mutual advantage. 
5.2 Non-Instrumental Public Utility 
Perhaps the starting point of the debate on the feature of Hume’s theory of 
justice is that Hume, both in the Treatise and EMP, famously draws an analogy 
between the origin of justice or social order and the situation of two men rowing a 
boat across the river. In both works, the instance is proposed by Hume when he 
rejects the view that justice arises from promise (Treatise, 315; EPM, 172). Justice 
does not arise from promise because the observance of promise is itself a 
considerable part of justice, ‘and we are not surely bound to keep our word, because 
we have given our word to keep it’ (EPM, 172). Therefore justice must be founded 
on some other basis, which Hume calls convention and describes as ‘a general sense 
of common interest’. It is when Hume tries to make the meaning of his idea of 
convention more explicit that he refers to the example of rowing and the rise of 
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language, words, and money in human society. Presumably the example of rowing 
was considered by Hume as properly expressing the implication of convention; 
otherwise the same example would not appear again in EPM. However, this is an 
example that triggers many important criticisms of as well as arguments about the 
feature of Hume’s theory of justice. As will be explained more clearly in Chapter Six, 
Brian Barry takes issue with Hume’s comparison of the convention of justice with 
the convention of rowing, and criticises Hume for being the one responsible for the 
difficulty in interpreting his theory of justice, for he fails to distinguish cooperation 
convention, which is the case of justice, from coordination convention, which is the 
case of rowing. David Gauthier likewise begins his reconstruction of Hume by 
reflecting on the analogy. Similarly to Barry, Gauthier believes that Hume’s analogy 
of rowing as social order is misleading, because while the former, to use Gauthier’s 
term, is a convention both dominant and stable, neither of these features are to be 
found in the latter, and therefore the device of contract is necessary in the formation 
of justice. In spite of the difference between their approaches, both Barry and 
Gauthier agree that in the situation of the rise of justice, unlike the example of 
rowing, man’s motive to cooperate cannot be created without appealing to certain 
devices additional to the situation, the device in Barry’s account being the state and 
in Gauthiers’ a hypothetical contract. 
To put it in slightly different terms, the reason why the analogy drawn by 
Hume between the convention of rowing and the convention of justice has produced 
criticism from Gauthier and Barry is because man’s compliance with convention in 
the former case is immediately beneficial, whereas in the latter case a single act of 
justice does not always have good consequences and can frequently have negative 
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effects, whether to the individual or to society. In this way, according to the 
conception of the person as observed by Gauthier and Barry in Hume’s theory, they 
believe that man has the motivation to be just only when political authority has been 
established to punish the transgressor, or when man judges it as more beneficial to 
himself compared to not being trusted again and, as a result, excluded from the social 
cooperation of mutual advantage. So an important question that causes the larger 
debate introduced in the previous section and also the debate on the feature of 
Hume’s theory of justice is this: what is man’s motive, if any, of performing duties 
such as justice, the immediate consequence of which is neither beneficial or even 
harmful either to himself and society? 
Now in addressing this question, I do not find Gauthier’s view convincing. 
Hume says at the outset of Section 3 of EPM ‘Of Justice’ that ‘public utility is the 
sole origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this 
virtue are the sole foundation of its merit’ (EPM, 83). Gauthier’s account of this 
sentence is that, although ‘the beneficial consequences’ of justice, which is the basis 
of its morality, consists of man’s moral approval of its promotion of social welfare, 
the ‘public utility’ which is the origin of justice is not social welfare but mutual 
advantage, that is, the self-interest of the individual. This view of enlightened self-
interest or reflective selfishness has typically been attributed to Hume by 
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contractarians, and Gauthier is one of the most remarkable among others.
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According to this view, man’s reason for performing acts which are not beneficial or 
harmful to his interest, e.g. justice, lies in the fact that he may reasonably expect to 
maximise his interest in an indirect manner, namely by upholding the institutions of 
property. Yet this is to ascribe to Hume a view which he not only does not hold but 
criticises stringently.  
It will not escape the reader’s attention that Gauthier’s interpretation of Hume 
is primarily based on EPM and Essays, and his ambition is evident. Given that the 
idea of utility plays a crucial role in EPM, many utilitarians consider this work the 
source of Hume’s utilitarianism and an important text in the tradition of classic 
utilitarianism. In this way, by focusing on EPM and arguing that Hume’s idea of 
utility is not of general interest in society but mutual advantage, Gauthier’s defeat of 
utilitarianism appears decisive. As he says: ‘at least in my view, the Treatise is at 
once more profound and more contractarian’ (Gauthier, 1998: 17). This then justifies 
my objection to Gauthier’s thesis by mainly referring to the Treatise and Essays, for 
if Hume’s anti-contractarian position may be revealed in a work regarded by 
Gauthier as more contractarian, my challenge to him would seem more effective. 
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 See also Rawls, 2000: 21-102. Though elaborating a sentimentalist rather than contractarian account 
of Hume, Frazer argues that the practices of justice and allegiance in Hume’s theory are based 
‘entirely’ on the ‘reflective self-correction of self-interest’ (Frazer, 2010: chap. 3). However, Frazer 
adds that the problem of ‘sensible knave’ may be solved by Hume’s sentimentalism. For Frazer’s 
criticism of Gauthier’s contractarian interpretation of Hume, see Frazer, 2010: 79. Again, though not 
endorsing a contractarian account of Hume’s political theory, Stroud likewise argues that enlightened 
selfishness is the only motive of man to perform justice in Hume’s theory, and many criticisms raised 
by Stroud against Hume are derived from this misinterpretation of Hume’s position. See Stroud, 1977: 
chap. 9. 
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Although I disagree with Gauthier’s view that Hume’s Treatise is more 
contractarian and, by implication, more Hobbesian, I do not deny that a number of 
paragraphs in that work seem to reveal a connection between men’s motive for 
forming society and performing justice and their egoistic tendencies, and this is the 
reason why one must read that work more carefully. For example, a paragraph 
favourable to Gauthier’s contractarian view appears directly after Hume’s referring 
to the situation of rowing in explaining his idea of convention, where Hume writes: 
‘This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest 
friends, is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society’ 
(Treatise, 316). This passion is universal for ‘There scarce is any one, who is not 
actuated by it; and there is no one, who has not reason to fear from it, when it acts 
without any restraint, and give way to its first and most natural movements’ (Treatise, 
316). In this way, Hume indicates that ‘we are to esteem the difficulties in the 
establishment of society, to be greater or less, according to those we encounter in 
regulating and restraining this passion’ (Treatise, 316). So far, Hume’s argument 
appears to fit Gauthier’s contractarianism, for he seems to emphasise the 
predominance of men’s egoism in the process of his seeking peace and order with 
others. Moreover, Gauthier’s view would seem to derive even more powerful support 
from the Treatise when Hume writes that ‘There is no passion, therefore, capable of 
controuling the interested affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of 
its direction’ (Treatise, 316). To judge from these paragraphs alone, it is 
understandable that Gauthier takes Hume’s Treatise as more contractarian and 
believes that his theory of hypothetical contract satisfactorily explains Hume’s 
thought. If this is all Hume had said, I would probably find Gauthier’s account of 
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Hume less questionable. However Hume does not stop here and it is important to 
note what Hume continues to say: 
But in order to form society, ’tis requisite not only that it be 
advantageous, but also that men be sensible of its advantages; and ’tis 
impossible, in their wild uncultivated state, that by study and reflection 
alone, they shou’d ever be able to attain this knowledge (Treatise, 312). 
If my reading of this paragraph is correct, it seems that it is designed precisely 
to reject the contractarian view as held by Gauthier. In this paragraph, Hume 
criticizes that the theory of hypothetical contract overestimates man’s rational faculty 
and assigns to that faculty so complex a task that man’s reason can hardly fulfil in its 
most primitive form. Thus Hume says: 
Now as ’tis by establishing the rule for the stability of possession, that 
this passion [of avidity] restrains itself; if the rule by very abstruse, and 
of difficult invention; society must be esteem’d, in a manner, accidental, 
and the effect of many ages (Treatise, 316). 
History has taught us, however, that a primitive form of society appeared at a 
very early stage of human evolution, and there were no well-designed or complex 
rules of property within it. On the contrary, the rules that prescribed man’s 
behaviours with respect to other people and their possessions were so crude that one 
may discern that these rules were not very different from the expediency that was 
invented to meet man’s more immediate and pressing needs. What, then, is the more 
immediate need of man that the rules of property were meant to serve? And why 
does Hume say that ‘this alteration [of man’s avidity] must necessarily take place 
upon the least reflection’ (Treatise, 316 emphases added)? The answer is to be found 
in an important paragraph of the Treatise: 
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Most fortunately, therefore, there is conjoin’d to those necessities [of 
establishing society and justice prudently], whose remedies are remote 
and obscure, another necessity, which having a present and more obvious 
remedy, may justly be regarded as the first and original principle of 
human society. This necessity is no other than that natural appetite 
betwixt the sexes, which unites them together, and preserves their union, 
till a new tye takes place in their concern for their common offspring. 
This new concern becomes also a principle of union betwixt the parents 
and offspring, and forms a more numerous society (Treatise, 312 
emphases added). 
Accordingly, it clearly shows that Hume does not regard society and justice as 
originating from man’s reflective selfishness, or at least not in the way Gauthier 
attributes to him. Rather, it is man’s sociable nature that explains the rise of society, 
and human beings in this respect are just like other social animals, both instinctively 
seeking the company of those resembling themselves. From this it follows: even if 
Gauthier may separate the question concerning the origin of justice from that 
concerning its morality, yet Gauthier’s theory of hypothetical contract does not help 
to address the former question, because man does not regard joining society an 
instrument for maximising his self-interest. Instead, he is carried along by his instinct 
and love for his offspring to form society and create justice. If justice arises this way 
may be described as a rational design, the role of reason is no more than instrumental 
and is motivated by man’s sociable nature and by man’s tender love for his children. 
Society is not rationally created as an instrument for maximising man’s self-interest, 
as what Gauthier argues. On the contrary, what Hume teaches us is that given man’s 
biological nature and his love for offspring, man’s egoistic tendency must be 
restrained, otherwise his more fundamental nature would be frustrated. In other 
words, man’s egoism is restrained not because it may more effectively be satisfied in 
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an indirect manner, but because man’s sociable nature could not be fulfilled 
otherwise. Therefore, instead of taking society and justice as instrumental and being 
rationally designed to meet man’s egoism, the redirection of man’s egoism is 
instrumental in preserving a peaceful social life in which man’s desire for company, 
his love for family and offspring, may avoid being unfulfilled. If reason has a role to 
play in the formation of society and justice, it is not a servant of selfishness, and is 
not assigned to artificially create sociability in human nature so that selfishness may 
be satisfied on a more stable and secure basis. On the contrary, reason is the servant 
of man’s sociability and is assigned to restrain selfishness within its proper limit to 
prevent it from causing obstacles to man’s sociability, which is implanted both in his 
biological and psychological constitution. A man’s selfishness drives him to clash 
with others, but a man’s sociability drives him to seek company of others. A 
hypothetical contract is effective in the former case because it restrains selfishness 
and creates sociability, but a hypothetical contract is redundant in the latter case 
because sociability is natural and selfishness is moderated by it.  
Therefore Hume once again affirms that the family rather than solitary 
individuals has been the basic unit of human society since the beginning, and man’s 
other-regarding feelings rather than selfishness are the origin of justice. In that 
situation, socialisation takes place both among families and within each family. 
Regarding the former, Hume says 
that nothing can be more simple and obvious than that rule [of property]; 
that every parent, in order to preserve peace among his children, must 
establish it; and that these first rudiments of justice must every day be 
improv’d, as the society enlarges (Treatise, 316). 
At the same time, in each family 
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where the parents govern by the advantage of their superior strength and 
wisdom, and at the same time are restrain’d in the exercise of their 
authority by that natural affection, which they bear their children. In a 
little time, custom and habit operating on the tender minds of the children, 
makes them sensible of the advantages, which they may reap from 
society, as well as fashions them by degrees for it, by rubbing off those 
rough corners and untoward affections, which prevent their coalition 
(Treatise, 312). 
It may be argued that, even if Hume’s biological account of the origin of 
society is admitted, nevertheless the situation in which one joins society out of self-
interest is not excluded. For example, it is wholly conceivable that some men who do 
not have a blood relationship with members of a society might join them due to the 
shelter and protection they may receive from the society. This seems to be one of the 
possible ways in which the family became enlarged into the tribe and the tribe into 
the city. However, even if this is the case, still Gauthier’s device of hypothetical 
contract does not serve to explain why these new members of the society have a duty 
to observe justice; at least, it does not help to clarify Hume’s view in this respect. For 
Gauthier conflates man’s motive of joining society with his duty to observe justice, 
something which is regarded as distinct by Hume, the latter being meant to restrain 
the former. Gauthier’s view is applicable only at the very beginning when new 
members first join a group, for given that their purpose is to seek protection and 
security, they must observe norms which regulate men’s interaction in that society, 
or be expelled. However, given that men are considered naturally sociable by Hume 
and that the psychological mechanism of sympathy is implanted in human nature, 
these new members would soon acquire feelings for the society they join and for 
people who generously accommodate them. Initially they would refrain from 
interfering with other people’s possessions because they would be punished and even 
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expelled, and this is a consequence that is in conflict with their motive for joining 
society in the first place. Yet their sympathy with the welfare of society and with the 
well-being of others is cultivated in their every interaction with other members of the 
society, and their dependence on the society is also deepened on a daily basis 
whether through the exchange of goods, friendship, love and marriage, etc. From 
these social relationships derive their feelings for the place and for the group of 
people of which they now are a part. As a result, if they suffer from pain caused in 
their breasts once their possessions are arbitrarily interfered with, and/or at the time 
when their sympathy has been cultivated to the extent that they may share the pain of 
others’ on their observing the threat to which other people’s possessions are exposed, 
the feelings regarding the morality of justice and immorality of injustice will have 
been developed in them. Hence the origin of their sense of duty of abstaining from 
taking other people’s possessions, a sense whose origin is independent of what they 
originally intended to obtain from social life, i.e. their self-interest. Therefore, when 
the sociability that Hume observes in human nature is taken seriously, Gauthier’s 
device of hypothetical contract is simply redundant in explaining man’s motive for 
observing justice. 
Having showed that Gauthier’s theory of hypothetical contract does not fit 
Hume’s account of man’s duty to be just whether when society was first formed or 
when new members join a society, now let us consider if the hypothetical contract 
thesis is applicable to the third situation, that is when a member of society is 
reflecting on his duty to observe justice. Although it is possible that this situation 
may occur in a member of society where the political authority has not yet been 
established, here I would like to consider the situation of the political society, 
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because this is also a situation Gauthier discusses through analysis of Hume’s essay 
‘Of the Original Contract’. Gauthier makes a distinction between different varieties 
of contractarianism; they are original contract, explicit contract, tacit contract, and 
hypothetical contract. Gauthier argues that, while the first three varieties of 
contractarianism are explicitly rejected by Hume, Hume nevertheless adopts 
hypothetical contract in his defence of property and government. However, it seems 
to me that Gauthier mistakes the point of Hume’s essay in two respects. 
First, it is by no means evident, as what Gauthier argues, that Hume rejects 
other forms of contractarianism but adopts hypothetical contract, because once we 
clarify the reason as to why Hume rejects the former, it is clear that the latter is 
likewise redundant in Hume’s account of man’s duty. Here let us take original 
contract as an example, for it is a form of contractarianism that Hume does not 
wholly reject. As Hume indicates, given men’s equality in their body force, in their 
mental powers and faculties, ‘nothing but their own consent could, at first, associate 
them together, and subject them to any authority’, and  
If this, then, be meant by the original contract, it cannot be denied, that 
all government is, at first, founded on a contract, and that the most 
ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by that 
principle (Essays, 468). 
Hume’s view that the original contract is a possible origin of the state is not 
overlooked by Gauthier, what Gauthier misses is the reason why Hume regards this 
origin of the state as having nothing to do with man’s duty of allegiance. Indeed, 
Hume criticises contractarians because they ‘are not contented with these 
concessions’ but insist that all political authority is founded on contract alone 
(Essays, 469). For Hume, this is to work in vain because contractarians simply seek 
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the origin of man’s duty in the wrong place. Even if, as Hume is willing to recognise, 
in primitive society men were motivated by self-interest to choose a governor and 
promise their allegiance, by this means they may have at first a leader in the time of 
war and then an arbiter in the time of peace, that motive may not be identified with 
the sense which men feel that they were obliged to be obedient. The former did not 
give rise to the latter. This is so because egoistic concern and promise may drive men 
into a stage named political society, but not long after the stage begins, these would 
be replaced by a sense of duty which is gradually cultivated in men and which will 
be instilled into the minds of their offspring in the process of socialisation, including 
family education, political discipline, the cultivation of their natural sympathy and 
love of reputation. This sense of duty independent of man’s original motive for 
joining political society is derived from his feelings for the governor, for his life and 
property under governance, and for his fellows in the same political society. These 
feelings allow him to perceive the pain caused in himself and in other people when 
turbulence and disorder occur, thus he feels that it is immoral to perform such acts. 
For their offspring, who were born into a society and did not enjoy the privilege of 
deciding to join political society prudently, socialisation begins at the very early 
stage of their life. What is passed to them from their parents is not the idea of the 
very origin of their obedience, i.e. self-interest and promise, but the sense of duty 
that it is moral to be obedient and immoral to transgress laws or rules. By this means, 
parents’ intention is not to teach their children that they have duty to respect others’ 
property and to be obedient to the governor only because they may reasonably expect 
to maximise their self-interest, but to cultivate their humanity and sympathy with 
other people’s feelings, and to educate them to behave properly in social life. This is 
motivated by the parents’ love for their children, by their sense of duty as being a 
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member of political society, and by their care for the fine reputation of family. This 
sense of duty, which originated from our ancestors’ sympathy with their fellows in 
ancient society, has been passed from one generation to another down to us, and it 
has not been lost in the long history of human beings because we are endowed with 
the same capability as our ancestors of feeling pain for others’ suffering. Although 
we skip the stage in which our earliest ancestors had the privilege of promising their 
obedience out of prudence, we nevertheless enjoy the utility that the state brings 
about just as our ancestors did, because we retain the sense of duty to be obedient 
which has nothing to do with the origin of the state, whether it is contract or not.
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This, of course, is not to suggest that people who were born under political 
society, like most of us, may not reflect on their relationship with the governor and 
on their duty to be obedient. On the contrary, this is precisely the question addressed 
by Hume in his essay, and by observing Hume’s view in this respect, we are also led 
to Gauthier’s second misunderstanding of Hume. The essay ‘Of the Original 
Contract’ is meant by Hume to be read along with another essay following it named 
‘Of Passive Obedience’, thus Hume claims at the outset of the latter that ‘In the 
former essay, we endeavoured to refute the speculative systems of politics advanced 
in this nation…We come now to examine the practical consequences’ (Essays, 488). 
When we clarify Hume’s view by taking both these essays into account, we will find 
that Gauthier’s thesis faces a strict challenge, and this is why he has neglected the 
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 This is precisely the feature of utilitarian’s view on men’s obligations to the government and 
government’s duty to men, as Plamenatz remarks that ‘Hume’s greatest service as a political theorist 
is his indifference to questions of origin…No matter how governments came into existence, the 
present duty of obedience is always grounded in utility’ (Plamenatz, 1958: 2; 43). 
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latter essay. For Hume’s purpose in these essays is to point out a middle way 
between the doctrine of resistance and the doctrine of passive obedience, thus he says 
‘That both these systems of speculative principles are just; though not in the sense, 
intended by the parties’ (Essays, 466). Indeed, Hume does not attempt to overthrow 
any of these doctrines. Instead, his intention is to show a more fundamental principle 
implanted in human nature by the evaluation of which the applicability of resistance 
or passive obedience, in other words, the measures of man’s submission due to 
sovereigns, is determined. The principle is public utility. Hume’s consequentialist 
standpoint is clearly expressed as follows: 
As the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of society, 
which require mutual abstinence from property, in order to preserve 
peace among mankind; it is evident, that, when the execution of justice 
would be attended with very pernicious consequences, that virtue must be 
suspended, and give place to public utility, in such extraordinary and 
such pressing emergencies. The maxim, fiat Justitia ruat Caelum, let 
justice be performed, though the universe be destroyed, is apparently 
false, and by sacrificing the end to the means, shews a preposterous idea 
of the subordination of duties…The case is the same with the duty of 
allegiance; and common sense teaches us, that, as government binds us to 
obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, that duty must 
always, in extraordinary cases, when public ruin would evidently attend 
obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation (Essays, 489). 
After affirming that public utility is the principle underlying justice and allegiance, 
Hume continues to make an important claim: 
Resistance, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies, the 
question can only be among good reasoners, with regard to the degree of 
necessity, which can justify resistance, and render it lawful or 
commendable. And here I must confess, that I shall always incline to 
their side, who draw the bond of allegiance very close, and consider an 
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infringement of it, as the last refuge in desperate cases, when the public is 
in the highest danger, from violence and tyranny (Essays, 490). 
Although Gauthier does not discuss Hume’s essay ‘Of Passive Obedience’, the 
conservative tendency of Hume’s moral and political theory has not escaped his 
attention, so he remarks that: ‘We may admit the value of Hume’s prescriptive 
appeal without fully accepting its accompanying conservatism’ (Gauthier, 1998: 41). 
According to Gauthier, Hume holds that ‘the utility of upholding established practice 
takes precedence over the utility of the practice itself’, and Hume’s defence of the 
status quo is a result of the limited horizon of his own social position (Gauthier, 1998: 
41). I think this account of Hume is problematic, because when Hume claims that 
resistance should be ‘the last refuge in desperate cases’, his reasoning is not based on 
a calculation that everyone may expect to benefit from upholding the established 
government more than any alternatives, a strategy attributed to Hume by Gauthier 
which draws a link between man’s self-interest and salience. Instead, Hume is 
cautious with the doctrine of resistance because it is a right that once generally 
employed by citizens in trivial cases of injustice caused by the state, the cost that the 
society is due to pay would outweigh its gain. This account of Hume’s view is 
verified by himself, as he says that besides the mischief of a civil war accompanying 
insurrection, it also forces the governors into very violent measures which they never 
would have embraced when the governed remain tame and obedient (Essays, 490). 
This shows that Gauthier’s conservative interpretation of Hume is inadequate 
because Hume does not defend the status quo for any belief in the intrinsic value of 
established institutions or practices. Rather, in determining the measure of man’s 
duty of allegiance, Hume clearly employs a calculation of general utility. That is, he 
gauges the utility of a certain type of act, e.g. resistance or obedience, once generally 
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performed against its cost, and when the cost is rather high as in the case of altering 
the political authority, the only possibility for such an act to produce utility 
outweighing its cost is ‘when the public is in the highest danger, from violence and 
tyranny’. 
5.3 Man’s Self-Justification and Hume’s Utilitarianism 
There is a difference between man contemplating his duty to be just when he is 
by nature other-regarding and bears some genuine feelings for his membership of 
society, and man considering his duty to be just when he values his participation in a 
society and his acquirement of its membership only because these are instrumental in 
his pursuit of self-interest. The former I take as what Hume is saying, the latter is 
Gauthier’s own position but is attributed by him to Hume. If this difference is made 
clear, we will see why Hume does not deserve the blame for misleading readers by 
drawing an analogy between two men rowing a boat and the rise of justice. Let me 
try to put it this way: In the case of rowing, from the view of contractarianism, I have 
a duty to row if and only if it is beneficial to me. If the boat moves only when both 
row, and if the other person is not going to row unless I row, then I have a reason to 
row and so does he, therefore the boat will cross the river and both me and him 
benefit. The situation whereby only one man rows is excluded, because the boat will 
move only when we both row and one will row only when the other rows, so both 
will row; otherwise it is pointless for us to sit in the boat. However, if I may still 
benefit from not fulfilling my part of the job, then I feel that my duty to row ceases 
because my self-interest will be maximised by being a free-rider. The situation is 
different in my understanding of what Hume is saying. I have a reason to row not 
because another person will row only when I row, but because I want to cross the 
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river and I feel that being a free-rider is an improper way to achieve that goal. I feel 
that it is improper to be a free-rider because I may sympathise with another person’s 
feelings when he is taken advantage of by me, and I may imagine how I would feel if 
another person attempted to take advantage of me. So I feel I am obliged to row as 
long as I want to cross the river, and he feels the same way, as a result both of us will 
cross the river. However, I will not row when I know another person will not row, 
because the boat will not move when only one rows, and I am not obliged to do 
things in vain. From this viewpoint, I will row even if I may benefit from not rowing; 
my duty of rowing does not cease because my feelings that being a free-rider is 
wrong make me feel that I am obliged to abstain from doing so. If the origin of 
man’s duty is like that which contractarians conceive, then everyone has motivation 
to take the chance of being a free-rider and to benefit from others’ labour. In that 
case, it is understandable why Hume’s comparison of two men rowing a boat with 
justice is regarded as confusing, since when the number of persons involved is larger 
than a dyad, when one’s act is not directly observed and imitated by others, one 
would seek to maximise his utility when he is confident that his transgression of 
justice will not be detected. If everyone holds the same view, it is simply impossible 
for order to arise or to last for any longer time among a group. In this way, man must 
be supplied with extra reasons for not escaping his duty, such as hypothetical 
contract or the political authority. However, if the example of rowing is as I believe 
Hume is saying, then Hume’s comparison of it with the origin of justice is sensible. 
Because man feels that he is obliged to do his part whether or not the other will do so 
(unless he can be certain that the other will not do his part for that would render 
one’s labour in vain), then the sense of duty that he is obliged to not do wrong will 
bind him whether it is in the situation of a dyad or in a much larger group. When this 
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is the case, order will arise within society just as the boat will cross the river. There is 
no need to supply extra reasons to create man’s motive for acting in accordance with 
that which his duty requires, for as Hume observes, the motive is already implanted 
in man’s sociability. Presumably, this is an important reason as to why Hume regards 
his philosophical works as fulfilling the role of anatomist rather than painter. 
However, contractarianism is not the only theory taking issue with Hume’s 
comparison of rowing with the convention of justice. If the discussion above has 
shown that Gauthier’s hypothetical contract thesis does not fit Hume’s theory of 
justice, which in fact is founded on the principle of utility, still it is not clear what the 
feature of Hume’s utilitarianism is. For in the situation of two men rowing a boat, it 
is presumed that the boat will progress only when both oarsmen row. In this case, the 
actions of either oarsman are necessary if the good which consists in the progress of 
the boat is to be secured. This is different from the case in which man has a duty to 
perform an act because the general performance of such an act will produce positive 
consequences. For the latter, each action does not produce a good consequence itself, 
and they are neither severally necessary if good consequences are to be secured. By 
contrast, for the former, since every act is necessary to produce good consequences, 
then every act does produce good consequences itself, as Jonathan Harrison writes, 
‘they produce good consequences because they are one of a set of actions the several 
performance of which is necessary if a certain good is to be produced’ (Harrison, 
1993 vol.1: 10). In other words, the latter form of utilitarianism does not take into 
account the fact that man has a duty to perform acts which do not themselves 
produce good consequences, for such duties simply are not recognised by it. Now if 
we consider the example of rowing alone, it seems that Hume conceives man’s duty 
165 
 
to be just as severally necessary if the good consequences produced by the practices 
of justice are to be secured. However, if this is what Hume has in mind, it would 
render Hume’s distinction between justice and benevolence in Appendix III to EPM 
pointless. Hume explains the difference between benevolence and justice by 
comparing the happiness and prosperity they bring about respectively to the building 
of a wall and a vault. In the case of benevolence, its utility is complete in each act of 
good-will, such as when each stone substantively increases the height of a wall. 
Whereas in the case of justice, each act contributes not to secure public utility, just 
like ‘each individual stone would, of itself, fall to the ground’ when a vault is built, 
‘nor is the whole fabric supported but by the mutual assistance and combination of 
its corresponding parts’ (EPM, 171). What Hume is saying here seems to be this: on 
the one hand, each single stone contributes not to the building of the vault without 
the support of others; on the other, when the vault is built, the falling of any stone 
would cause the falling of those next to it and eventually the collapse of the whole 
vault. Considering the first point alone, it seems to suggest that justice is a virtue 
which produces good consequence only when it is generally performed. Yet the 
second point implies that every act of justice is necessary if the utility of the whole 
practice is to be secured; in other words, every act of justice is beneficial. If the latter 
is the case, then Hume’s distinction between justice and benevolence in terms of 
their utility is insensible, because, not unlike benevolence, each act of justice also 
contributes to public utility directly, and this is so because any transgression of 
justice would seriously undermine the stability of the practice. 
If Hume’s distinction between justice and benevolence is not to lose its 
significance, then we may take the first view as his underlying position, so his 
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conception of man’s duty to be just is based on the idea that this type of acts brings 
about good consequences when generally performed. Indeed, this seems to be a more 
plausible account of Hume’s view, for if every act of justice is indispensable for this 
practice to be beneficial, then man should not escape his duty even in the most 
extreme cases, because one can hardly imagine an act the utility of which is going to 
compensate the harm caused by the collapse of justice. However, a view like this is 
incompatible with man’s idea of his duty to be just, the explanation and description 
of which is the main purpose of Hume’s philosophy. Ordinarily we feel we should 
not transgress justice at will, and we should not transgress justice when the benefit of 
doing so is very tempting to us, but we also feel that justice is not to be observed in 
the most urgent and extreme cases. For example, supposing there is a well-kept lawn 
in the park. I feel I should not walk on the grass at will, and I feel I should not walk 
on the grass even if it will save time when I am late for an important interview. 
However, if I am trying to save a victim of a car accident and walking across the 
lawn is the shortcut to the hospital, I may totally justify my own act of taking the 
shortcut. Justice is suspended and gives place to benevolence or compassion in this 
case. In ordinary situations, I have a duty not to walk on the grass not because my act 
might set a bad example, as a view held by contractarians, for even if no one is 
around I still feel it is incumbent on me. Rather, my duty is derived from a supposed 
fact that if everyone does the same, the park lawn would be spoilt. In the 
extraordinary case, the reason why I feel my walking on the grass is justified lies in a 
supposed fact that if everyone in the same situation does the same, utility secured 
would outweigh the harm caused. Now I suggest that Hume’s principal view is rather 
closer to what is stated here than to a rigid view, otherwise he would not enumerate 
circumstances in which justice is suspended and gives place to other norms which 
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produce more utility (EPM, 83-89). One possible way, therefore, to make sense of 
Hume’s position is to suppose that Hume is not always clear that he actually employs 
two types of utilitarian reasoning in his theory. As indicated by Jonathan Harrison, 
although two views are similar, the act prescribed by one may be impermissible 
according to another. For example, there may well be an act which, to the best of my 
power, may produce most utility compared with other acts that I am capable of. 
Meanwhile, however, this act may also be a type of action which if generally 
performed would produce harmful consequences. When this is the case, according to 
the original or act utilitarianism, I am obliged to perform it; whereas according to the 
modified or cumulative-effect utilitarianism, I am obliged to refrain from it. 
A distinction should be made clear. In the previous section it has been said that 
man is driven to observe justice by his natural sociability, that is, his desire for the 
company of others and sympathy with public interest constituting his sense of duty. 
Now man’s sense of duty, i.e. being just is right and unjust is wrong, drives him to 
respect others’ possessions, perform his promise, and respect social norms. So far, 
however, man fulfils his duty to be just before another psychological mechanism is 
employed, i.e. his self-justification.
56
 That is to say, instead of man’s performance of 
justice out of a desire for social life, a man must also know that he is being just for a 
reason. For most of us, the function of desire and self-justification are working in our 
minds almost every minute. I may have a desire to do something for which I am not 
able to provide a reason for doing; on the other hand, I may have a reason to do 
things that I do not desire. For example, after a party night I may have no desire to 
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 For a psychological affirmation of this mechanism of mankind, see Aronson, 1999: chap. 5. 
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attend a lecture in the early morning, but I have a reason to do so because it is 
important for me to pass the exam at the end of term. Conversely, I may have a 
desire to cheat in an exam because I have not studied hard and I do not want to fail 
the exam, but I may not give myself a reason to do so because I know in most cases 
cheating is an improper way to achieve the goal. It is by this psychological process of 
self-justification that I provide myself with a reason to observe justice if I may 
impoverish myself by returning a loan and desire that ‘with regard to that single act, 
the laws of justice were for a moment suspended in the universe’ (Treatise, 319). Of 
course, self-justification is still related to desire, so the difference between reason 
and desire as motives is not a categorical distinction. Moreover, it is also by self-
justification that I may provide myself with a reason to turn away from justice under 
some extraordinary circumstances, as Hume writes: 
Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument 
of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to former limitations of 
property? Or if a city besieged were perishing with hunger; can we 
imagine, that men will see any means of preservation before them, and 
lose their lives, from a scrupulous regard to what, in other situations, 
would be the rules of equity and justice? The USE and TENDENCY of that 
virtue is to procure happiness and security, by preserving order in society: 
But where the society is ready to perish from extreme necessity, no 
greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injustice; and every man 
may now provide for himself by all the means, which prudence can 
dictate, or humanity permit (EPM, 85). 
Therefore a difference between what I understand Hume to be saying and what 
is attributed to him by contractarians is this: For the former, Hume takes both man’s 
desire to maintain social peace and man’s reason for justifying his doing so as 
implanted in human nature. However, for the latter, contractarians such as Gauthier 
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and Barry understand Hume to be saying that there is no natural desire in man for a 
social relationship, but man does have a reason to seek peace and order with one 
another because he is a natural utility maximiser, so a desire for peaceful social life is 
created for that reason by appealing to devices such as the state or hypothetical 
contract. 
I hope to stick to the utilitarian account of Hume, so what must be clarified 
next is the reason for man’s self-justification as Hume observes in human nature. To 
answer this, we find that the principle extracted from our common experience of 
daily life such as abstaining from walking on a well-kept lawn, namely one having a 
duty to perform a certain type of act when the general performance of it brings good 
consequences, is not precise enough. For there are many actions which when 
generally performed do produce good consequences, but they do not become my 
duty on that account. For example, running for half hour everyday when performed 
generally would improve the general health condition of society, but if I have a duty 
to do so, it is because that act is good for me rather than the positive effects of its 
general performance. However, this has not changed the fact that in many cases we 
feel we have a duty to abstain from doing something given that if everyone does the 
same bad consequences would arise. Therefore, in these cases there must be some 
extra condition that conjointly gives rise to my duty. It is important to observe this 
because it is this condition along with another (which I will soon explain) that 
together constitute the reasonable boundary of man’s duty to be just. The condition 
here I mean is that, to use Harrison’s expression, ‘actions of the class must be so 
related to one another that, if they are not performed in the majority of cases, then 
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they will not produce good consequences’ (Harrison, 1993 vol.1: 18). R. F. Harrod 
characterises the condition thus: 
There are certain acts which when performed on n similar occasions 
have consequences more than n times as great as those resulting from 
one performance. And it is in this class of cases that obligations arise 
(Harrod, 1936: 148, quoted in Harrison, 1993 vol.1: 18). 
Accordingly, this condition well explains one’s idea of the duty to observe 
justice. On the one hand, it suggests that, in contrast with act utilitarianism, not every 
act of justice is necessary to secure the good produced by the practice of justice. Man 
may omit to perform justice here and there because other norms produce more utility 
compared with justice. In this way, the difference between cumulative-effect 
utilitarianism and act utilitarianism is evident. The latter takes every act of justice as 
indispensable, but the former is less rigid and more realistic in that it explains the 
fact that not to perform any just act does not undermine the utility of the whole 
practice, but not to perform every or most of just acts does cause the collapse of it. 
Therefore we must perform certain act, the consequence of which is no good if not 
bad, because if everyone escaped from his duty in similar cases, justice would be 
undermined. However, on the other hand, we do not think the duty binds us when the 
performance of it brings about disaster. ‘Let justice be performed, though the 
universe be destroyed’ is a principle incompatible with our experience and is, as we 
have seen, the object of Hume’s criticism. So when should I suspend my duty to be 
just? Does cumulative-effect utilitarianism offer a principle to help me judge this 
matter? Yes, in fact, and it is in this respect that cumulative-effect utilitarianism, 
according to Harrison, is more advantageous that other theories such as intuitionism 
of Sir David Ross (Harrison, 1993 vol.1: 20-22). This then brings us to the second 
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condition which has not yet been explained, namely, to borrow Harrod’s expression 
again:  
A lie is justified when the balance of pain or loss of pleasure is such that, 
if a lie was told in all circumstances when there was no less a balance of 
pain or loss of pleasure, the harm due to the total loss of confidence did 
not exceed the sum of harm due to truthfulness in every case (Harrod, 
1936: 149, quoted in Harrison, 1993 vol.1: 20). 
In other words, our failure to apply a rule to a case is justified if the harm 
derived from so doing in cases as hard or harder is less or no more than the harm 
caused by applying the rule to these cases. It should be noted that, when duty is 
suspended in not very hard cases, the gain in every case is smaller than the gain 
derived from the suspension of duty in very hard cases, yet not very hard cases 
happen much more frequently than very hard cases, so when general utility is 
considered, not very hard cases have the advantage. Meanwhile, the loss of the utility 
by the suspension of duty in not very hard cases is also greater than the loss of utility 
in very hard cases. For example, although man may not justify his walking on a well-
kept lawn simply because he wants to, he may regard the rule that one is justified to 
walk on a lawn only in cases when someone’s life is at stake as too rigid, because he 
may feel that the advantage brought about by everyone’s walking on the lawn when 
one is late for important interviews evidently outweigh its harm. However, if this is 
the case, one can imagine that the lawn would soon be spoilt, because it may 
reasonably be supposed that among people who walk in the park, some of them are 
late for important occasions, and such event may happen frequently every day. When 
man takes this condition into account, he then feels that being late for an important 
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interview is not a reason which may justify his walking on a well-kept lawn, thus he 
abstains from doing so. 
Here we have introduced two conditions implied in Hume’s theory of justice: 
one is that we have duty to perform a certain type of action not only because the 
general performance of this type of action is beneficial, but also because its 
beneficial consequences depends on its being performed in the majority of cases; 
another is that we may justify our failure to perform certain type of actions when the 
general failure to perform these type of actions causes less or no more harm than its 
general performance. What these two conditions conjointly constitute is the 
reasonable boundary of man’s duty to be just; the one provides a reason for him to do 
so, and another provides a reason for which his suspension of duty is justified. It 
should also be noted that between these two conditions is a rigid prescription with 
respect to man’s duty to observe justice and almost no exception is to be justified, 
which then reveals another important difference between Hume’s utilitarianism and 
the hypothetical contract thesis of Gauthier. According to a contractarian moral 
theory such as Gauthiers’, a theory of moral duty based on the supposed consequence 
of an action when it is generally performed is not realistic enough. Instead, it is 
argued that ‘We should base our conduct upon what, after the fullest consideration 
possible in the time at our disposal, it seems most likely will happen’ (Harrison, 1993 
vol.1: 23). From this viewpoint, if I have reason to suppose that everybody will 
continue to perform his duty, and if I may relieve a not very hard case by failing to 
apply a rule of justice, then I should do so even if I realise that the general 
performance of this type of action would produce negative consequences. Likewise, 
this view holds that I do not have a duty to perform a certain type of action even if its 
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general performance would bring good consequences, so long as I have good reason 
to believe that other people will not do the same. This view, however, is problematic, 
and what is equally problematic would be to attribute this view to Hume. The 
contractarian view is problematic because my duty to perform an action is 
conditioned by what I believe others will do. It might be objected that Hume’s 
utilitarianism likewise bases man’s duty on a supposed consequence caused by other 
people’s actions. Indeed, this is true. Yet a difference between Hume’s utilitarianism 
and Gauthier’s contractarianism is that, the agent in the former theory has his eye on 
public interest while the agent in the latter theory cares only about maximising his 
self-interest. This is a significant difference because agents in either theory are not 
capable of knowing what other people will do, the best they can do is to make a 
supposition in this respect, so admittedly both a contractarian and a utilitarian would 
have to take into account some undecided factors in deciding what action he ought to 
perform. The difference lies in that since a utilitarian has genuine feelings for his 
fellows and society, his interpretation of those undecided factors would be based on 
what he regards as most beneficial for society, so even if he is not capable of 
knowing what other people will do, he nevertheless performs what his sense of duty 
instructs and does those actions of which he feels other people would approve. On 
the contrary, a contractarian cares about social cooperation only because it is the 
most secure way for him to benefit, so his interpretation of those undecided factors 
would be based on what he regards as most beneficial to himself. In this way, even if 
he is not certain about what other people will do, he presumes that his injustice 
would not be detected in some secret events and others would continue to observe 
justice, so that he may justify his being a free-rider to maximise his self-interest. To 
put it in slightly different terms, ‘good reasons’ to believe that others will not do the 
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same is sufficient for a contractarian to fail his duty, but not sufficient for a utilitarian 
to turn away from what he thinks is right. For a utilitarian, he must have ‘conclusive 
reasons’ for thinking that others will not apply the rules which he applies, then his 
duty to apply those rules ceases. This is so because if everyone ceases his duty only 
when he knows that others will not apply these rules, no bad consequences would 
follow. However nobody except the omniscient being is capable of having a 
conclusive reason for knowing what others will do, and since I am not omniscient, 
my duty binds me all the time, because if everyone fails his duty only because he has 
good reason to believe others will not do the same, bad consequences will arise, and I 
have a duty to avoid such consequences according to the first condition. My duty 
binds me unless it meets the second set of conditions, namely the failure to fulfil my 
duty in some very hard cases, once generally performed, produces less or no more 
harm than its fulfilment (Harrison, 1993 vol.1: 25-28). In brief, for Hume’s 
utilitarianism, as Harrison accurately remarks, 
My duty to perform actions of a sort which would have good 
consequences if they were generally practised will thus depend, in some 
measure, upon my ignorance of the behaviour of other people (Harrison, 
1993 vol.1: 27). 
Harrison’s essay ‘Utilitarianism, Universalisation, and Our Duty to be Just’ 
which I have drawn on in this section provides a detailed account of utilitarian reason 
for man’s duty to be just, and in the previous section I have tried to explain that in 
Hume’s account of the origin of society, man’s desire to seek peace and order is 
already implanted in him by nature and is cultivated in the process of his 
socialisation. Both the desire and the reason to observe justice is to be found in 
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Hume’s philosophical theory because these, as Hume argues, are both parts of human 
nature. 
5.4 Hume’s Egalitarianism in Essays 
Next I would like to consider another important implication of Gauthier’s essay, 
namely that Gauthier seems to take Hume as agreeing with his own standpoint in 
defending the status quo and not providing a sanction of redistribution of property. In 
doing so, Gauthier is using Hume to support his own theory of justice as mutual 
advantage and to challenge the egalitarian implications of justice as impartiality. I 
hope to show that this is a misunderstanding of Hume’s view and also fails to take 
utilitarianism seriously as a third type of theory of justice. To continue the criticism 
of hypothetical contract theory and the utilitarian interpretation of Hume’s theory of 
justice above, in this section I concentrate on Hume’s economic essays and shall try 
to show that there is an egalitarian tendency implied in them. Accordingly I suggest 
that Hume’s criticism of distributive justice in his philosophical works is derived 
from his conception of the task of a moral anatomist, rather than it being an approval 
of Gauthier’s view. 
  As has been said, Gauthier takes Hume as drawing a link between self-interest 
and salience. That is to say, every person has strong need for a system of property to 
secure his life and safety, ‘so that each has strong interest in reaching and 
maintaining agreement with his fellows on some system’ (Gauthier, 1998: 31). On 
the other hand, every person expects to benefit less from two different systems of 
property in comparison with no system at all, ‘so that each is much more concerned 
with agreement on some system, than with the choice among possible systems’ 
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(Gauthier, 1998: 31).
57
 In this way, those rules which seem most obvious to men 
would catch their imagination and become the objects of their agreement. In 
Gauthier’s terms, these rules provides the salient basis for men’s agreement, and the 
rules of property that share this feature of salience including first possession, present 
possession, succession, prescription, and accession. According to Gauthier, 
It will be noted that the use of salience to select among possible 
conventions and rules is highly conservative in its effects. This 
conservatism, of course, reflects Hume’s insistence that, while a system 
of property is essential, the choice among systems is of much less 
importance. In critical discussion of Hume’s theory we might wish to 
question this insistence. We might question whether present possession, 
inheritance, precedence, would command the interested recognition of all 
concerned (Gauthier, 1998: 32). 
I am skeptical of this being an adequate account of Hume’s view on the 
distribution of property, for it seems that Gauthier fails to distinguish clearly what 
Hume regards as moral and praiseworthy from Hume’s psychological explanation of 
the formation of morality. If there is an conservative tendency as one may perceive 
from reading Hume’s account of justice and property rules whether in the Treatise or 
EPM, that tendency along with the desire for a system of property more urgently than 
a ideal distribution of property are both propensities of human nature, and Hume is 
describing rather than justifying them. Moreover, before one questions Hume’s 
‘insistence’, one must first be clear about that, if salience has a role to play in 
Hume’s account of the origin of property, it is connected with man’s sociability and 
sympathy rather than with self-interest. If the rules enumerated by Hume seem 
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conservative in their effects, they are not chosen for that effect but because they are 
the most effective way to satisfy man’s sociability. Therefore, underlying the 
seemingly conservative appearance of these property rules is man’s sympathy with 
public utility. 
One of Hume’s most explicit criticisms of distributive justice is found in 
Section 11 ‘Of a Particular Providence and Of a Future State’ in EHU. In Chapter 
Three, I discussed Hume’s argument and suggested that his criticism of religionists 
may help to clarify the implication of the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ passage. A principal point 
of Hume’s criticism is that religionists’ reasoning commits a logical fallacy, namely 
that although everyone may freely infer cause from effect, a just philosophical 
reasoning is not allowed to return from cause to effect and attempt to add something 
on effect which they ascribe to cause on no other ground but conjecture and 
hypothesis. This is exactly what the religionist is doing, and this is the reason why 
distributive justice, which religionists advocate, is criticised by Hume. In other words, 
religionists should not enjoy superiority in instructing how people ought to live. 
Hume remarks that: 
And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a 
supreme distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more 
particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond the 
ordinary course of events; I here find the same fallacy, which I have 
before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, that, if we grant 
that divine existence, for which you so earnestly contend, you may safely 
infer consequences from it, and add something to the experienced order 
of nature, by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods. 
You seem not to remember, that your reasonings on this subject can only 
be drawn from effects to causes; and that every argument, deduced from 
causes to effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism; since it is 
impossible for you to know any thing of the cause, but what you have 
178 
 
antecedently, not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the effect (EHU, 
193). 
After one paragraph, Hume continues to say that: 
Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world? If you answer 
in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts itself, it is 
satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude, that you have then no 
reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a 
medium between affirmation and negation, by saying, that the justice of 
the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent; I answer, 
that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as 
you see it, at present, exert itself (EHU, 193-194). 
Accordingly, it is clear that Hume does not criticise distributive justice because 
of his disapproval of its egalitarian implication. Instead, Hume’s reason is that 
distributive justice is an issue out of the reach of the philosopher. If the philosopher 
contributes to enlighten the vulgar, that must be in a scientific rather than a moral 
sense, because what a philosopher can say about morals is derived from his 
experience of being a vulgar, so he is in no way superior to others in this respect. 
Since he is not superior to others, what he says about distributive justice does not 
then prescribe what other people ought to do, how society ought to be organised or 
public policy ought to be made. Distributive justice is criticised in EHU because 
religionists simply confuse these two roles which for Hume are distinct: 
Greater good produced by this Being must still prove a greater degree of 
goodness: A more impartial distribution of rewards and punishments 
must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity. Every supposed 
addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the 
Author of nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any 
reason or argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and 
hypothesis (EHU, 196). 
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Does Hume’s criticism of distributive justice, then, justify the status quo and 
defend an unequal distribution of property? Certainly not, otherwise Hume would 
himself commit the same fallacy as the religionists. In the remainder of this section, I 
would like to consider a number of Hume’s economic essays and reveal Hume’s 
criticism of inequality, which is explicitly normative judgment made by Hume and 
which is almost nowhere to be found in his philosophical works. In other words, 
when one focuses on Hume’s role of a moral painter as he states in Essays, one will 
find that regarding Hume as a conservative thinker is to misunderstand him. For 
Hume clearly indicates that he cannot find any reason to justify inequality in ancient 
times as well as the cruelty and inhumanity which usually accompany it. If the 
history of human beings may be seen as progressive, and if such progress has any 
significance, then one of the most important for Hume is cultivating man’s humanity 
and his sympathy with others’ feelings, so that man may learn to put others’ pain and 
pleasure on equal footing with his own, which is what Hume means by equality.
58
 
                                                 
58
 Hume writes: ‘A good-natur’d man finds himself in an instant of the same humour with his 
company; and even the proudest and most surely take a tincture from their countrymen and 
acquaintance. A chearful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; as 
an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, 
mirth and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural 
temper and disposition’ (Treatise, 206). In this sense, Hume belongs to the tradition of, as Albee terms 
it, universalistic hedonism, of which Richard Cumberland is the first advocate in England (Albee, 
1902: 11-12). For an account of Hume’s progressivism in the Treatise, see Baier, 1991. The emphasis 
on sympathy here is also inseparable from our account of the importance of family in the process of 
man’s socialisation, for, as proved by social psychologists, close and secure family relationships are 
associated with the highly-developed sympathy, see Frazer, 2010: 180. 
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In the essay ‘Of Commerce’, Hume affirms the value of foreign trade, for it 
augments the power of the state and the riches and happiness of the subjects (Essays, 
263). This is so because foreign trade usually gives rise to refinement in domestic 
manufactures and luxury. One the one hand, men’s natural love of novelty makes 
them desire foreign commodities rather than improving domestic ones. On the other, 
it is also profitable to export what is superfluous in a nation to others which have 
greater need for these commodities. Along with the rise of the spirit of trade in 
society, men ‘become acquainted with the pleasures of luxury and the profits of 
commerce’; and once their ‘delicacy and industry’ are awakened, these spirits carry 
people to further improvements both in domestic and foreign trade (Essays, 264). As 
a result, ‘a commerce with strangers’ cultivates man’s sociability; it liberates people 
from indolence, and raises their ‘desire of a more splendid way of life’ which their 
ancestors never dreamed of. Meanwhile, the spread of foreign trade give rise to a 
group of merchants who benefit most from it, and these people with their great 
opulence not only become rivals in wealth to the ancient nobility, but liberate 
political powers from being controlled by few hands. Imitations then diffuse the art 
of trade, and with more people involved in the foreign trade, domestic manufactures 
are also improved because they must compete with foreign commodities. This then 
excites people’s desire for more utility and encourages them to explore what is 
unknown to them. 
Meanwhile, however, Hume also notices the unequal distribution of resources 
which may rise along with foreign trade, as he remarks that ‘A too great 
disproportion among the citizens weakens any state’ (Essays, 265). Contrary to 
Gauthier’s observation, Hume’s egalitarian concern is evident in a paragraph which 
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he writes down right after explaining the advantages of trade. Hume points out that, 
as the novel skills and techniques are more advantageous when more people are 
acquainted with them, so the productions of these skills would be more beneficial if 
they are shared by more people: 
Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his labour, in a full 
possession of all the necessaries, and many of the conveniences of life. 
No one can doubt, but such an equality is most suitable to human nature, 
and diminishes much less from the happiness of the rich than it adds to 
that of the poor (Essays, 265). 
Here Hume is justifying his concern for social equality by the principle of 
maximum utility: what seems trivial to a rich man can be valuable in the eyes of a 
needy person, thus if social resources can be distributed on more equal basis, general 
welfare will be maximised. Moreover, when the access to wealth and resources is 
shared by more people, the burden on each citizen will then be lessened. For ‘Where 
the riches are engrossed by a few, these must contribute very largely to the supplying 
of the public necessities’, but when wealth is distributed more equally, ‘the burthen 
feels light on every shoulder, and the taxes make not a very sensible difference on 
any one’s way of living’. In that case, taxes are paid with more cheerfulness and the 
power of the state is augmented (Essays, 265). 
This is not the only evidence that Hume holds an egalitarian position and that 
he justifies this by the principle of public utility. In another essay ‘Of Money’ Hume 
opposes mercantilist views that national power and wealth depend on the quantity of 
money of a nation. Hume disagrees with this view because ‘the want of money can 
never injure any state within itself: For men and commodities are the real strength of 
any community’ (Essays, 293). Instead, what harms the public is that money has 
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been confined to few hands, thus preventing its universal diffusion and circulation 
(Essays, 293-294). This is the defect that arises from the simple life, for along with 
the development of refined arts and industry of all kinds, money will then be 
circulated more thoroughly in society. In that case, even the quantity of money is low, 
‘They digest it into every vein…and make it enter into every transaction and contract. 
No hand is entirely empty of it’ (Essays, 294). This will then contribute to strengthen 
the power of the state, because when wealth is more equally circulated, the governor 
will more easily levy taxes from every corner of the state, and what he receives from 
people will again be invested in the market through his consumption of fine 
commodities (Essays, 294).  
Again, Hume’s egalitarianism and his view that man’s sympathy and humanity 
will develop in the process of civilisation, and that this is the reason man ought to 
pursue a more refined and civilised life is expressed in another essay ‘Of the 
Populousness of Ancient Nations’. In this essay Hume opposes the argument 
advanced by some authors in his time that the ancient world was more populous than 
the modern, and a main reason they hold is the popularity of the practice of slavery in 
the ancient which was abolished in a large part of Europe in Hume’s time. In 
addition to objecting that the practice of slavery does not have much to do with 
population, Hume’s criticism of this practice and of its upholders, republicans 
perhaps, is also significant and is revealed in the essay. Hume criticises the fact that 
some passionate admirers of the ancients and zealous partisans of civil liberty, the 
two sentiments which Hume describes as almost inseparable, cannot help but regret 
the loss of slavery in modern times, and while all obedience to a tyrant is 
denominated by these men as degradation and ‘slavery’, ‘they would gladly reduce 
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the greater part of mankind to real slavery and subjection’ (Essays, 383). In this 
respect, Hume is the son of Enlightenment rather than a disciple of ancient republic, 
as he writes: 
But to one who considers coolly on the subject it will appear, that human 
nature, in general, really enjoys more liberty at present, in the most 
arbitrary government of EUROPE, than it ever did during the most 
flourishing period of ancient times. As much as submission to a petty 
prince, whose dominions extend not beyond a single city, is more 
grievous than obedience to a great monarch; so much is domestic slavery 
more cruel and oppressive than any civil subjection whatsoever. The 
more the master is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty 
we enjoy; the less are our actions inspected and controled; and the fainter 
that cruel comparison becomes our own subjection, and the freedom, and 
even dominion of another (Essays, 383).
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The interpreters who regard Hume as a moral skeptic or as a conservative 
defender of established institutions would have to take Hume’s passions for equality 
and liberty more seriously, and Hume’s criticism of slavery does not stop here. When 
we compare what Hume continues to say with his attitude towards the subjection of 
Indians and of women in EPM, the stark contrast clearly suggests the different 
perspectives which Hume respectively adopts in composing these works (EPM, 88-
89). Hume says: 
The remains which are found of domestic slavery, in the AMERICAN 
colonies, and among some EUROPEAN nations, would never surely 
create a desire of rendering it more universal. The little humanity, 
commonly observed in persons, accustomed, from their infancy, to 
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 See Kelly, 2001 for an elaboration of the idea of liberty of classical utilitarianism, especially that of 
Bentham and Sidgwick, in response to the criticism of republicanism. 
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exercise so great authority over their fellow-creatures, and to trample 
upon human nature, were sufficient alone to disgust us with that 
unbounded dominion. Nor can a more probable reason be assigned for 
the severe, I might say, barbarous manners of ancient times, than the 
practice of domestic slavery; by which every man of rank was rendered a 
petty tyrant, and educated amidst the flattery, submission, and low 
debasement of his slaves (Essays, 383-384). 
If Gauthier’s justice as mutual advantage may well express Hume’s theory of 
justice, if Hume is reluctant to criticise the existing practice due to his belief in its 
intrinsic values, then one wonders why he opposes the practice of slavery so harshly, 
as it indeed is an ancient institution in the history of human beings, and as slaves 
according to Gauthier’s idea of justice contribute nothing to the system of mutual 
advantage since they are not eligible to own any property, Hume needs not therefore 
bother himself with the interests and feelings of this group of people. Furthermore, if 
Hume’s theory of justice is as Gauthier describes, namely that what Hume is 
concerned with and thus takes as the foundation of morality is the interests of each 
individual rather than the public utility of society, why would Hume criticise masters’ 
encouragement of the propagation of their slaves as much as that of their cattle 
(Essays, 386)? Why would Hume find it deplorable that the opulent are interested in 
the ‘being’ of the poor just like of their cattle while paying not the least attention to 
their ‘well-being’ (Essays, 387)? Why, if I may be permitted to object to Gauthier’s 
account of Hume by indicating one more mistake of it, would Hume bother to point 
out that 
We may here observe, that if domestic slavery really encreased 
populousness, it would be an exception to the general rule, that the 
happiness of any society and its populousness are necessary attendants. A 
master, from humour or interest, may make his slaves very unhappy, yet 
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be careful, from interest, to encrease their number. Their marriage is not 
a matter of choice with them, more than any other action of their life 
(Essays, 387 n.17).
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I hope these are sufficient to support the argument in this chapter, that is, it is 
social welfare rather than mutual advantage on which Hume’s theory of justice is 
grounded, and it is sympathy with the feelings of our fellows in the society that is our 
motivation to observe justice rather than the artificial motive created by our concern 
for the maximisation of self-interest. The main problem with Gauthier’s essay lies in 
that, the points he takes Hume as making are actually those which Hume is criticising, 
and what Gauthier is criticising, namely his intention to object that Hume is a proto-
utilitarian, is precisely what best stands for Hume’s view and his position in the 
tradition of political thought. 
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 The egalitarian implication of Hume’s philosophy matches one of Plamenatz’s definitions of 
English utilitarianism: ‘The equal pleasures of any two or more men are equally good’ (Plamenatz, 
1958: 2; 28). 
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Chapter 6 Hobbesian or Lockean?  
Reconsidering Hume’s Theory of Property 
6.1 Hardin and Barry: A Debate in the Same Camp 
David Gauthier is not alone in the contemporary philosophical enterprise of 
marginalising the role of utilitarianism by attributing to Hume a conception of the 
person that is enlightened egoistic and thus integrating Hume into the tradition of 
social contract theory. Although defending a different approach in the camp of 
contractarianism, Brian Barry’s account of Hume, founded on his criticism of Russell 
Hardin, essentially assists in strengthening the position of social contract theory in 
contemporary debate on justice, while contributing to a serious misunderstanding of 
Hume’s political thought. 
In his paper ‘David Hume as a Social Theorist’ published posthumously in 
Utilitas, Brian Barry offers a review of Russell Hardin’s work David Hume: Moral 
and Political Theorist. Along with his criticism of Hardin, Barry’s reconstruction of 
Hume is also found in the same paper and is intended to amend those defects of 
Hardin’s argument which he thinks are misleading. Barry is not persuaded by 
Hardin’s interpretation of Hume’s view on an important question in the tradition of 
political philosophy, i.e. can social order be secured in a community without sanction 
of government? The different answers to this question held by Barry and Hardin 
originate from their different views on the origin of the institution of property. A 
primary object of Hardin’s work is to show that, while Hume famously declares that 
convention is the basis of property, it is important to notice the convention Hume has 
in mind is a coordination convention, the feature of which is its order growing out 
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among its participants spontaneously without relying on any extra force such as the 
state. For Hardin, a motive of self-interest that he takes as generally shared by human 
beings along with sufficient times of coordination would not only build up a pattern 
of interaction among people but stabilise it, until then a convention is formed. 
Property, among others, is a result of coordination convention.
61
 Contrary to this, 
Barry thinks that Hardin’s argument is defective by its over-optimism and by the fact 
that it misconceives the nature of the institution of property in Hume’s theory, which, 
according to Barry, is a cooperation problem. It should be noticed that, by observing 
Hardin’s interpretation of Hume and Barry’s criticism of it, we are led to see two 
significant things. On the one hand, a debate between Barry and Hardin is a debate 
within a specific interpretation of Hume’s political theory, namely Hume has been 
taken as disciple of Hobbes. On the other, however, a debate between them is also a 
debate between two theoretical traditions, that is, unlike Barry’s theory which is 
developed in line with Gauthier, both of which are meant to defend the tradition of 
social contract theory, Hardin’s intention is to challenge them and provide a 
utilitarian interpretation of Hobbes by pointing out his influence on Hume. In this 
sense, Hardin is developing a utilitarian genealogy by examining Hobbes’s 
connection with Hume, whereas Barry is defending a contractualist view by showing 
what Hume owes to Hobbes. This then has an impact on the degree of resemblance 
that is identified by two interpreters between Hume and Hobbes. For Barry, the 
degree of similarity is rather higher than Hardin acknowledges, so that he takes 
Hardin as falsely overstating the originality and fecundity of Hume’s ideas, 
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especially in relation to the problem of social order (Barry, 2010: 369). Hobbes holds 
that the nature of such a problem is a prisoner’s dilemma, and also suggests that the 
state is the solution. Barry believes that Hume takes over Hobbes’s view in the 
respect, thus the contribution of Hume lies not in the originality of his theory, but in 
the fact that he provides a more precise version of Hobbes’s position (Barry, 2010: 
392). Therefore, for Barry, Hardin's evaluation that ‘The pervasiveness and power of 
coordination is Hume’s richest strategic insight…it underlies his extraordinary theory 
of convention’ (Hardin, 2007: 82) cannot be accepted without qualification. 
Nevertheless, Barry’s criticism of Hardin has not changed the fact that their 
interpretations of Hume’s theory of property overlap in a way that I cannot agree 
with and propose to criticise in this chapter. 
6.2 Some of Hardin’s Misunderstandings 
Given the fact that both theorists pay their attention primarily to the theoretical 
connection between Hume and Hobbes, we should not then be surprised to find that 
what is largely overlooked by them is Locke’s influence on Hume. In Barry’s paper, 
he is so focused on deepening the similarity between Hobbes and Hume that he 
nowhere considers this, and among his objections to Hardin’s view, Barry does not 
seem to find Hardin’s remarks on Locke particularly problematic. At the outset of his 
work Hardin declares that 
It is now increasingly common to present the British tradition of political 
philosophy as going from Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) to John Locke 
(1632-1704) to Hume (1711-76) to John Stuart Mill (1806-73). Locke is 
a misfit in many ways and the direct line skips a generation to go from 
Hobbes to Hume (Hardin, 2007: 1-2). 
189 
 
Indeed, it might not be fair to say that Hardin has thoroughly ignored Locke’s 
influence on Hume, but all that he has noticed seems to be negative. For example, in 
a footnote attached to the passage just quoted, Hardin acknowledges Hume’s 
indebtedness to Locke in the sphere of epistemology, yet Hardin continues to say: 
Because the focus here is on Hume’s political philosophy, we can 
acknowledge the great importance of Hobbes’s arguments, which seem 
to be at play very often in the more important foundational claims of 
Hume (Hardin, 2007: 2 n.6). 
What Hardin is ready to accept without much questioning is the view that, 
where Hume’s political theory is concerned, Locke is one of his ‘greatest antagonists’ 
(Hardin, 2007: 198), and Hume ‘rejects [Locke’s] theory outright, sometimes with 
seeming contempt. Hence Hume corrects Hobbes but dismisses Locke’ (Hardin, 
2007: 210). Hardin’s view, however, does not seem to be supported by Hume’s own 
judgment on his two forerunners in political philosophy. Although, as Hardin says, 
philosophers in Hume’s time often do not cite the authors with whom they agree or 
disagree, Hume does, however, explicitly leave some clues in his works. In the 
Introduction to the Treatise where Hume declares his ambition of applying the 
methods of natural science to moral subjects, Hume clearly shows his awareness that 
he is integrating himself into a broad intellectual movement. Therefore he 
enumerates a number of important figures in a footnote and describes them as his 
forerunners who began to ‘put the science of man on a new footing’, including Locke, 
Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Butler, and the misspelled name of ‘Hutchinson’ (Treatise, 
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5 n.1).
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 Hobbes’s absence here is curious; he certainly belongs among those 
philosophers indebted to Francis Bacon, who Hume picks out in the Treatise as the 
modern originator of the movement in which Hume situates himself (Treatise, 5). 
However, as Buckle suggests, perhaps the absence of Hobbes is a consequence of his 
being too much the traditional dogmatist and thus inadequately experimental (Buckle, 
2001: 81 n.25). Along with this explanation, we can still observe the phenomenon by 
situating it in a wider theoretical context in which what Hume faces is, to use David 
Fate Norton’s terminology, a crise morale (Norton, 1982). 
Traditionally, the importance of Hume’s philosophy has been viewed from a 
predominantly epistemological perspective. As Norton notes, the common account of 
Hume’s philosophical efforts presents them as the logical and negative outcome of 
the empiricism initiated by Bacon and Hobbes and embraced by Locke and Berkeley. 
Hume’s philosophy, in this way, represents a negative and skeptical conclusion of 
the logical-historical development of empiricism. This is exactly the view that 
Norton challenges in David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Skeptical 
Metaphysician by showing that 
In point of fact, in the hundred years from Hobbes to Hume British 
philosophers were intensely concerned with moral theory, and highly 
motivated to refute what they saw as, and called, ‘moral skepticism’ 
(Norton, 1982: 12). 
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will consider MacIntyre’s interpretation of Hume in more detail in Section 4. 
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In other words, although the epistemological interpretations of this period are 
not insignificant, the researchers’ preoccupation with the crise pyrrhonienne has 
obscured the fact that the most urgent concern of early modern British philosophers 
was the reconstruction of a viable moral theory (Norton, 1983: 13, 21; see also 
Hardin, 2007: 81-83). As Shaftesbury, one of Hume’s predecessors in the moral 
sense school and a close associate of Locke, indicated, one would scarcely expect 
Hobbes’s theory to alleviate a crise morale. Hobbes is a careful thinker, but he made 
the mistake of attempting to trace various human acts to the single principle of self-
love (Norton, 1982: 34). According to Shaftesbury, Hobbes’s position has made 
moral judgments meaningless, because all acts or character traits, whether altruistic 
or the opposite, are reduced by Hobbes to one single principle, thus they all are by 
nature the same. Therefore, Shaftesbury thinks that Hobbes’s theory amounts to ‘a 
general skepticism that was both misguided and genuinely dangerous’ (Norton, 1982: 
34-35). Shaftesbury’s criticism of Hobbes would soon remind us of the similar view 
held by Hume in Appendix II to EPM, that researchers who are considering the 
relation between Hume’s theory and that of Hobbes may expect to learn something 
significant from this Appendix. Hume’s objection to what he calls the ‘selfish system 
of morals’ is conclusive and his reason is concise: since such theory is obviously 
contradictory to the living experience of common people, and even its advocates 
cannot put it into practice in their own lives,
63
 then such theory must be rejected by 
any true philosophy, or by Hume’s own philosophy at least. Thus Hume writes: 
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irreproachable lives’ (EPM, 165). 
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The most obvious objection to the selfish hypothesis, is, that…it is 
contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions…To the 
most careless observer, there appear to be such dispositions as 
benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, 
compassion, gratitude. These sentiments have their causes, effects, 
objects, and operations, marked by common language and observation, 
and plainly distinguished from those of the selfish passions (EPM, 166). 
In this passage, Hume can hardly make it plainer that the philosophical theory 
based on one single tendency of human beings, Hobbes’ for example, is a distortion 
of human nature. Along with this, one might suspect that in this part of his theory 
Hume has somehow deviated from his role as an anatomist of human nature, and 
seems to involve himself in the normative enterprise of condemning what is morally 
wrong. In fact, Hume has not. For what is criticised by him is the philosophical 
system which was motivated by the ‘love of simplicity’ and which takes selfishness 
as the only principle to which the diversity of human tendency may be reduced. In 
other words, what is condemned by Hume is the blindness of the ‘selfish’ 
philosophical system to our common experience as human beings instead of men’s 
selfish tendency per se. For an anatomist of human nature as Hume regards himself, 
so long as the plurality of human psychology is accurately portrayed, which means 
the predomination of man’s selfishness is deprived and hence is put on same footing 
with various passions and tendencies that men are by nature endowed with, then 
there is no reason for him to interfere with the working of man’s psychological 
mechanism. In this way, even the fact that man may be motivated to act by his 
tendency towards selfishness must also be revealed instead of concealed. After all, 
like benevolence, selfishness is a part of human nature; what motivates Hume to 
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develop a science of human nature is not to praise the former and blame the latter, 
but simply to describe them. 
Another clue that might also help to clarify Hume’s position is his evaluation 
of Hobbes in History: 
Hobbes’s politics are fitted only to promote tyranny, and his ethics to 
encourage licentiousness. Though an enemy to religion, he partakes 
nothing of the spirit of skepticism; but is as positive and dogmatic as if 
human reason, and his reason in particular, could attain a thorough 
conviction in these subjects (History, vol.6: 153). 
It seems unlikely that Hume would have endorsed a philosophical system, the 
consequences of which are regarded by himself as to ‘promote tyranny’ and 
‘encourage licentiousness’. Although this judgment was not overlooked by Hardin, 
he does not think it sufficient to alter his conviction that ‘Hume’s theory of politics 
seems to have more in common with that of Hobbes than with any other’ (Hardin, 
2007: 224). 
Hardin’s interpretation of Hume as a Hobbesian also influences his view on the 
relation between Hume’s two main texts on morals: the Treatise and EPM. As stated, 
Hume’s positions in these works are consistent, but consistent does not mean 
identical. They are consistent because from the conception of sympathy in the 
Treatise to the principle of utility in the EPM, Hume does not change his role as an 
anatomist whose purpose is to develop a descriptive theory of human nature. It seems 
that this is an argument that Hardin would happily endorse. However, when he is 
addressing the question which exists long in Hume scholarship, namely, given the 
fact that the idea of benevolence is apparently elevated to a more prominent role in 
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the later work, whether there is a significant change in views from the Treatise to 
EPM, Hardin’s reply to this question seems less satisfactory than one may expect. 
Hardin writes: 
Perhaps this difference between the earlier and later texts is little more 
than one of emphasis and wording intended to counter the chance of 
misreading Hume’s views. Hence, it is an elaboration of the earlier views 
(Hardin, 2007: 63). 
What, then, are the ‘earlier views’ in the Treatise which were elaborated in 
EPM, and therefore must be most representative of Hume’s standpoint as a political 
theorist? For Hardin, it is certainly a position that Hume inherits from Hobbes, and 
Hardin even quotes the only one contemporary review of Book III of Hume’s 
Treatise to support his view, as he writes 
The reviewer rightly asserts that, in his discussion of the origin of justice 
and of property rights, Hume presents ‘the system of Hobbes dressed up 
in a new taste’ (Hardin, 2007: 224).64 
This is why I regard Hardin’s reply to the important question about the 
relationship between the Treatise and EPM as unsatisfactory. For, on the one hand, it 
is not clear why Hardin should appeal to an unsympathetic review of Hume’s work 
to support his own interpretation, not to mention the reviewer’s superficial reading of 
the Treatise leading to a criticism that Hume does not deserve. The reviewer says, 
Hume ‘could have more order in it [i.e. Book III of the Treatise], more clarity, more 
detail; but also he could not have more paradoxes in it, more singular associations of 
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 This review can be found in more detail in Mossner, 1980: 138-139. 
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ideas and of words which no one had yet taken it into his head to bring together’, and 
adds that ‘Here, as you can see, is the system of Hobbes dressed up in a new taste. If 
that philosopher had produced it in this fashion I doubt if he would have had such a 
reception in the world’ (quoted in Mossner, 1980: 138-139). We do not see much 
help for Hardin to derive from a review like this. 
On the other hand, more significantly, if the reviewer had disappointingly 
considered Hume’s theory of justice in the Treatise as Hobbesian, he is less 
blameworthy in comparison to Hardin, for it was only eleven years later that Hume’s 
EPM was published to address some of the misunderstandings caused by his first 
work. Among which, given the fact that the ideas of utility and natural sociability 
play such important roles in the later work, it seems reasonable to infer that a 
misunderstanding Hume would like to address is too close a connection drawn by 
researchers between him and Hobbes, which unfortunately is exactly what both 
Hardin and Barry take pains to do. This also justifies the more serious consideration 
we have given to the connection between Hume’s two major works on morals. For it 
might have an impact on our identification of Hume’s place in the history of political 
thought.
65
 I do not deny Hardin’s view that, from the Treatise to EPM, Hume has 
tried to make his position more explicit by restructuring and rephrasing the text, but I 
do not accept Hardin’s argument that Hume’s intention of rewriting his moral theory 
is to draw a link more closely between himself and Hobbes. Before the end of this 
section, let us say something more about Hume’s two works, as this is not only a 
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 Contrary to Hardin, James Noxon begins his study of Hume with a profound analysis of the 
differences between the Treatise and its later replacements. See Noxon, 1973: 1-26. 
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response to Hardin but also will have bearing on Barry’s interpretation of Hume, as 
we will discuss in the following section. 
It should be noted that, in the Treatise, Hume discusses various qualities of 
mind and behaviour that all may equally be regarded as virtues, among which, the 
virtue of allegiance is but just one. Although the space devoted to the artificial 
virtues is about twice that of natural virtues, readers need not infer from this that 
Hume regards the former as morally more significant than the latter. Instead, it is so 
because, from the perspective of a moral scientist, the formation of artificial virtues 
involves the function of psychological mechanisms which are more complex than 
those of the natural virtues, therefore a more detailed explanation of the co-working 
of various instincts and passions such as ‘love of life’, sexual appetite, selfishness, 
limited generosity, ‘kindness to children’,66 children’s natural dependence on their 
parents, natural sociability, along with the mechanism of sympathy, is provided. This 
view on the relation between the artificial and the natural virtues in the Treatise is 
helpful in allowing us to see why Hume has adjusted his structure of discourse in 
EPM. For it is likely that by means of this adjustment, Hume would like to manifest 
the essence of his thought which does exist in the Treatise but tends to be obscured 
by the structure of that work, the essence here being that it is society rather than the 
state which is Hume’s main concern, so he asserts that ‘we not only observe, that 
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 Both of love of life and kindness to children belong to what Hume calls calm passions and are taken 
by him as ‘instincts originally implanted in our natures’. Other passions of this kind are benevolence, 
resentment, the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil (Treatise, 268). As MacIntyre suggests, 
these passions are ‘directed to certain highly general types of good, of a kind which human beings 
tend to pursue recurrently throughout their lives’ (MacIntyre, 1988: 300). 
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men always seek society, but can also explain the principles, on which this universal 
propensity is founded’ (Treatise, 258). It is true that Hume’s discussion of justice is 
still longer than that of benevolence in EPM, but to emphasise this point does not 
contribute significantly to our understanding of Hume. This is so because, in the later 
work, what is revealed by the removal of the distinction between the natural and 
artificial virtues, and by Hume’s discussion of benevolence which is the most typical 
of ‘social virtues’ prior to justice and political society, and, still, by the minimal role 
of the state which is no apparent difference from a necessary evil as regarded by 
Hume,
67
 is Hume’s determination to convey the nature of his theory more clearly, 
namely it is primarily a social rather than a political theory. To put it another way, it 
is a theory based on man’s sociable nature, and it takes the idea of politics as 
comprehended under a broader idea of society.  
Moreover, there is a phenomenon in EPM worth our consideration: the second 
Section of that work is named ‘Of Benevolence’, the third Section ‘Of Justice’, while 
the fourth Section, curiously, ‘Of Political Society’ rather than ‘Of Allegiance’, a 
conception which was adopted by Hume earlier in the Treatise. Can Hume try to 
inform his readers that the subject of his discussion here is not a ‘virtue’ like justice 
and benevolence, but rather a particular status of the human condition named 
‘political society’? If this is the case, does it imply that Hume regard political society 
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 The section on justice is the longest one in EPM, the section on political society is the shortest, and 
the discussion of the virtue of allegiance is confined to the very first paragraph of the latter, whereas 
the remainder of the section is devoted to the discussion of law of nations, chastity, purity of manners, 
friendship, traffic convention, and rules of games, many of which, strictly speaking, do not directly 
rely on the existence of a political authority, but are arranged in the same place because they are all 
conventional. 
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as a historical stage different from that in which both benevolence and justice exist? 
Furthermore, does it also imply that the structure of EPM is intentionally arranged in 
accordance with the process of human history? That is, benevolence must be 
considered first because it is rooted in human nature, however, provided that natural 
resources are limited and human nature is inevitably partial, a convention to secure 
the stability of possessions is formed to aid men’s social life, thus the idea of justice 
is created and acquires its meaning. After this, one has to wait until society expands 
to a certain scale before the state is then established to solve the inconveniences that 
obstruct men’s social life; thence they stepped into political society which, though 
not its most original and natural form, is nevertheless a form of society. If this 
historical and sociological dimension of Hume’s political theory which used to 
occupy a lot of space of Book III Part II of the Treatise can now be discerned from 
the structure of EPM, and thus makes the latter more concise and readable, one might 
feel less suspicious of the reason why EPM was considered by Hume as 
‘incomparably the best’ (My Own Life, xxxvi).68 Moreover, if it is sensible to read 
Hume this way, then the value of Hume’s rewriting his moral theory after eleven 
years lies in moderating his psychologism which was most prominent in the Treatise 
and, by this means, making the underlying argument of the Treatise more explicit in 
EPM. Hume’s intention becomes even clearer when we observe that, in EPM, after 
his brief discussion of ‘political society’ in Section 4, he proceeds to explore the 
natural connection between men’s sociability with his idea of utility in Section 5. In 
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 From this view, it seems curious to observe J. B. Stewart’s comments that EPM is only an 
incomplete abridgement of Book III of the Treatise, and is meant to help the readers who tend to get 
lost in the intricacies of the Treatise (Stewart, 1973: 18). 
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the two following sections Hume discusses those qualities which are immediately 
agreeable to their possessor or to the observer. None of these sections depends on the 
presupposition of the political authority, but cannot be understood without a social 
life in the background. If we further combine this with our earlier observation on the 
first half part of EPM, then the very limited role of the state in that work is evident. 
Finally, in the conclusion of EPM, Hume’s position remains consistent and he makes 
no mention of any external authority as indispensable to social order. Perhaps Hume 
was worried that his readers might fail to grasp this point, therefore he famously 
picks up the question of the ‘sensible knave’ before the end of the work. Against 
Barry’s view that Hume, not unlike Hobbes, as we will see more clearly in the 
following sections, adopts the state as the only solution to the question of the 
‘sensible knave’ or free-rider, Hume nowhere showing his similarity with Hobbes in 
his discussion of this question. On the contrary, he highlights the values of reputation, 
of character, and of inner tranquillity,
69
 which, as will be demonstrated in what 
follows, have been regarded by Hume since the Treatise as the most indispensable 
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 The state of ‘inward peace of mind’ and ‘the peaceful reflection on one’s own conduct’ Hume 
proposes in the conclusion of EPM (EPM, 155-156), along with one’s ‘peace and inward satisfaction’ 
and the self-survey of one’s mind, are taken by some interpreters as supporting that Hume’s 
philosophy is justificatory and normative. See, for example, Baier, 1991; Frazer, 2010. For criticism 
of this account of Hume, see, for example, Gill, 1996. 
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norms in maintaining a peaceful social life, and it is Locke instead of Hobbes who 
has overshadowed this aspect of Hume’s thought.70 
6.3 Barry: No Political Authority, No Social Order 
A more significant difference between Hobbes and Hume, nevertheless, is 
noticed both by Barry and Hardin, as Barry remarks: 
Where Hobbes and Hume do differ, and Hume scores, is in their views of 
the possibility of peaceful and harmonious social interaction that is not 
imposed by the government (Barry, 2010: 372). 
Hardin coincides with this by asserting that: 
Hume’s account of convention denies Hobbes’s claims of the necessity 
of an all-powerful sovereign and of the absolute need of government if 
we are to have social order (Hardin, 2007: 82). 
However, what differentiates Barry’s interpretation of Hume from that of 
Hardin’s and therefore causes one’s criticism of another is their disagreement on the 
proper limit of spontaneous social order in Hume’s theory. To observe this, as Barry 
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 Annette Baier’s comment on the adjustment of the structure Hume has conducted in EPM is 
inspiring. She writes: ‘Possibly it is an afterthought, but the appendices to EPM, unlike the appendix 
to the Treatise, are not second thoughts. If EPM is seen as a grand villa, then they are its workrooms, 
its kitchen, scullery, laundry, and cellars, lying behind, or under, the nine grandly furnished reception 
rooms with their many portraits, while off to one side is a more frivolous independent little building, a 
summerhouse or gazebo. Some of the materials for the main building, especially for its workrooms, 
are taken from one of the three wings of an earlier, condemned building’ (Baier, 2010: 215). It should 
be noted that Baier, among others, is not entirely convinced of the regard which EPM has received 
from various scholars and from Hume himself as ‘incomparably the best’. For Baier’s preoccupation 
with Hume’s Treatise, see also Baier, 1991. 
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says, the stability of property is certainly a notable instance. To put it differently, a 
central question both Barry and Hardin takes as crucial to the interpretation of 
Hume’s political theory is: is it possible to maintain a stable institution of property 
without government? Barry’s understanding of the scope of spontaneous social order 
is much more constrained compared with Hardin’s. He recognises there are various 
rules discussed by Hume, especially in EPM, that arise without any control or 
direction by government to make social interactions enjoyable and harmonious, such 
as politeness, rules of games, and certain traffic rules. But Barry insists that such 
examples are only limited in Hume’s political theory, and Hume’s explanation of the 
origin of property certainly is not one of them, for what underlies property is 
cooperation rather than a coordination convention. From Barry’s view, the fault of 
Hardin’s interpretation is partly caused by Hume, because Hume has moved too 
quickly from introducing justice as a convention to three examples that are 
indubitably coordination problems: 
Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for 
common interest, without any promise or contract: Thus gold and silver 
are made the measures of exchange; thus speech and words and language 
are fixed, by human convention and agreement (EPM, 172; see also 
Treatise, 315). 
While many readers of Hume, including Hardin, were led to think that Hume 
intentionally drew parallels between conventions of justice and conventions of 
language, rowing, and money in order to provide a more vivid account of the origin 
of property, Barry thinks this is a misunderstanding of Hume, because Hume has 
‘employed two sharply different accounts of convention without distinguishing 
between them’ (Barry, 2010: 369; 375-376). The one is cooperation convention, and 
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the other is coordination convention. Although Barry does not deny that the 
argument of spontaneous social order in Hume’s theory is a feature that distinguishes 
him from Hobbes, one suspects that Barry was prepared to give only very limited 
credit to such an argument when it is observed that Barry says: ‘Hume needs not be 
taken to mean that such rules could be maintained in a Hobbesian state of nature’, 
and he insists that ‘The law still has to be in the background to inhibit the escalation 
of quarrels about marked cards into shoot-outs, as happened in the Wild West’ 
(Barry, 2010: 373). What is implied in this is Barry’s denial of the maintenance of 
stable possessions without sanction of the state, for if norms less motivated by the 
selfishness of human nature such as rules of riding and good manners can barely 
sustain without the state functioning in the background, how could one possibly 
expect the rules concerning the distribution of resources, which are much more 
relevant to people’s survival, to be observed without enforcement from the state? 
Barry thinks that the following paragraph quoted from EPM clearly shows that Hume 
treats justice as cooperative convention in an indefinitely iterated prisoner’s dilemma: 
if it be allowed…that the particular consequences of a particular act of 
justice may be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals; it follows, 
that every man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole 
plan or system, and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the 
same conduct and behaviour. Did all his views terminate in the 
consequences of each act of his own, his benevolence and humanity, as 
well as his self-love, might often prescribe to him measures of conduct 
very different from those, which are agreeable to the strict rules of right 
and justice (EPM, 172, quoted in Barry, 2010: 376). 
Barry then explains to us the difference between coordination and cooperation 
conventions as follows. For the former, the mutual advantage is fully contained in a 
single transaction. For example, the two men in a boat may never expect to meet 
203 
 
again, but if it takes two men to row the boat and they have a common destination, it 
is a simple matter of agreeing that they will join forces. Similarly, if one would like 
to communicate with somebody, he had better speak in a language that other people 
understand, although he may have no wish to strengthen the language the other 
person speaks and may even wish that it would die out (Barry, 2010: 375-376). But 
the case is otherwise in a cooperation convention. For two persons who are in a 
situation of cooperation, if they do not expect to cooperate again, that is, if their 
cooperation is a one-shot game, then its payoff structure reveals a prisoner’s dilemma; 
none of them will choose to cooperate, so defection is a dominant strategy. However, 
if what two players face are indefinitely iterated plays, then a cooperative 
equilibrium is likely to be obtained between them, because what each player does 
can be made contingent on what the other player did previously (i.e. a tit-for-tat 
strategy). That is to say, if the first player chooses to cooperate and thereafter 
chooses cooperation with another cooperation and defection with another defection, 
each will serve his own interest as well as can be hoped for by playing cooperation 
every time. Following cooperation with defection (the dominant strategy in a one-
shot play) will always reap an immediate gain, but will risk breaking the cooperative 
equilibrium and will cause a long series of defections from one party followed by 
defections from the other.  
Therefore, Barry argues that when Hume’s theory of justice limits its scale to 
two persons, it is like an indefinitely iterated prisoner’s dilemma, a cooperative 
equilibrium being a likely outcome for two self-interested players. This is what the 
confusion between justice as a cooperation convention with other coordination 
convention consists of. However, an equilibrium is unlikely to happen when the scale 
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of participants expands, as in support of his view Barry quotes from Hume that 
‘But ’tis very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou’d agree 
in any such action’ (Treatise, 345, quoted in Barry, 2010: 378). This is so because 
communication among these people would be much more difficult than a dyad, and 
thus detains the planning and the execution of the work (imagine two neighbours 
planning to drain a field and one thousand people planning to drain a much larger 
field). Of course this difficulty could be met if people choose someone who acts as a 
manager to plan and execute the whole thing, and they just pay instead of taking part 
in the work. But still, as Barry indicates, this will soon bring us to the other 
impediment, namely the free-rider problem. So the only solution here is a state, with 
its power to fund public projects by taxation, arrange for them to be executed, and 
punish those who seeks to take advantage of others: 
Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences…Thus 
bridges are built; harbours open’d; ramparts rais’d; canals form’d; fleets 
equip’d; and armies disciplin’d; every where, by the care of government 
(Treatise, 345, quoted in Barry, 2010: 378). 
This is a sketch of Hume’s account of the origin of property and government 
provided by Barry, and what should be noticed is that it contains three conventions, 
each of which is formed subsequent to another; these are property, government, and 
public goods. That is to say, in Hume’s theory, the origin of government is derived 
from people’s need for an impartial arbiter in the execution and decision of justice, 
namely that government is to reconcile those conflicts caused by people’s failure to 
obey three natural laws, i.e. the stability of possession, the performance of promises, 
and the transference of possessions by consent (Treatise, 337). However, once a 
government is established it usually does something more: 
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government extends farther its beneficial influence; and not contented to 
protect men in those conventions they make for their mutual interest, it 
often obliges them to make such conventions, and forces them to seek 
their own advantage, by a concurrence in some common end or purpose 
(Treatise, 345). 
It is this tendency of government that explains its behaviours of taxation and 
provision of public goods. If we may describe this as the positive function of 
government, then it seems that its negative function, namely, being an impartial 
arbiter in the execution and decision of justice, is the true origin of it. After all, what 
is the point of building a national gallery before public order is secured? If this is the 
case, then what needs to concern us is the question that since when was government 
needed to fulfil its role as an impartial arbiter? In considering this question, what is 
important is the scale of the group. Hume’s view is, as is believed, that when society 
became more numerous, people’s original motive for observing justice was getting 
weaker, as everyone would suppose a single act of injustice would not bring society 
crashing down. Yet society does collapse if all or most of its members hold the same 
belief. In this case, although a cooperation equilibrium is likely to be fostered among 
a number of people who collaborate for self-interest, the same cooperation 
equilibrium would soon be broken down with the enlargement of the group because 
of people’s selfishness. Therefore, Barry thinks that scale matters critically in a 
cooperative context, and in answering the question ‘how large is large?’ Barry 
objects to Hardin’s optimism and argues that the state should be a solution that can 
be appealed to for maintaining order at very early stage. Thus Barry writes: 
If a thousand men could not drain a meadow in the absence of a state, it 
seems to me highly doubtful that we would need to get to anything like 
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the size of a ‘tribe or nation’ before the justice convention failed to bring 
about stability of possessions (Barry, 2010: 379-380). 
Barry regards government as indispensable to a peaceful society, and he 
criticises that Hume’s use of the language of convention under the sanction of 
government is meaningless. For example, Hume describes government as 
‘protect[ing] men in those conventions [as those of justice] they make for their 
mutual interest’ (Barry, 2012: 380). It is meaningless because ‘once we have a rule 
that is enforced we have lost whatever traction the concept of convention can give us 
in the explanation of social order’ (Barry, 2010: 380). Moreover, Barry criticises the 
fact that 
In particular, I can see no reason why every compulsory contribution to 
the cost of a public good should be described as obliging taxpayers to 
make conventions when the whole point is that the kind of convention 
that enables two men to drain a meadow without enforcement has broken 
down. Why not simply talk about property laws and taxes (Barry, 2010: 
380)? 
This then verifies the observation above, namely that although Barry realises 
the difference between Hobbes and Hume lies in the fact that Hume sees the 
possibility of peaceful and harmonious social interaction before people join political 
society, but Barry not being prepared to give much credit to Hume’s argument 
because he is doubtful that such reasoning can be extended to groups larger than a 
dyad. In this way, Barry is clearly more interested in interpreting Hume as a 
Hobbesian than interpreting Hume as what he genuinely is. 
One more proof of Barry’s intention is, after denying the possibility of 
obtaining a cooperative equilibrium among a group of selfish people larger than a 
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dyad, he rushes to bring ‘state’ into the scene while completely ignoring a central 
conception of the Treatise, i.e. sympathy. This observation is important for the 
purpose of this chapter, so let us consider it more carefully. In p.379 of Barry’s essay, 
a paragraph from Hume’s Treatise is cited to support the argument that self-interest 
may motivate people to respect each other’s possessions at the very beginning, but as 
soon as the group becomes larger, people tend to break the rules of justice for the 
same motive, hence the origin of the state: 
To the imposition then, and observance of these rules [of justice, men] 
are at first mov’d only by a regard to interest; and this motive, on the first 
formulation of society, is sufficiently strong and forcible. But when 
society has become numerous, and has encreas’d to a tribe or nation, this 
interest is more remote; nor do men so readily perceive, that disorder and 
confusion follow upon every breach of these rules, as in a more narrow 
and contracted society (Treatise, 320). 
Barry’s strategy of taking this paragraph as justification of the state is not 
entirely convincing. In fact, it is an intentional misconstruction of Hume’s argument. 
The paragraph quoted by Barry is only an extract from a passage near the end of 
Book III Part II Section 2 of the Treatise, and Hume’s mission in this section of the 
text is to address an important question: ‘Why we annex the idea of virtue to justice, 
and of vice to injustice?’ (Treatise, 320) In answering this question, Hume indicates 
men’s dual obligations to observe justice: one natural and another moral. A man’s 
natural obligation is the interest that he may reap from a peaceful society, and his 
moral obligation is that he should not infringe on others’ possessions because it is the 
wrong thing to do. The point here, as Hume aims to make clear, is that in addition to 
our pursuit of self-interest, we are still obliged to perform justice morally, i.e. an 
obligation based on a non-egoistic concern. I will elaborate on the connection 
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between Hume’s idea of sympathy and social order shortly, but before the end of this 
section what I hope to suggest is that Hume’s discussion of sympathy in his theory of 
justice is by no means trivial, and Barry’s argument is undermined by his thorough 
neglect of this dimension of Hume’s thought.71 I also would like to suggest that the 
idea that the state must be created to secure social order as soon as our natural 
obligation weakens with the expansion of group, is imposed on Hume by Barry given 
his preoccupation with Hobbes. In fact, Hume clearly states that before men step into 
the stage of political society, they must realise and feel that they are still morally 
bound to be just even when they no longer perceive the immediate benefit of 
performing such behaviour. This is a point Hume aims to make clear in his theory, 
unfortunately, this is also a point Barry avoids in his essay. However, when we 
realise that the moral obligation Hume mentions here is closely connected with the 
idea of sympathy, it seems to become more understandable as to why Barry 
intentionally ignores this part of Hume’s argument when the goal of his essay is to 
show Hume’s affinity with Hobbes. For sympathy as elaborated by Hume in Book II 
of the Treatise is so crucial a conception by means of which Hume then successfully 
moves from the more egocentric perspective he adopts in Book I to a moral and 
political theory in Book III which cannot be separated from its presupposition of a 
social life. 
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 As Hume says that ‘the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone’ (Treatise, 394), 
Barry’s neglect of this tendency of human nature explains the reason why he must appeal to the state 
to create men’s motive to observe justice, which is a strategy of Hobbes’s but not of Hume’s. 
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6.4 Sympathy and Hume’s Social Order 
In Chapter Two where I identified and analysed the differences between 
Hume’s Treatise and EPM, it was argued that sympathy is an idea crucial for 
understanding Hume’s psychological anatomy. According to Hume’s observation, 
sympathy functions like an invisible channel through which the communication of 
sentiments and opinions is taking place among individuals, and it is largely by means 
of this mechanism that a social life originated from men’s instincts is peacefully 
maintained. To refute Barry’s interpretation of Hume and to do Hume’s theory 
justice, this section aims to provide a further exploration of the idea of sympathy and 
of the way in which it contributes to Hume’s theory of property. The idea of 
sympathy is frequently applied to Hume’s account of morals; it is not only the basis 
of moral values of artificial virtues such as justice, fidelity and allegiance, but 
indispensable in forming a ‘more constant and universal’ point of view on which our 
moral judgment of natural virtues depends (Treatise, 377). Now it is by no means 
contingent that Hume introduces the idea of sympathy and explains its function in the 
middle part of the Treatise. For after an egocentric elaboration of human 
understanding, Hume deliberately provides an empirical account of human emotive 
reactions in support of the view that men are by their natural constitution socially-
oriented, and this tendency of natural sociability will then be assigned an important 
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part in his account of virtues.
72
 In other words, the function of sympathy in Book II 
of the Treatise is to provide an empirical evidence of men’s sociability. Now let us 
start with a reflection on Hume’s texts to see what important elements of Hume’s 
theory are missed in Barry’s interpretation.73 
6.4.1 Sympathy and Hume’s Difference from Hobbes 
In Book III of the Treatise the conception of sympathy is indispensable in 
Hume’s account of both categories of virtues, and one may even argue that Hume’s 
moral theory in the Treatise would have collapsed had the conception of sympathy 
been removed from it. As stated, sympathy is regarded by Hume as connected with 
men’s sociability, and when men’s sociability is demonstrated in a social life in 
which various social transactions and exchanges are taking place, the passions that 
motivate men’s interactions are what Hume calls indirect passions, among which the 
                                                 
72
 See also MacIntyre, 1988: 290. Hume’s view that sympathy and sociability are inseparable and both 
are instinct shared by human beings along with other no-human animals is well demonstrated in the 
following passage where he shows that sympathy instead of self-interest is the main cause of men’s 
esteem and love for others’ power and property: ‘The best method of reconciling us to this opinion is 
to take a general survey of the universe, and observe the force of sympathy thro’ the whole animal 
creation, and the easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another. In all 
creatures, that prey not upon others, and are not agitated with violent passions, there appears a 
remarkable desire of company, which associates them together, without any advantages they can ever 
propose to reap from their union. This is still more conspicuous in man, as being the creature of the 
universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages. We can 
form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest 
punishment we can suffer’ (Treatise, 234). 
73
 My interpretation of Hume in this section against that of Barry’s will largely draw on Hume’s 
theory of passions as elaborated on in Book II of the Treatise. For a systematic analysis of Hume’s 
theory of passions, see also Á rdal, 1966. 
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most important are pride and humility, love and hatred (MacIntyre, 1988: 292). It is 
also because of the important roles which indirect passions play in men’s social lives 
that Hume has devoted most of the Book II of the Treatise to an account of them. 
Accordingly, this implies that before Hume moves on to discuss the origin of social 
order in Book III, an idea of social life has already been presupposed in the 
background of Book II of the Treatise. Moreover, I hope to suggest that Book III can 
be read as Hume’s portrayal of a social landscape, and the principles which 
determine the constitution of this social landscape were revealed by Hume in the first 
two Books, that is, the causal law and the limited role of reason on the one hand, and 
on the other the communication of men’s sentiments and opinions, which cannot 
occur in each subject but must presuppose the existence of others along with their 
impact on one’s psychology and subsequently one’s responses to them. In this way, 
in reading Book III of the Treatise, what we are led and expected by Hume to 
observe is not a description of an accomplished character that as an individual is 
capable of achieving anything on one’s own due to one’s fear of punishment in 
afterlife, nor a peaceful social order created by the state, nor a society in which only 
contract or promise is esteemed as a reasonable and reliable foundation of social 
transactions. In contrast, what Hume endeavours to show is a dynamic scene of 
human society constituted by various virtues and vices discussed by him in the text, 
along with various socially established norms and institutions he takes pains to 
explain. In this scene of society, allegiance is in one way no more significant than 
benevolence and friendship, for the state has not always been a part of the arena 
whereas benevolence and friendship have. In contrast to allegiance, Hume regards 
justice more highly because it is a virtue indispensable for fulfilling men’s natural 
sociability, whereas allegiance is not. But justice is significant only when people 
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need it, that is, when it is useful. If in some ‘extreme cases’ observing justice does 
not serve men’s purpose or even causes impediment, there is nothing wrong in 
justice being replaced by other norms since it no longer brings men good. In brief, 
what Hume would like to convey to his readers through the Treatise is primarily an 
idea of society in which each member naturally cares about others’ feelings for him, 
and it is this nature along with other natural instincts and passions of men that creates 
a peaceful and enjoyable social life before the state is needed by them. To put it 
differently, men’s care for their own fames or reputation, according to Hume, is the 
most important norm, based on which the society he is depicting operates. While the 
state may join the scene at a certain historical stage, only society is as old as human 
nature. In this sense, there does not seem to be an apparent difference between 
Hume’s science of human nature and a science of society, because human nature, as 
Hume understands it, is not going to exhibit itself to the philosopher sitting in his 
armchair, but can only be observed from ‘men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, 
and in their pleasure’, that is, in men’s social life. To further this understanding of 
Hume’s thought, let us pay attention to Book II of the Treatise, for it is in there that 
Hume demonstrates ‘the minds of men are mirrors to one another’ so that they 
cannot think, feel and behave without reference to others (Treatise, 236). It is also 
based on his idea of society, in which men’s behaviour is restrained by their care for 
reputation, that Hume’s theory of property and justice is developed. To discover 
more about this, therefore, is to see what is overlooked in Barry's interpretation of 
Hume as a Hobbesian. 
At the outset of Book II of the Treatise, Hume first clarifies what he means by 
passions. He reasserts that ‘all perceptions of the mind may be divided into 
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impressions and ideas’, and impressions admit of a further division into original and 
secondary. Original impressions or impressions of sensation are perceptions that 
arise directly ‘from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the 
application of objects to the external organs’ (Treatise, 181). All the impressions of 
the senses and all bodily pains and pleasure are original impressions. On the other 
hand, secondary or reflective impressions are those derived from the original ones, 
‘either immediately or by the interposition of its idea’. Passions are of this kind. The 
difference between original and secondary impressions, that is, the difference 
between sensational perceptions and passions, according to MacIntyre, lies in the fact 
that the former are just states and occurrences, while some of the latter are featured 
by their ‘intentionality’, i.e. passions have an idea as their essential component and 
are directed on intentional objects. The passions that are featured by their 
intentionality are distinguished from those which lack this feature, and they are 
respectively named indirect and direct passion (MacIntyre, 1988: 292).
74
 As Hume 
explains, ‘the impressions, which arise from good and evil most naturally, and with 
least preparation are the direct passion of desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and 
fear, along with volition’. Meanwhile, if the object which gives rise to pains or 
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 Along with the distinction between direct and indirect passions, Hume provides another division of 
passions: the calm and the violent. ‘Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, 
composition, and external objects’, and the second kind includes ‘the passion of love and hatred, grief 
and joy, pride and humility’. Hume claims that it is the latter that he will explore here (Treatise, 181-
182). Perhaps it is because Hume knows the division of calm/violent passions is not entirely precise, 
for a violent passion often decays into a calm one and vice versa, so Hume soon proposes the division 
of direct and indirect passions. The difference of these divisions of passions, according to Mercer, 
mainly lies in that the calmness or violence of a passion refers to the intensity with which the passion 
is felt, while direct or indirect passions refers to the origins of the passion (Mercer, 1972: 22-23). 
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pleasures is in some way related to us, then the feelings it causes are indirect 
passions, such as pride and humility, love and hatred.
75
 According to Hume, pride 
and humility are passions directed to self, i.e. self is the object on which these 
passions are projected. For example, I feel pride when my ‘excellency in the 
character, in bodily accomplishments, in cloaths, equipages or fortune’ (Treatise, 188) 
earns approbation; on the contrary, when my vicious act, poverty, deformity, or bad 
reputation is detested, humility is felt. Although the self my pride is directed at is 
different from the self another person’s pride is directed at, the point is that they must 
in some way connect with each other, otherwise the strength of our passions of pride 
and humility would largely be weakened. In this way, pride and love, humility and 
hatred, are two pairs of passions interconnected, and they deserve more careful 
consideration because, by demonstrating the fact that an object of my love is always 
an object of someone’s pride, and when an object causes humility in me it almost 
inevitably causes hatred in someone else, Hume then shows that ‘each self conceives 
itself as part of a community of selves, each with an identity ascribed by others’ 
(MacIntyre, 1988: 292). In what follows, by a further exploration of what Hume calls 
indirect passions, I hope to make explicit a social structure presupposed in Book II of 
the Treatise, for this may not only support my refutation of Hume as a Hobbesian, 
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 Although the direct and indirect passions are distinguished based on their different origins, they do 
connect with and has an influence on each other. As Hume writes ‘a suit of fine cloaths produces 
pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the impressions of 
volition and desire. Again, when these cloaths are consider’d as belonging to ourself, the double 
relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion; and the pleasure, which 
attends that passion, returns back to the direct affections, and give new force to our desire or volition, 
joy or hope’ (Treatise, 281). 
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but will help us to reflect on the nature of Hume’s philosophy in the latter part of this 
section. 
‘Of Pride and Humility’, the first Part of Book II of the Treatise, is comprised 
of two parts. In the first, Hume provides a psychological theory about how pride and 
humility arise in the mind. According to Hume, pride and humility as passions must 
have a cause and an object, and the object of these passions is self. As to their causes, 
Hume divides them into the quality and the subject on which the quality is placed. 
Suppose a man is proud of a beautiful house possessed by him, in this case, the 
object of his passion of pride is the man himself, and the cause of the passion is the 
beautiful house. The beautiful house has two components: the beauty and the house 
in which the beauty inheres. To give rise a passion of pride, the quality and the 
subject are both indispensable. For although beauty when considered in itself always 
causes pleasure in us, unless it is placed on something related to us, it does not make 
us feel proud. On the other hand, if a thing, however closely related to us, is without 
beauty or other admirable quality, it has no influence on our passion of pride 
(Treatise, 183). This psychological mechanism is called by Hume ‘a double relation 
of impressions and ideas’. In the second part of the text, Hume then provides a 
systematic account of the causes of pride and humility, these being enumerated by 
him as virtue and vice, beauty and deformity, external advantages and disadvantages, 
property and riches, and finally, the love of fame. 
Although all of these are comprehended under causes of pride and humility, 
Hume says that there is something particular in men’s love of reputation: 
beside these original causes of pride and humility, there is a secondary 
one in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the 
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affections. Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of 
vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, 
beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the 
opinions and sentiments of others. In order to account for this 
phenomenon ’twill be necessary to take some compass, and first explain 
the nature of sympathy (Treatise, 206). 
Hume’s point here is that those original causes including virtue, beauty, and 
wealth may give rise to the passion of pride both because they makes us feel pleasure 
at first sight and because they are related to us. But this is only the origin, not the end, 
of the formation of pride, for the passions embraced by others towards us are then 
taken into account and have great influence on the passion of pride originally formed. 
In other words, from one cause of pride I feel at least two different sorts of pleasures: 
the first pleasure is that directly brought about by the cause, and the second pleasure 
is derived from the satisfaction that the first pleasure I am experiencing is shared by 
others and subsequently causes them to love me, which in turn is felt by me and 
contributes to the strengthening of my original pleasure. Accordingly, the generation 
of pride and humility normally involves at least a double sympathy. In the passage 
quoted above Hume shows that it is primarily the second kind of pleasure that 
motivates us and regulates our conduct, and in the following passage Hume makes 
his point even clearer: 
the pleasure, which a rich man receives from his possessions, being 
thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem [i.e. first 
sympathy]; which sentiments again, being perceiv’d and sympathis’d 
with, encrease the pleasure of the possessor [i.e. second sympathy]; and 
being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and 
esteem in the beholder [i.e. third sympathy]. There is certainly an original 
satisfaction in riches deriv’d from that power, which they bestow, of 
enjoying all the pleasures of life; and as this is their very nature and 
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essence, it must be the first source of all the passions, which arise from 
them. One of the most considerable of these passions is that of love or 
esteem in others, which therefore proceeds from a sympathy with the 
pleasure of the possessor. But the possessor has also a secondary 
satisfaction in riches arising from the love and esteem he acquires by 
them, and this satisfaction is nothing but a second reflection of that 
original pleasure, which proceeded from himself. This secondary 
satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal recommendations of 
riches, and is the chief reason, why we either desire them for ourselves, 
or esteem them in others (Treatise, 236 emphases added). 
Hume does not deny that being wealthy per se does bring pleasure and cause 
pride. However, he emphasises that it is because we can feel the opinion which other 
people hold of us, and through their sharing with our passions that we acquire an 
even stronger pleasure than the wealth originally produces, so we are motivated to 
procure wealth. For given the fact that ‘all men desire pleasure’ (Treatise, 204), this 
stronger pleasure generated through sympathy must be more favourable to us. 
However, it should be noted that Hume’s hedonistic men are by no means reckless. 
For when men are motivated to pursue a sort of pleasure that can only be derived 
from other people’s opinion and feelings, to offend the latter is the last thing men 
would do, since that would make their pursuit a vain one. Hence a norm based on 
sympathy and men’s love of reputation is formed in society. It should also be noted 
that this norm does not suppress men’s natural vanity and selfishness by appealing to 
an external authority, whether it is God or the state. This is so because it sees that 
men, though being selfish, are also altruistic and have a very strong desire for others’ 
company, and as a consequence men’s selfishness will naturally be moderated in 
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order for their sociability to be fulfilled.
76
 This moderate selfishness along with 
men’s natural sociability will then contribute to the prosperity of public welfare and 
to the fulfilment of the life plans of individuals within society, thus Hume writes in 
an essay ‘Of National Characters’ that 
Most men are ambitious; but the ambition of other men may commonly 
be satisfied, by excelling in their particular profession, and thereby 
promoting the interests of society (Essays, 200 n.3). 
When Hume indicates in his discussion of sympathy that ‘So remarkable a 
phenomenon merits our attention’, perhaps what he has in mind are some 
philosophers who attempt to explain the origin of human society while completely 
leaving behind so conspicuous a propensity of human nature. Hobbes is an example. 
In fact, men’s love of reputations has not been ignored by Hobbes, but Hobbes gives 
it a very different use in his theory, writing that: 
men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in 
keeping company where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For 
every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate 
he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, 
naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which among them that have no 
common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them 
destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners, by 
damage, and from others, by the example (Hobbes, 1994: 75-76). 
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 In this way, to take a single tendency of men as their only motive is not only naïve, but will miss the 
essence of human nature, thus Hume says ‘’Tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, 
to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation. Human nature is too inconstant 
to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it’ (Treatise, 186). 
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It is in this way that men’s love of glory is regarded by Hobbes, along with two 
other factors, i.e. competition for resources and diffidence generated by their natural 
equality, as causes of quarrels and lead to a war of ‘every man against every man’ 
(Hobbes, 1994: 76). Accordingly, the difference between Hume and Hobbes is plain. 
For the former, men’s love of reputation is based on their sociability; for the latter, 
men’s love of glory is motivated simply by self-love. Both philosophers realise the 
possibility of conflicts caused by the competition for resources, but in addressing this 
question, Hobbes sees no options other than appealing to the authority of the 
sovereign state, for individuals in his theory are atomic and solely egoistic, and there 
is no way to reconcile conflicts among them unless their violent pursuit of self-
interest is to be restrained by the Leviathan. On the contrary, however, whether there 
be the state or not, Hume believes that man must naturally be born in a social state: 
’tis utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that 
savage condition, which precedes society; but that his very first state and 
situation may justly be esteem’d social (Treatise, 316). 
This passage is written down by Hume in Book III Part II Section 2 of the 
Treatise when he is discussing ‘the manner, in which the rules of justice are 
establish’d by the artifice of men’ (Treatise, 311). However, one has to wait patiently 
before Hume turns to the subject of ‘the origin of government’ in Section 7. This 
suggests two things: one is that Hume thinks a social status framed by justice and 
natural virtues is not immediately followed by a political society; another is that 
before the government is established, do we ever see any disastrous chaos like the 
Hobbesian state of nature mentioned by Hume? No. On the contrary, Hume criticises 
that ‘This state of nature…is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not unlike that of the 
golden age, which poets have invented’ (Treatise, 317) for 
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The state of society without government is one of the most natural states 
of men, and may subsist with the conjunction of many families, and long 
after the first generation. Nothing but an encrease of riches and 
possessions cou’d oblige men to quit it; and so barbarous and 
uninstructed are all societies on their first formation, that many years 
must elapse before these cou’d encrease to such a degree, as to disturb 
men in the enjoyment of peace and concord (Treatise, 346 emphases 
added). 
Although I do not find convincing the Hobbesian interpretation of Hume as 
Hardin expresses it in his book, with regard to this aspect of Hume’s theory, namely 
the origin of social order, Hardin clearly has a better grasp in comparison with Barry, 
who is suspicious of the maintenance of social order among a group of men not much 
larger than a dyad. Perhaps this is partly because Hardin is aware of the significance 
of sympathy in Hume’s theory, while Barry is not. The point here is, if our love of 
reputation is based on sympathy instead of brutal self-love, we would have to be self-
disciplined in order to earn the respect of others rather than ‘making’ them respect us 
by doing them any potential harm. We would not try to acquire pleasure from other 
people’s suffering, because when they feel pain, we inevitably share their feelings 
through sympathy. Furthermore, we naturally imagine ourselves in their positions 
and condemn those who pose a threat to them, and as a result we refrain from those 
similar offensive behaviours when an opportunity is open to us. For even though our 
single offence of justice does not seem to pose any threat to social order, and though 
it is likely that we could get rid of punishment or hostility, ‘we never fail to observe 
the prejudice we receive, either mediately or immediately, from the injustice of 
others [and] we fail not to extend it even to our own actions’ (Treatise, 320). 
Therefore, Hume thinks that when men’s behaviours are regulated by sympathy and 
love of reputation, their selfishness is moderated and some norms are then 
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established among a group of people whose selves constitute the selves of each other. 
In other words, when the natural obligation of men becomes weaker as they do not 
seem to perceive the immediate disadvantage caused by their transgression of justice, 
yet the moral obligation still binds. For Hume, disorder is not the inevitable 
consequence and the state is neither the only solution when society was first formed. 
This is so because the conception of the person as a rationally egoistic agent is 
presupposed by Hobbes and Barry, but has never been verified in Hume’s science of 
men. Thus Hume writes: ‘I am apt to think a traveller wou’d meet with as little credit, 
who shou’d inform us of people exactly of the same character with…those in 
Hobbes’s Leviathan’ (Treatise, 259). 
6.4.2 Hume’s Social Order 
It is true that to emphasise the importance of sympathy is to emphasise men’s 
natural social connection, yet one need not infer from this that Hume’s theory has 
been trapped in parochialism, for this is a question Hume is fully aware of in 
conducting his moral inquiry. The connection between men’s passions, instrumental 
reason, sympathy, and sociability, as MacIntyre comments, are regarded by Hume as 
true of all societies in all times and in all places. Hence on Hume’s view 
my regard for ancient Roman virtue expresses the same approbation 
which I also express in respect of modern English virtue; the qualities 
which I approve in past and alien societies are those which in my own 
world serve my interest (MacIntyre, 1988: 306). 
Indeed, in Hume’s discussion of indirect passions, he thinks that pride and 
humility, love and hatred are passions with which human nature is generally 
endowed. Likewise, sympathy is a natural disposition of mankind, and it is only by 
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appealing to this disposition that men adopt ‘some common point of view’ when 
moral judgment is to be made, and thus prevent public discourse from collapsing. 
Furthermore, it is because sympathy may overcome not only partiality of individuals 
but parochialism that Hume places so much weight on it. Yet it should be noted that 
Hume is also aware of the distinction between the universal feature of sympathy, of 
the indirect passions and their causes – all of which are implanted in human beings 
by the hand of nature – and the different proportion of influence that these causes 
have on indirect passions and sympathy. It is the latter that gives rise to the diversity 
of what Hume calls national characters, namely that ‘each nation has a peculiar set of 
manners, and that some particular qualities are more frequently to be met with 
among one people than among their neighbours’ (Essays, 197). If one further 
investigates what gives rise to the different influence that each cause of indirect 
passions has, that is, why members of a nation take more pride in virtues than in 
other qualities, while members of another nation admire beauty more than virtue and 
fortune, to this Hume suggests three possible answers: accidental causes, moral 
causes, and physical causes. By accidental causes Hume means the historical 
contingencies occurred in the infancy of a society or nation. For example, if there 
was a generous leader who embraced an enthusiasm for liberty and public good, at 
the same time overlooked personal ties and private interest, then his virtue would 
‘kindle the same passion in every bosom’ and ‘the next [generation] must imbibe a 
deeper tincture of the same dye’ (Essays, 203). On the other hand, by moral causes 
Hume means ‘all circumstances, which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or 
reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us’ (Essays, 198). 
Circumstances of this kind comprehend the political and economic conditions of a 
nation such as ‘the nature of government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty 
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or penury in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its 
neighbours’ and the like. Finally, physical causes are ‘those qualities of the air and 
climate, which are supposed to work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone 
and habit of the body’ (Essays, 198). The purpose of Hume’s essay ‘Of National 
Characters’, then, is to show that all national characters are primarily influenced by 
moral causes, and that ‘physical causes have no discernible operation on the human 
mind’ (Essays, 203). 
What can we learn from this? It seems that there are at least two things implied 
in Hume’s argument. First, it shows that, although Hume’s purpose of developing a 
science of human nature is to reveal the universal dispositions and passions of 
mankind, whereby he may then explain the origin of social order and political 
authority, Hume is nevertheless conscious that the operation of men’s dispositions 
and passions are conditioned by the social context in which they are placed. 
Sympathy is taken by Hume as the most important principle when characters of a 
nation is formed, and he writes that 
The propensity to company and society is strong in all rational creatures; 
and the same disposition, which gives us this propensity, makes us enter 
deeply into each other’s sentiments, and causes like passions and 
inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or 
knot of companions (Essays, 202). 
The universal disposition of sympathy, however, does not create universal 
characters in every nation. On the contrary, it creates diversity and plurality, and not 
only does every nation have its own characters, within each nation its members still 
acquire personal characteristics ‘peculiar to each individual’ (Essays, 203). 
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Related to this, another thing that can be learned for Hume’s essay is its 
bearing on our discussion of indirect passions in the first part of this section. As 
stated, Hume thinks that it is moral causes that primarily contribute to the shaping of 
the characters of a nation, and this is possible only when the effects of moral causes 
are circulated among people ‘by contagion’, that is, by sympathy. Now, what can be 
communicated among people through sympathy must be their passions, and where 
social life is concerned, those which motivate people are what Hume calls indirect 
passions. Indirect passions, likewise, have their causes, namely virtue, property, 
beauty, love of fame, and those opposite qualities. In other words, a complete process 
of forming national characters is like this: the moral causes, such as free or 
oppressive government, affluent or needy living condition, and peaceful or unstable 
society, determine the different proportion of influences that virtue, property, beauty, 
and love of reputation have on men’s indirect passions. This then determines what 
men take pride in and love as well as what causes humility and hatred in them. When 
these passions circulate within the group by sympathy, the general characters of the 
community are formed. To put it differently, when we approach Hume’s 
psychological theory of passions by consulting his essay ‘Of Nation Characters’, we 
learn that indirect passions and their causes have great importance in shaping the 
feature of each nation or society. Though these passions and causes are universally 
valid, different moral causes, i.e. the different political and economic conditions of 
different nations will make some of the causes of indirect passions more obvious and 
influential than others. Hume verifies this observation by saying that: 
Now though nature produces all kinds of temper and understanding in 
general abundance, it does not follow, that she always produces them in 
like proportions, and that in every society the ingredients of industry and 
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indolence, valour and cowardice, humanity and brutality, wisdom and 
folly, will be mixed after the same manner (Essays, 203). 
If this is the case, then when Hume in his discussion of pride and humility 
comments that ‘the relation, which is esteem’d the closest, and which of all others 
produces most commonly the passion of pride, is that of property’, and again 
‘Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power 
and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness’ (Treatise, 231; 202), we 
may reasonably discern from this that Hume’s comments which are regarded by him 
as generally true are actually derived from a specific society or a certain type of 
social order in which men’s indirect passions have been rendered more closely 
connected with property than with virtues and beauty by the moral causes of that 
society. It is on this basis that MacIntyre comments that ‘Hume’s philosophical 
psychology does not provide foundations for Hume’s political philosophy, 
independent of that political philosophy’, because ‘The fundamental theses of the 
political philosophy are themselves presupposed by the account of the ordered 
interrelationship of the passions’ (MacIntyre, 1988: 298). The way in which the 
passions are interrelated, then, and thus the social order they represent, has much to 
do with Hume’s intentioned break with the Scottish tradition and Anglicisation of 
himself. 
What can further be drawn from our account above and from MacIntyre’s 
comments on Hume is a question concerning the nature of Hume’s theory, namely 
whether Hume has consistently considered himself an anatomist of human nature or 
if he has also fulfilled the role as a moral painter? The view I suggest is that Hume 
has deliberately separated these roles but has played on each of them in composing 
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his different works. Although this seems to be Hume’s intention, one may still 
question whether Hume has been successful in achieving it. As MacIntyre argues, 
practical judgments on Hume’s account presuppose a socially ordered 
reciprocity of the passions, a reciprocity in which the key moments are to 
be characterised in terms of pride, humility, love, and hatred and those 
relationships to property, kinship, and hierarchy which play such a large 
part in providing the objects and causes of those passions. The 
characteristics of one very specific type of social order are thereby 
presupposed by those judgments, and to defend Hume’s account it would 
be necessary to show of every actual social order that either it is of that 
type or it deviates from that type only in ways which can be explained by 
Hume’s own principles (MacIntyre, 1988: 297-298). 
Accordingly, MacIntyre is not convinced that Hume’s intention of separating 
description from prescription is applicable, and this seems to be a sensible criticism 
of Hume. The same view is also held by James King. In his comparison between the 
Treatise and EPM, King indicates that their difference lies in the shift of focus from 
sentiment to language, that is, from an explanation of the constitution of morality 
based on human nature to an explanation of human nature by a public moral 
language. Given the moral language in use is not abstract but reveal standards 
implicit in men’s moral thinking whereby any sentiment or judgment can be 
measured, King thinks that Hume, in EPM, adopts an ‘internal point of view’ in 
order to solve the difficulty caused by his causal-generative model of explanation as 
advanced in the Treatise (King, 1976: 343-361). King’s view is convincing to me but 
I hope to endorse MacIntyre’s view and suggest that, even in the Treatise, Hume’s 
view is not ‘extreme external’, something that is particularly evident in the 
connection drawn by Hume between a number of crucial conceptions including 
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sympathy, property, and pride. To clarify this, a brief introduction of the difference 
between internal and external points of view will help. 
The distinction between internal and external points of view is proposed by H. 
L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law when he is discussing the relationship between 
men and rules. According to Hart, while almost every social group has certain rules 
of conduct, ‘this fact affords an opportunity for many closely related yet different 
kinds of assertion’, and the difference is derived from different views held by men on 
their relationship with those rules. On the one hand, a man may be an observer of 
rules who does not himself accept them, on the other hand, a man may regard himself 
as a member of group which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct. Hart 
respectively calls these ‘external’ and ‘internal points of view’ (Hart, 1994: 88-89). 
The external point of view admits of further division. That is, either the observer may, 
without himself accepting the rules, imagine how the rules are perceived by people 
who accept them. Or the observer may hold an extreme external point of view, 
namely he may stick to a causal understanding of the interaction between rules and 
the group which accepts them without even imagining being a member of the group. 
For the extreme externalist, after his observation over some time, may acquire the 
regularity from it and have a precise knowledge of rule-breaking and punishment as 
its effect, which then enables him to live among the group without unpleasant 
consequences. Yet the terms like rules, right, and obligation do not mean much to 
him, for the only reason for him to observe rules is to avoid the unpleasant 
consequences that usually follow rule-breaking. He has no regard for others since he 
does not see any common advantage shared between himself and others through 
observing rules. As Hart remarks, what will be missed out by the extreme external 
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point of view is ‘a whole dimension of the social life of those whom he is watching’ 
(Hart, 1994: 90). From the view of people who are called by Hart members of a 
group rather than observers, ‘the violation of a rule is not merely a basis for the 
prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for hostility’ (Hart, 1994: 
90), as that kind of behaviour is wrong, and it is wrong because it undermines the 
common interest shared among them which the rule is meant to preserve. 
If MacIntyre’s account of Hume is correct, and it seems it is, still one can 
hardly deny Hume’s endeavour in this respect, and this can be judged from the 
limited evaluative judgments to be found in Hume’s major philosophical works. In 
contrast, it is not difficult for the readers of Essays and History to discern from these 
works Hume’s normative position, such as his critical attitude towards despotism, his 
egalitarian tendency, his advocate of the rise of middle class as it poses a restrain on 
tyranny, and his love of the rise of fine art, of free trade, etc. To explore this 
dimension of Hume’s view on property will reveal that, first, there is a connection 
between the social structure presupposed and described by Hume in Book II of the 
Treatise and the social order which Hume defends in Essays; and second, the original 
model of this social order is to be found in Locke’s theory. In this way, it is Locke 
rather than Hobbes who has an impact on the development of Hume’s thought. 
6.5 Sociability and Locke’s Impact on Hume 
Hume has a basic category of virtues which he adopts both in the Treatise and 
EPM, namely, he thinks that all virtues are either useful or agreeable to their 
possessors or to others, and under this category various characters or mental qualities 
are comprehended. By revealing the plurality of human mental qualities, Hume 
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attempts to distinguish himself from Hobbes and thereby reject self-interest as the 
only motive of men. However, there is a property underlying most, if not all, of the 
qualities termed virtues by Hume, namely that they are socially oriented. Even in his 
discussion of the qualities which are useful or agreeable to their possessors, Hume’s 
purpose is nevertheless to show that we, being observers and neighbours of the 
possessors, though not directly benefitting from those qualities, still share the 
pleasure of them and thus esteem those qualities as virtues. Accordingly, sociability 
may well be taken as the most prominent feature of human nature manifested by 
Hume. Sociability is the nature of mankind, but it is comprised of various passions 
and tendencies, not all of which directly contribute to a harmonious social life. Some 
of these passions may even be harmful to society, but after they work to strengthen 
or counterbalance each other, a decent social life would be its result. In this sense 
Hume is neither a Hobbesian nor a Hutchesonian, for neither selfishness nor 
benevolence is regarded by him as predominant in human nature. Thus when Hume 
was explaining the importance of three fundamental social rules, i.e. the stability of 
possessions, the transference of possessions by consent, and the performance of 
promise, he says that 
Whatever restraint they may impose on the passions of men, they are the 
real offspring of those passions, and are only a more artful and more 
refin’d way of satisfying them. Nothing is more vigilant and inventive 
than our passions; and nothing is more obvious, than the convention for 
the observance of these rules. Nature has, therefore, trusted this affair 
entirely to the conduct of men, and has not plac’d in the mind any 
peculiar original principles, to determine us to a set of actions, into which 
the other principles of our frame and constitution were sufficient to lead 
us (Treatise, 337-338). 
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One point Hume hopes to make clear in his theory of justice is that there is no 
insolvable conflict between private and public interest, because even those natural 
tendencies of men that seem incompatible with social life at first glance, men’s 
selfishness for example, could have no way to satisfy themselves other than being a 
servant of man’s sociability. In other words, the moral life of mankind or the 
fundamental distinction between right and wrong was created in social life when a 
‘general sense of common interest’ is shared by every member of the group due to 
their natural sociability, and this is exactly what distinguishes Hume from Hobbes, 
since for the latter morality and society are not natural but artificial, that is, they are 
created by the state and thus cannot exist before a political authority is established by 
social contract. If this justifies the view that sociability is the core of Hume’s 
political theory, he is not original in this respect, for the idea of sociability is already 
expressed in Locke’s Essay and STG. It is my purpose in this section to demonstrate 
the theoretical connection between Hume and Locke by revealing the fact that they 
both found theories on the general sociable nature of mankind, therefore a decent 
pre-political social life is found in both. Their views on the role of the state are also 
close, for since morality and order exist already in the pre-political society, the state 
is not established to secure men from a disastrous moral vacuum; rather, its primary 
task is auxiliary, namely to execute the pre-political moral rules on a more stable and 
general basis and determine controversies indifferently so that peaceful social life 
can be maintained. It is on this and on nothing else that the legitimacy of the state is 
founded.
77
 What then is implied in this view is that supposing the governor fails his 
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 For example, Richard Ashcraft writes that ‘if individuals cannot be presumed to be capable of 
acting for the public good in the state of nature, they cannot, in Locke’s view, be presumed to act for 
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task in this respect or is even corrupt enough to undermine the moral rules from 
which the legitimacy of his governance has originated, it is not morally wrong to 
overthrow the governor and replace him with a reliable arbiter, because the common 
social interest which it is meant to preserve is now threatened by it. Nor is it 
particularly dreadful to remain for some time in that interval when a new arbiter is 
yet to be elected, because by describing the state of nature as a social status, and by 
arguing that various norms and social interactions, especially an institution of 
property, exist already in it, what both Locke and Hume are attempting to show is 
that a status without political authority is the most natural condition of human beings 
and is a lawful status. In brief, for both Locke and Hume, political duties and civil 
laws are derivatives of moral duties and natural laws in response to the change in 
men’s living conditions, especially the expansion of population and men’s 
accumulation of possessions with the use of money, which is as well regarded by 
both as a pre-political convention. One difference between two philosophers, 
however, lies in their account of the origin of men’s moral duties. That is, while 
Locke takes God’s will as the ultimate origin of morality and men’s reason as the 
only way to know it along with revelation, in Hume’s theory this theological premise 
is replaced by a secular account of human nature in which reason is rendered 
instrumental in serving passions which actually motivate us to act. In this way, 
Hume’s philosophy is developed on the basis of Locke’s and aims to provide a 
                                                                                                                                          
the common good within political society. For, contrary to Hobbes’s approach, Locke’s definition of 
political power is framed in such a way as to demonstrate that all of its basic ingredients are 
constitutive elements of the natural condition of individuals’ (Ashcraft, 1987: 100). I think the same 
view holds true in Hume’s theory. 
232 
 
naturalistic foundation in the place of God’s authority; hence it might not be absurd 
to interpret Hume as a more naturalistic Locke. 
6.5.1 The State of Nature in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government 
In Two Treatises of Government, after providing an alternative reading of the 
scripture in the First Treatise in order to refute Sir Robert Filmer’s patriarchal 
account of political authority, Locke then in the Second Treatise develops his own 
theory of the origin of political society. Locke declares at the end of Chap. I: 
Political Power then I take to be a Right of making Laws with Penalties 
of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and 
Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in 
the Execution of such Laws, and in the defence of the Common-wealth 
from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Public Good (§3). 
In this passage Locke indicates that political society is not the original 
condition of mankind, instead political power is set to preserve social norms existing 
prior to it, i.e. property. Further, the nature of political power is neither absolute nor 
divine, because it is derived from the force of the community into which men were 
naturally born and which it is meant to serve. Therefore Locke continues to make an 
important statement at the beginning of Chap. II: 
To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we 
must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of 
perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, 
and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, 
without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other 
Man…[and] A State also of Equality, wherein all the Power and 
Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another: there being 
nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank 
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of 
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same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without 
Subordination or Subjection (§4). 
After affirming that there is a state of nature prior to political society and 
within that all men are free and equal, Locke’s political theory is launched. These 
statements made at the beginning of STG are significant, because it is largely against 
these original conditions of mankind that the legitimacy of the political authority is 
measured. To put it differently, Locke thinks that men join political society for an 
impartial umpire to avoid and ‘remedy those inconveniences of the State of Nature, 
which necessarily follow from every Man’s being Judge in his own Case’ (§90). 
However, if the governor fails his role as an indifferent arbiter by holding an absolute 
power in hands, namely by holding both legislative and executive power in himself 
alone, in that case, no indifferent appeal lies open to men, so they are still in the state 
of nature. To defend an absolute governor is ‘to think that Men are so foolish that 
they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, 
but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions’ (§93). This is also the 
reason why Locke postpones his discussion of political society to §87, and before 
that he has discussed various topics including ‘the state of nature’, ‘the state of war’, 
‘slavery’, ‘property’, ‘parental power’, and different forms of society which exist 
prior to and independent of political society. By so doing, Locke develops normative 
criteria regarding what men ought and ought not to be, the task of political authority 
being then to preserve the former without violating the latter, and for our purpose 
here, it is precisely this normative standard and its impact on Hume that concerns us. 
Saying that the pre-political normative standard as depicted by Locke is our 
concern is not much different from saying that we are focusing on, in a broad sense, 
234 
 
Locke’s theory of property. Indeed, Locke has a twofold definition of property. First, 
in Chap. V ‘Of Property’ his discussion is confined to a narrow sense of the term, so 
he elaborates on a labour theory to explain the distribution of natural resources, the 
invention of money based on tacit consent or convention, and how men’s behaviour 
in this regard is restrained by natural law. Second, an extensive definition of property 
is also to be found in STG. For example, Locke says that man ‘hath by Nature a 
Power, not only to preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate, against 
the Injuries and Attempts of other Men’ (§87; §123). According to this extensive 
definition, it seems reasonable to view all of Locke’s argument before §87 as his 
theory of property, because his purpose there is to show that men’s life, liberty and 
possessions can be preserved in a pre-political social condition, which then reminds 
us of Hume’s view on men’s natural sociability as explained above. However this is 
not to suggest that Locke’s theory of property terminates at §87, for men’s purpose in 
establishing political society is to seek better protection of their property against 
arbitrary interference. Also, when Locke indicates that the chief end of civil society 
is the preservation of property, his position again is inherited by Hume and revealed 
in the latter’s view on the relationship between social order and the state. Before 
more affinity between Locke and Hume can be revealed, more about Locke’s state of 
nature needs to be said. 
Right after affirming that men in the state of nature are free and equal in §4 and 
§5, Locke adds in §6 that ‘yet it is not a State of Licence’ and this is because ‘The 
State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it’. It is likely that Locke is 
responding to Hobbes here, so he proceeds to explain the only origin of order in the 
state of nature, i.e. God’s will. Locke writes, ‘Man, not having the Power of his own 
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life’ (§23) as they ‘being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely 
wise Maker’ (§6) that they are obliged to preserve themselves and have not liberty to 
destroy either themselves or others. Men do not own themselves and others, but all 
are the property of God. Along with this, when one’s self-preservation comes not in 
competition, he is still obliged ‘as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind’ 
(§6). The view that men in their natural condition are obliged to preserve each other 
reveals the moral characteristics of Locke’s state of nature, as Richard Ashcraft 
indicates. Indeed, this means that certain social relations are presumed to exist 
among individuals living in that state, which then make us reflect on the received 
interpretation of Locke as an advocate of atomistic individualism, a view ‘has been 
thoroughly and convincingly discredited by the scholarly work on Locke produced in 
the last thirty years’ (Ashcraft, 1987: 99-100). It is important to recognise that, for 
Locke, the state of nature is a social state or, in his terminology, ‘one Community of 
Nature’ (§6), because this will help us to solve the tension which seemingly exist 
between his views on everyone’s right to punish the transgressors of natural law, on 
the state of war and slavery, and, on the other, his description of the state of nature as 
‘a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation’ (§19). 
The state of nature is a lawful condition, but it does not have an umpire for 
men to appeal to. Since a law must be in vain were there no sanctions to ensure 
men’s compliance, and since men are by nature equal, thus ‘every Man hath a Right 
to punish the Offender, and be Executioner of the Law of Nature’ (§8). It is men’s 
obligation to preserve not only themselves but their fellows, so when someone has 
renounced reason, which is the common measure of mankind given by God, and 
attempted by unjust violence to encroach another’s property, the social connection 
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between him and others is ceased and he ‘may be destroyed as a Lyon or a Tyger, one 
of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security’ 
(§11).
78
 By committing such violence, one has ‘declared War against all Mankind’, 
and the state of nature which he and others were originally in is now replaced by 
what Locke calls the state of war. Locke’s account of the state of war is twofold. On 
the one hand, when someone threatens my life and safety by doing me harm, the state 
between me and the criminal reveals a state of war, and I have the right to kill him 
for the same reason I may kill a wolf in order to preserve myself (§16). On the other 
hand, supposing someone does not threaten my life immediately but intends to 
restrain my freedom and subject me to his absolute power, then he makes ‘an attempt 
to enslave me’ in Locke’s terms (§17). When this is the case, his behaviour may still 
be viewed as a design on my life, and I am obliged to and rightfully may ‘kill him if I 
can’ (§18). This is so because by his attempt to enslave me, he has subjected me to 
his arbitrary will and taken away my freedom which is ‘the Foundation of all the 
rest’. In this way, I have no reason to suppose he will not take away everything else, 
so I may destroy him before ‘the mischief may be irreparable’ (§19). In Locke’s view, 
slavery is not an option available to oneself, because ‘Freedom from Absolute, 
Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and closely joyned with a Man’s Preservation’ 
(§23) that we are not allowed to part with it given that we are obliged to preserve 
ourselves. Thus Locke says that no one can become slave voluntarily because ‘No 
                                                 
78
 The same view is held by Hume as he argues that justice is suspended when a virtuous man falls 
into the society of ruffians, when a man transgresses laws in political society, and when the 
relationship between human beings and other animals is concerned (EPM, 86; 88). 
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body can give more Power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own 
Life, cannot give another power over it’ (§23).  
After his account of slavery Locke moves on to elaborate on his theory of 
property in Chap. V, which, according to Locke, is an institution, along with the use 
of money, based on convention without political sanction of the state. Now we can 
imagine that a state in which personal possessions are stabilised and currency is 
circulated must be a state with order and peace, along with this a general sense of 
common interest is shared among most of the members, otherwise they would have 
no motive for coordinating. In other words, it is not likely to be a state of constant 
war and conflict as Hobbes describes, for in that case it would be senseless to speak 
of norms such as property and money for which both a certain degree of mutual trust 
and the general participation of most members of the community are requisite. This 
then brings us back to the tension mentioned above, that is, that Locke’s tone is 
rather harsh when he was speaking of the state of war and of slavery, especially with 
his view that the transgressor of natural law may be killed by anyone like noxious 
creatures; on the other hand, he nevertheless describes the state of nature as ‘a State 
of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation’ (§19). Certainly Locke 
draws a distinction by calling each of them the state of war and the state of nature, 
but the point is that so long as these two states exist in one society in the meantime, 
and this seems to be Locke’s view, then the occurrence of the former would 
inevitably threaten the latter. That is, the disorder and turbulence caused by every 
transgression of natural law and the potential threat men are exposed to would 
undermine the peace of the society in general and the mutual trust among its 
members. 
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A possible solution is implied in Locke’s account of the state of nature. As has 
been said, it is not only the situation in which one’s life is exposed to immediate 
danger but when men’s souls are eroded by their subordination to other’s arbitrary 
will that are regarded by Locke as a state of war, and it seems it is the latter that is 
Locke’s primary concern for it has a bearing on his account of the legitimacy of 
political authority. Locke writes that 
Want of a common Judge with Authority, puts all Men in a State of 
Nature: Force without Right, upon a Man’s Person, makes a State of 
War, both where there is, and is not, a common Judge (§19). 
This shows that when an indifferent umpire is set, the state of nature ends and 
the political society begins; wherever such an indifferent umpire is unavailable, men 
are still in the state of nature. In this way, people who are governed by an absolute 
monarchy are still in the state of nature, since no indifferent judge is available under 
such regime, thus it is ‘inconsistent with Civil Society, and so can be no Form of 
Civil Government at all’ (§90). Not only are men still in the state of nature when 
their government is absolute, since their property is constantly under threat due to ‘a 
manifest perverting of Justice, and a barefaced wresting of the Laws,’ so ‘there it is 
hard to imagine any thing but a State of War’ (§20). Locke’s preoccupation with the 
state of war between governor and the governed is made explicit in the following 
passage: 
wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to 
administer Justice, it is still violence and injury, however colour’d with 
the Name, Pretences, or Forms of Law, the end whereof being to protect 
and redress the innocent, by an unbiased application of it, to all who are 
under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, War is made upon the 
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Sufferers, who having no appeal on Earth to right them, they are left to 
the only remedy in such Cases, an appeal to Heaven (§20). 
From this we may infer that when Locke twice refers to the example of thief, 
and emphasises that it is still a state of war even if a thief restrains a man’s freedom 
without taking away his life (§18; §19), presumably what Locke has in mind was a 
thief who tramples on men’s individuality and dignity by restraining them through 
absolute political power but who has skilfully conducted his evil enterprise without 
yet doing much immediately perceivable harm to men’s life and property. Locke’s 
cautious attitude towards political power then motivates him to discuss social 
mechanism in more detail in Chap. VI ‘Of Parental Power’ before he turns to 
political society in the following chapter. It is evident that one of Locke’s purposes in 
Chap. VI is to refute Filmer’s idea of taking parental power as the origin of political 
authority, as Locke writes: ‘these two Powers, Political and Paternal, are so 
perfectly distinct and separate; are built upon so different Foundations, and given to 
so different Ends’ (§71). However, by demonstrating that they are two separate and 
distinct powers, Locke also attempts to ensure the autonomy of society independent 
of the state. From this perspective one can appreciate the importance of Locke’s 
elaboration of familial relationships, as family is the origin of various norms on 
which social order depends. Men acquire social experience primarily from their 
interaction with members of the family. Locke’s influence on Hume’s then is 
demonstrated in the structure of Hume’s political theory, that is, justice and the 
institution of property are likewise distinguished by Hume from allegiance and the 
institution of government. Moreover, Hume’s view that the combination of males 
and females and family thus derived are important because they are the occasions on 
which men’s socialisation first takes place is also overshadowed by Locke’s account 
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of ‘conjugal society’ and ‘the society betwixt parents and children’. Let us compare 
the following passages of two philosophers. Locke writes that 
God hath made it their [i.e. parents’] business to imploy this Care on their 
Off-spring, and hath placed in them suitable Inclinations of Tenderness 
and Concern to temper this power, to apply it as his Wisdom designed it, 
to the Childrens good, as long as they should need to be under it (§63). 
GOD having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own Judgment, it 
was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong Obligations of 
Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination to drive him into Society, as well 
as fitted him with Understanding and Language to continue and enjoy it. 
The first Society was between Man and Wife, which gave beginning to 
that between Parents and Children; to which, in time, that between 
Master and Servant came to be added: And though all these might, and 
commonly did meet together, and make up but one Family, wherein the 
Master or Mistress of it had some sort of Rule proper to a Family; each of 
these, or all together came short of Political Society, as we shall see, if 
we consider the different Ends, Tyes, and Bounds of each of these (§77). 
Locke’s influence on Hume is discernible from the following passage which appears 
in the Treatise: 
’Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects…and leave him in 
every respect more satisfy’d and happy, than ’tis possible for him, in his 
savage and solitary condition, ever to become…that natural appetite 
betwixt the sexes, which unites them together, and preserves their union, 
till a new tye takes place in their concern for their common offspring. 
This new concern becomes also a principle of union betwixt the parents 
and offspring, and forms a more numerous society; where the parents 
govern by the advantage of their superior strength and wisdom, and at the 
same time are restrain’d in the exercise of their authority by that natural 
affection, which they bear their children (Treatise, 312). 
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What is revealed by the passages quoted above is that both Locke and Hume 
regard mankind as social animals, therefore they take pains to explain the process 
through which order grows spontaneously out of society, and family is important 
because it is the starting point of social relations. Indeed Locke’s view that the power 
a father has to command and tutor his offspring before his years of discretion come is, 
to speak properly, more the duty of parents and privilege of children than any 
prerogative of parental power. The natural affection of parents for their children 
makes the duty of nourishment and education ‘a Charge so incumbent on Parents for 
their Childrens good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it’ (§67). 
Although children are dominated by their parents, ‘yet God hath woven into the 
Principles of Humane Nature such a tenderness for their Off-spring’ that the excess is 
seldom on the rigour side than on the other way (§67). Under such care and 
tenderness, when children come to the years of discretion, the ‘Father’s Empire then 
ceases’ (§65), and he can no longer dispose of the liberty of his son; but the 
affectionate tie between parents and children does not thereby cease, for now by the 
law of God a son is under a duty to honour his parents. Although in Locke’s theory 
God is the only origin of morality and commands what men ought to perform, being 
Locke’s readers, we may perceive a tension between Locke’s conventionalism and 
the theological premises of his political philosophy. For it seems conceivable that 
even if God were removed at some point, Locke’s theory would largely remain the 
same. Locke’s elaboration of familial and other social relations is an example of this, 
and what Hume achieved later on was to further that conventionalist dimension of 
Locke’s theory. Hume demonstrates that a pre-political social order can be derived 
from men’s sociable tendencies and from the natural social ties that bind them not 
only before the state is established but also without God commanding in the 
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background. In Locke’s account of family as the origin of social ties, it is also made 
clear that, as has been said, it is an misunderstanding of Locke to take him as 
defending atomistic individualism, for his true intention is to provide an account of 
social order based on various social relations which originate from family and which 
‘are Names as old as History’ (§85). For Locke, as for Hume, society has never been 
a moral vacuum in which man pays no regard to others, for they both think that, 
whether there is a state or not, when men were first born, they must be born in a 
social network in which their various roles are given to them by the existing order: 
first as a son, and later also as a husband, a father, and a master or servant. These 
social relations constitute the essence of social order and are as old as human history; 
therefore Hobbes’s state of nature can only be a philosophical fiction which never 
has any reality in human experience. The following passage challenge scholars who 
views Locke as a Hobbesian: 
God having made the Parents Instruments in his great design of 
continuing the Race of Mankind, and the occasions of Life to their 
Children, as he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and 
bring up their Off-spring; So he has laid on the Children a perpetual 
Obligation of honouring their Parents, which containing in it an inward 
esteem and reverence to be shewn by all outward Expressions, ties up the 
Child from any thing that may ever injure or affront, disturb, or endanger 
the Happiness or Life of those, from whom he received his; and engages 
him in all actions of defence, relief, assistance and comfort of those, by 
whose means he entred into being, and has been made capable of any 
enjoyments of life (§66).79 
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 For the interpretation of Locke that draws a link between him and Hobbes, see, for example, Strauss, 
1965: 202-251; Cox, 1960; Zuckert, 2002. 
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One may recognise that the familial relationship did contribute to the formation 
of social order at the very early stage of human history, for presumably the original 
model of society was based on the expansion of family, therefore most members in 
the society are of the same blood. However, with the further expansion of society, the 
ties among people would become loose, especially for men from different families. 
When a man is facing those to whom he does not seem to owe any duty, their 
interactions are restrained by no norms and disorder is likely to happen. However, 
this poses no challenge to Locke as his idea of social ties is not confined to family. In 
fact he has a much broader idea of social norms that apply to the whole society or to 
human beings per se. This reminds us of Locke’s natural law theory, that everyone is 
bound to preserve himself and to preserve the rest of mankind as much as he can 
when his own preservation is not in competition (§6). Yet Locke’s argument does not 
stop at this abstract level. He is aware that men’s reason, though universal, when put 
into practice must be provided with an empirical basis so that natural law is to have 
its specific content. To explore this important dimension of Locke’s thought and its 
inspiration to Hume, it is helpful to consider Locke’s division of moral rules into 
three kinds by which morally good and evil are determined. 
6.5.2 The Law of Reputation in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding 
In Book II Chap. XXVIII of Locke’s Essay where he was discussing ‘Moral 
Relations’, he points out three sorts of moral rules according to which morally good 
and evil are distinguished. First, the divine law is derived from ‘That God has given a 
Rule whereby Men should govern themselves…and he has Power to enforce it by 
Rewards and Punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life’. Men’s 
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sins or duties are determined by this law (Essay, 352). Second, civil law is ‘the Rule 
set by the Commonwealth…to protect the Lives, Liberties, and Possessions, of those 
who live according to its Laws’, and take away lives, liberty, or goods of those who 
disobey. In other words, civil law judges men to be criminal or innocent (Essay, 352-
353). Finally, the third is the law of opinion or reputation by which virtues and vices 
are judged.
80
 As Locke says, most men seldom seriously reflect on the penalties that 
attend the breach of God’s laws; and among those that do, many of them, while 
breaking the law, ‘entertain Thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their 
Peace for such Breaches’ (Essay, 357). As to the punishment due from the breach of 
civil laws, men ‘frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of Impunity’ (Essay, 
357). However, by contrast, ‘no Man scapes the Punishment of their Censure and 
Dislike, who offends against the Fashion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and 
would recommend himself to’ (Essay, 357). Therefore, compared with the other two 
sanctions, the law of reputation has most immediate and inescapable influence on 
men’s conduct, and it is also the law to which Locke pays most attention. 
Presumably Locke’s emphasis on reputation and on the influence of custom and 
fashion in shaping the moral standard of a community inspired by Hume and was 
represented in Hume’s idea of sympathy and moral conventionalism. 
In the second part of the previous section, when I discussed Hume’s idea of 
sympathy, it was said that Hume takes men’s propensity for sympathy and indirect 
passions as universal, but these universal propensities and passions do not create 
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 According to Brogan, Locke’s account of sanctions has influenced the development of later 
utilitarian philosophers such as John Gay and Jeremy Bentham. See Brogan, 1991: 690-710, and 
Berry, 1982: 17. 
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universal moral characters in different societies. Instead, they give rise to diversity 
because of the influence of moral causes of each nation. Here I hope to suggest that 
the origin of Hume’s view can be traced to Locke’s theory, yet their difference lies in 
the fact that Hume has completed Locke’s theoretical scheme, in a good way or 
otherwise, by providing it with a thoroughly naturalistic basis. That is, Hume 
eliminates the role of divine law as the ultimate origin of morality and transfers its 
universal normativity to human nature itself. In other words, both Hume and Locke 
endorse the view of moral conventionalism, but they also hold that there are some 
features generally shared by the diverse social norms of different societies, whether 
this is what Hume terms ‘utility’ or what Locke describes as ‘every one finds his 
Advantage’ (Essay, 356). They also grant that this universal feature of morality is 
derived from their inductive reasoning. However, the difference between the two 
philosophers is that while Locke attributes the origin of this feature to the law of God, 
Hume attempts to discard this theological premise and to prove that Locke’s theory 
would largely remain the same even if the origin of morality were to be transferred 
from God’s will to a secular account of human nature. Accordingly, Hume is one of 
the most faithful and ingenious among Locke’s readers, and Hume’s theory need not 
be taken as a rigid criticism of that of Locke’s. Instead it may be seen as a 
sympathetic revision driven by the change of social atmosphere from religious to 
secular.
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 The alteration of atmosphere of English society in Hume’s time is fully perceived by him as he 
writes in the essay ‘Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, or to a 
Republic’ (1741) that ‘Now, there has been a sudden and sensible change in the opinions of men 
within these last fifty years, by the progress of learning and of liberty. Most people, in this island, 
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This account of the relation between two philosophers is supported by the 
observation that Locke is fully aware of the possible tension between a universal 
theological premise and the diverse social norms that characterise different societies, 
and one purpose of Hume’s philosophy is to address Locke’s question by providing a 
secular basis of morality. As Locke writes, it is pretended that virtue and vice are 
names ‘to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong’, and when they are 
so applied, they are coincident with the divine law (Essay, 353). However, Locke 
continues, that ‘whatever is pretended’, experience teaches that this is not the way 
that people apply the terms like virtue and vice. Instead what is ‘visible’ is that these 
terms ‘are constantly attributed only to such actions, as in each Country and Society 
are in reputation or discredit’ (Essay, 353 emphasis added). Therefore, virtue and 
vice are terms applied to those behaviours which are already praised and blamed by 
men in a society. In other words, instead of being understood as representing values 
intrinsically right and wrong and hence prescribing men’s behaviours, virtue and vice 
convey men’s 
approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret and tacit 
consent establishes it self in the several Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of 
Men in the World: whereby several actions come to find Credit or 
Disgrace amongst them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Fashions 
of that place (Essay, 353). 
                                                                                                                                          
have divested themselves of all superstitious reverence to names and authority: The clergy have much 
lost their credit: Their pretensions and doctrines have been ridiculed; and even religion can scarcely 
support itself in the world. The mere name of king commands little respect; and to talk of a king as 
GOD’s vicegerent on earth, or to give him any of those magnificent titles, which formerly dazzled 
mankind, would but excite laughter in every one’ (Essays, 51). 
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Locke clearly takes ‘this power of approving or disapproving of the actions of 
those whom they live amongst’ (Essay, 353) as a part of human nature, for even men 
resign to the public of all their force of executing natural law when they are uniting 
into political society, they nevertheless retain this power. It is interesting to observe 
this point, because in the state of nature, that is before civil law comes into existence, 
Locke’s peaceful and well-ordered society has only divine law and the law of 
reputation to rule it. Also, as stated, Locke believes the latter to be more influential 
than the former. In other words, the law of reputation and opinion is the principal law 
that regulates men’s conduct in the state of nature, and Locke believes that only by 
this law are men able to conduct social transactions peacefully. Of course, men may 
also punish the offender of natural law with force, but, as explained above, this is 
more like to be remedy of men against an absolute governor than against their 
fellows, otherwise it seems not sensible to speak of conventions like property and the 
use of money before the state is established. 
Locke shows his conviction of the authority of reputation in rejecting his critics 
as ‘little skill’d in the Nature, or History of Mankind’, the greatest part of which, 
according to Locke, ‘govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this Law of 
Fashion…[but] little regard the Laws of God, or the Magistrate’ (Essay, 357). This 
shows that for Locke, as for Hume, men are by nature social animals that care about 
other’s feelings for themselves, thus the connection between sympathy, love of 
reputation, and sociability is evident for both philosophers. In the previous section 
when I refuted Barry’s account of Hume, I showed that sociability is an important 
idea which distinguishes Hume from Hobbes. Now, in illustrating the affinity 
between Hume and Locke, it is again helpful to observe Locke’s account of human 
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nature as socially-oriented which is similar to Hume’s view, both of which being 
apparently different from Hobbes. As Locke writes: 
Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough, to 
bear up under the constant Dislike, and Condemnation of his own Club. 
He must be of a strange, and unusual Constitution, who can content 
himself, to live in constant Disgrace and Disrepute with his own 
particular Society. Solitude many Men have sought, and been reconciled 
to: But no Body, that has the least Thought, or Sense of a Man about him, 
can live in Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill Opinion of his 
Familiars, and those he converses with. This is a Burthen too heavy for 
human Sufferance: And he must be made up of irreconcilable 
Contradictions, who can take Pleasure in Company, and yet be insensible 
of Contempt and Disgrace from his Companions (Essay, 357). 
A perceivable tension implied in Locke’s account of moral relations, and 
presumably a difficulty Hume later sought to sort out for Locke, as stated, is that 
between divine law as the only valid origin of morality and the phenomenon that ‘in 
different Societies, Vertues and Vices were changed’ (Essay, 356). Facing the 
criticism that by advocating the law of reputation Locke has attributed the origin of 
morality to those who have neither authority to make it nor power to enforce it, and 
thus ‘make Vertue Vice and Vice Vertue’, Locke, amidst his discussion of the actual 
effect of reputation on human psychology and act, emphasises that this law, though 
contributing to diverse social norms, is everywhere correspondent ‘with the 
unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the Law of God hath established’ 
(Essay, 356). Locke defends himself by pointing out that his purpose is not to prove 
that the general measure of virtue and vice is men’s love of reputation and fashion of 
each particular society, but to prove that the Law of Nature, being that standing and 
unalterable rule, is the law ‘by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and 
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pravity of their actions’ (Essay, 355n emphasis added). In this way, when Hume later 
remarks that ‘I am surpris’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an 
ought, or an ought not’, presumably one thing Hume has in mind is the tension 
between Locke’s account of divine law and philosophical law, so he removed the 
former as a solution. However Hume does not thereby fall into the criticism of 
rendering ‘Vertue Vice and Vice Vertue’, because he transfers the universal feature of 
both divine law and reason to human nature. On this account, the important task of 
avoiding moral skepticism is now fulfilled by men’s sympathy, and the universal 
moral principle which men everywhere observe is, as Hume later indicates in EPM, 
utility. 
In short, Hume’s position does in some significant respects differ from Locke’s, 
and what I am trying to suggest is that it is precisely in these differences that Hume’s 
importance lies. However I also hope to suggest that in many other ways Hume takes 
over Locke’s view without much alteration. For example, although reason in Hume’s 
theory is well-known for its subordinate role, it is nevertheless indispensable when a 
general and constant moral standard is to be formed. That is to say, without reason to 
clarify relevant facts and relations, we can hardly make moral distinctions impartially. 
Thus Hume says 
reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and 
conclusions…There are just grounds to conclude, that moral 
beauty…demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to 
give it a suitable influence on the human mind (EPM, 75-76). 
Perhaps one fundamental difference between Hume and Locke, then, is that 
Hume recovers the nature of moral distinctions from ideas to impressions, and thus 
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replaces reason with passions as the final judge of morality. Along with this, when 
we observe Locke’s account of divine law that the ‘Law which God has set to the 
actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the light of Nature, or the voice of 
Revelation’ (Essay, 352), the difference between Locke and Hume is again not so 
decisive. Locke takes revelation as a source of divine law, an important source of 
revelation being the Bible. Now it should be noted that the Bible for Locke and his 
17
th
 century readers was the primary source for any endeavour to supply a ‘historical’ 
account of man’s existence (Ashcraft, 1987: 147n).82 Therefore, for Locke, the divine 
law is not without anthropological and historical basis. Hume does not take over the 
divine law from Locke as a sanction of morality, but he inherits the historical and 
empirical feature of Locke’s thought by replacing the mixture of divine and secular 
history as to be found in Locke’s thought with a thoroughly secular account of 
human history, i.e. his History of England in six volumes. If the connection between 
Hume and Locke is made evident by a comparison between their theories of property, 
in next chapter, I will further the argument by showing that, in his theory of 
government, Hume’s project of the naturalisation of Locke’s philosophy continues. 
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 For an account of the historical and empirical implications of Locke’s state of nature, see Ashcraft, 
1987: chap. 6. 
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Chapter 7 Conservative Utilitarianism and Hume’s Political 
Philosophy 
7.1 The Tradition of Conservative Utilitarianism 
Having examined Hume’s theory of justice and his theory of property, we are 
now in a position to focus on the third main component of Hume’s political thought, 
i.e. his theory of government. As has been indicated by many researchers, Hume’s 
theory of government implies a conservative tendency in his defence of existing 
government. I do not deny this view, but I hope to point out that the conservative 
feature of Hume’s political theory is mainly a result of his ethical naturalism. In other 
words, the purpose of this chapter is to show that it might not be adequate to treat 
Hume as a genuine conservative thinker, for, instead of valuing the tradition and the 
status quo for their own sake and instructing that man can always be inspired by 
reflecting on the history of the community, Hume values them on a naturalistic and 
consequentialist basis, that is, because they reflect a tendency of human nature and 
because they meet the principle of utility when this principle is interpreted in a 
moderate manner. An important implication of this is that Hume would be much less 
reluctant than a conservative when social and political institutions are in need of 
reform. As will be suggested, Hume could be much more active in this respect. On 
this account, while trying to show that conservative utilitarianism is an idea that 
represents Hume’s position, I hope to make explicit that, first, Hume is in essence a 
utilitarian rather than a conservative, and, second, his conservative tendency is 
conditioned by the principle of utility. 
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The idea of conservative utilitarianism once appeared in Henry Sidgwick’s 
essays. In a review of John Grote’s posthumous Examination of the Utilitarian 
Philosophy, the first book length study of John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism (West, 
2007: 126), Sidgwick agrees with Grote’s view on the difference between John 
Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham in the sense that Mill’s theory ‘takes en bloc the 
current rules of morality’, as ‘belief obtained from experience as to the effect of 
actions on happiness, to be accepted provisionally even by the philosopher’, and this 
position is described by Sidgwick, following Grote (Grote, 1870: 230-232), as 
‘conservative utilitarianism’ in contrast with Bentham’s ‘innovating utilitarianism’, 
which ‘professed to reconstruct morality from (utilitarian) first principles’ (Sidgwick, 
2000: 174). Yet Sidgwick also says that the difference between Bentham and Mill is 
one that may fairly exist within one school, for both Bentham and Mill would agree 
that ‘the question of accepting provisionally or throwing aside traditional rules of 
morality must be settled entirely on utilitarian grounds’ (Sidgwick, 2000: 174). It is 
on these ground that Sidgwick defends the continuity between Bentham and Mill, 
and thus rejects Grote’s view that Mill’s ‘neo-utilitarianism’ has introduced alien 
elements from other sources and is thus a deviation not really reconcilable with the 
fundamental principles of the utilitarian system. For Sidgwick, Grote failed to 
appreciate that utilitarianism is method of ethical thought which is ‘not exactly 
coincident with the opinions of any individual, but having an organic growth and 
development as it passes through the minds of different thinkers’ (Sidgwick, 2000: 
174; Kelly, 1990: 3). The idea of conservative utilitarianism is borrowed for the 
purpose of this thesis, and its content, where it is applied to Hume’s political theory, 
will be considered in what follows. 
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This view on Hume’s political theory has certainly been noted by Hume 
scholars and has thus inspired my argument. For example, in Order and Artifice in 
Hume’s Political Philosophy, Frederick Whelan describes Hume’s position as 
conservative utilitarianism and provides a comprehensive elaboration of the idea 
(Whelan, 1985: 365). Moreover, in his essay ‘Hume and Conservatism’ Sheldon 
Wolin likewise clarifies the peculiar connection between Hume’s political theory and 
the historical development of conservatism in England. Despite the fact that in 
Wolin’s essay he takes Hume’s principle of utility as subordinate to history and 
tradition, this does not prevent us from considering his interpretation of Hume as in 
line with that of Whelan’s. For, as will be argued in Section 2, although Whelan 
endorses the idea of conservative utilitarianism, it seems that what he is most 
interested in is the conservative tendency which he regards as pervading Hume’s 
works and the mitigated skepticism which underlies it.
83
 So for Whelan, as for Wolin, 
the principle of utility is not fundamental to Hume’s political theory. It is the view 
defended by both scholars in favour of the conservative interpretation of Hume’s 
political theory that will be reflected on here. By clarifying the meaning of Hume’s 
conservative utilitarianism along with observing the internal development of Hume’s 
philosophy, which started with the Treatise and ended up with History through 
various Essays and two Enquiries, I wish to show that the conservative tendency of 
Hume’s works is inseparable from the approach that Hume adopts in conducting his 
philosophical inquiry. That is to say, I wish to show that Hume’s conservatism is a 
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 For example, Whelan writes that ‘I argue, Hume is brought in the end to a distinctive, conservative 
approach to the practical matters of moral and political life’ (Whelan, 1985: 13). 
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theoretical consequence not primarily intended by Hume, but derived from his 
fundamental position as descriptive naturalism. 
7.2 Hume’s Conservatism: Wolin and Whelan 
Wolin begins his essay by repudiating the view which focuses on Hume’s 
theoretical impact on the growth of Benthamite utilitarianism. Wolin does not deny 
that Hume’s inquiries into causation, the role of reason, and the nature of moral 
judgments helped eventually to undermine the natural-law structure of eighteenth 
century liberalism, and that Hume’s emphasis on utility as the test of institutions 
contributed an important ingredient to Benthamite liberalism. Yet Wolin’s intention 
is to reject this view as rootless in Hume’s political doctrine and tending only to 
obscure its implication (Wolin, 1976: 239). What tends to be obscured by the 
utilitarian interpretation of Hume, and what ‘warrant[s] some attention’ for their 
being supported by Hume’s personal inclination as well as by his doctrine, is Hume’s 
impact on eighteenth century conservatism (Wolin, 1976: 239-240). 
Some fundamental differences between Hume’s thought and the conservative 
tradition which developed after 1789 are noticed by Wolin, and these differences are 
mainly derived from two different attitudes toward the Enlightenment.
84
 As Hume 
died in 1776, he lived in a placid era which preceded the French Revolution, and 
while later conservatives tended to lump together the Enlightenment with the 
revolution and to damn the former because of its presumed relation to the latter, 
Hume’s thought was constructed from the materials of the Enlightenment (Wolin, 
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1976: 240-241). According to Wolin, the first fundamental respect in which Hume’s 
position is distinguished from later conservatives is its secularity. Later conservatives 
draw on some form of political supernaturalism to confront the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment position, examples of this being Coleridge’s disposition to revive 
Scripture as a ‘statesman’s manual’, and Burke’s phrase that history is an expression 
of the ‘divine tactic’ which men could only faintly understand, whereas Hume’s 
conclusions were rooted in a strictly secular analysis, with experience as the final 
court of appeal (Wolin, 1976: 240-241). Secondly, the methods of Hume’s science of 
human nature reveals the spirit of the Enlightenment, such as ‘its quest for objective 
analysis, its distrust of obscurantism, its faith in empirical data, its disdain for the a 
priori, and its strong emphasis on the criterion of utility’. Hume has carried the 
methods out with the sort of dispassion which, as Wolin believes, would have been 
taken by later conservatives as ‘cold-blooded’ (Wolin, 1976: 241). Thirdly, Wolin 
thinks that Hume was a philosopher who owed no inspiration to catastrophe, so he 
exhibited none of the heightened sensitivity of later conservatives to the necessity for 
strong authority as the main guarantor of unity. For Hume, Wolin writes, ‘society 
was a product of human interests whose satisfaction provided the requisite amount of 
social cohesion’ (Wolin, 1976: 241). However, Wolin believes it is against the 
conventional understanding of conservatism that the earlier conservatism of Hume 
assumes some significance. Therefore, despite these differences, Wolin’s 
conservative interpretation continues. 
‘Analytical conservatism’ is the term that Wolin thinks best represents Hume’s 
position (Wolin, 1976: 252), for it accommodates both the scientific spirit that Hume 
inherited from the Enlightenment, and the traditionalism by which later conservative 
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thinkers like Burke was inspired. Wolin writes that ‘Hume was something more than 
the Enlightenment incarnate, his significance is that he turned against the 
Enlightenment its own weapons’ (Wolin, 1976: 241). The first Book of the Treatise, 
for example, whittles down the claims of reason by the use of rational analysis. 
Moreover, Wolin thinks that the ‘concept of time’ has long been ignored by the 
students of political theory, and some misunderstanding of Hume’s thought is 
inseparable with this phenomenon. According to Wolin, Hume regards historical 
time as imparting to social arrangements a ‘qualitative element’ (Wolin, 1976: 247). 
Since institutions were developed over a period of time, and their purpose and nature 
cannot be correctly understood without a sense of time, so the idea of utility in 
Hume’s thought is subordinate to the idea of tradition or history, or, to put it 
differently, to the duration of institutions and practices. In other words, tradition or 
the duration of institutions per se is considered as a kind of value or utility, and if 
their contribution to the welfare of human beings, apart from the stability or order 
which was derived from their long existence, is to be estimated, we can only appeal 
to a principle, utility for example, which must be regarded as morally inferior to the 
value of the existence of institutions per se. In this way, either reform can hardly be 
justified or must be conducted very reluctantly; ‘gradual adjustment’ no doubt is 
preferred to any drastic change. Therefore Wolin writes that ‘utility, in political 
matters, was inseparable from time and experience’ (Wolin, 1976: 247). 
Wolin thinks that this traditionalist dimension of Hume’s political theory is one 
of his legacies which prepares the way for conservative thinkers like Burke. By 
manifesting the affinity between Hume and later conservative thinkers, Wolin aims 
to convince his reader of his perspective on the tradition of political thought, that 
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Hume is seen as a paradigm which puts an end to the legalism and individualism 
prominent in earlier thinkers like Hobbes and Locke, and replaces them instead with 
psychologism and the idea of the organic community or ‘sense of community’ which 
contributed to the development of conservatism (Wolin, 1976: 253-255). In any case, 
Locke is regarded by Wolin as a target of Hume’s criticism. For, on the one hand, 
Wolin argues that Hume’s attack on the state-of-nature hypothesis present in some 
social contract theorising reveals his position against theorists who seek to justify 
rebellion against authority on the basis of a ‘mere philosophical fiction’ (Wolin, 1976: 
245). On the other, according to Wolin, while Locke takes the political categories of 
allegiance, obligation, and justice as logical derivatives from the basic sovereignty 
established by the contract, Hume turned the procedure around by showing that 
justice, obligation, and authority were consequences of human attitudes and 
expectations; therefore they were to be explained on psychological, not judicial, 
grounds (Wolin, 1976: 253). Moreover, Wolin argues that Locke’s system is founded 
on abstractions which cut through the communal bonds of class, status, and hierarchy, 
leaving only ‘unattached and undifferentiated individuals’ (Wolin, 1976: 254). ‘The 
sense of community’ or the idea of organic community which, in Wolin’s 
observation, grows out the placid society of the 18
th
 century England and has 
influenced Hume’s political theory, was indiscernible in Locke’s system. Indeed, one 
purpose of Wolin’s essay is to settle the dispute among liberalism and conservatism 
with respect to the feature of Hume’s political theory, and his strategy is to indicate 
that the gap between two camps was not so wide because since 17
th
 century 
‘liberalism was becoming conservatised’ (Wolin, 1976: 254). This is observable 
from the moderate fashion of the Glorious Revolution and the political landscape of 
England at the beginning of 18
th
 century into which essential liberal elements have 
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been incorporated, including ‘the idea of government under law, the superiority of 
Parliament, and the rights of Englishmen’. Liberalism, then, was converted from a 
challenge to the established order to the order itself (Wolin, 1976: 254). Given his 
attention to the continuity of the historical development of political ideology in 
England between 17
th
 and 18
th
 century, however, it seems surprising to find that 
Wolin excludes the possibility of the continuity which might exist between two 
philosophers who are respectively most representative of these two periods, namely 
Locke and Hume. In Section 4 I shall clarify Hume’s connection with Locke by 
considering Hume’s idea of political duty; for now let us consider more thoroughly 
the conservative interpretation of Hume. 
Hume’s conservatism is of a distinct kind, according to Wolin, partly because 
his thought, although contributing to altering the course of conservatism, cannot be 
turned into a justification for various forms that later conservatism takes. For 
example, as Wolin rightly indicates, imagination, habit, and emotion are important 
conceptions in Hume’s philosophy, but this is because they are a ‘catalog of 
descriptive facts concerning human behaviour…they were not values in themselves’ 
(Wolin, 1976: 243-244). Frederick Whelan echoes this observation and rejects Hume 
as a romantic traditionalist, for although Hume’s psychological theory offers 
materials for explaining ‘sentimental traditionalism’, such as reverence for the past 
or the ancestral being explained by the natural tendency of men’s imagination, he 
does not develop this theme (Whelan, 1985: 321 n.34). The reason lies in the fact 
that, unlike later conservatism which ‘began to turn into transcendental norms in 
order to combat the revolutionary appeal to reason’, thus diverse elements of 
irrationalism, romanticism, religion, and history were brought in to weave a new 
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vision of an older order, Hume’s acceptance of established practice is connected with 
his philosophical empiricism and skepticism that forms the background of his entire 
enterprise (Wolin, 1976: 253; Whelan, 1985: 322). This view brings us to the 
premise of Whelan’s interpretation, namely ‘An adequate interpretation and a fair 
assessment of Hume’s political philosophy must thus consider its grounding in his 
work, with its continuities, as a whole’ (Whelan, 1985: 9). Whelan is entirely 
convinced of the continuities of Hume’s thought that he warns that any 
‘Departmentalisation of interest in Hume has been detrimental to the interpretation of 
all aspects of his works, since all its parts can be fully understood only in relation to 
the whole’ (Whelan, 1985: 5). In this way, each book of the Treatise cannot be fully 
understood without referring to the other two. Moreover, since the Treatise has in 
itself been seen as a complete philosophical system and as ‘the work on which 
Hume’s reputation as a philosopher chiefly depends’, Whelan thus ‘concentrates on 
the Treatise’, and the importance of Enquiries is inevitably underestimated in his 
work. Whelan has not ignored Hume’s turn to the writing of Essays and History; 
instead he refers to them ‘mainly for concrete illustrations of points made [in the 
Treatise]’, for there was no such disjuncture in Hume’s own view on his project, and 
the study of history is meant to confirm the account of human nature put forward in 
the Treatise (Whelan, 1985: 4-5; 21). Given his preoccupation with the continuity of 
Hume’s thought, Whelan therefore treats the connection among Hume’s various 
works as an extension and application of the thesis accomplished as early as 1739 
and 1740: according to Whelan, not only is the conservative disposition of the third 
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Book of the Treatise derived from Hume’s skepticism, but Hume’s view on History 
and on other issues as elaborated in Essays can only be understood when we trace 
their origin back to the skepticism and empiricism in the first Book of the Treatise.
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In his moral inquiry as well as in his epistemology, as Whelan indicates, Hume 
starts with a skeptical attack on any rational foundation, but this has not made Hume 
a moral skeptic or a Pyrrhonist in epistemology. The lack of rational grounding does 
not normally prevent us from making moral judgments and drawing causal 
inferences with conviction. Genuine and total suspension of belief in morals, just as 
with respect to causation, is impossible in life. Here Hume turns to psychology for 
remedy, and he finds that moral judgments arise from the distinctive feeling of 
approval or disapproval that normal people experience when considering certain 
objects or circumstances (Whelan, 1985: 20-21; 198).
86
 This naturalistic turn in 
Hume’s philosophy is considered by Whelan the most significant; it not only 
salvages Hume from the crisis of extreme skepticism, but also forms the foundation 
of Hume’s normative doctrine which justifies social order through the mediation of 
mental and social artifices. As Whelan says: ‘Hume’s normative ethical 
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 For example, Whelan argues that ‘Hume’s conservative inclination arises indeed from his 
skepticism—not, however, from a perverse spirit of paradox but from a cogent philosophical position, 
together with the diffidence in reasoning that it prescribes and the naturalism that he adopts as his 
practical guide and as the apparent condition of any reasoning and morality at all’ (Whelan, 1985: 
315). J. B. Stewart likewise thinks that the later development of Hume’s thought is all derived from 
the extension of the Treatise, see Stewart, 1973: chap. 1 and passim. 
86
 Thus the first two sections of the third Book of the Treatise aim to prove both that, as their titles 
show, ‘Moral distinctions not deriv’d from reason’ and ‘Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral 
sense’. 
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doctrine…offers only comparatively small refinements on what he takes to be the 
usual conclusions of the ordinary moral sentiments’ (Whelan, 1985: 22). The 
refinement, though small, is taken by Whelan as the core of Hume’s political theory, 
because it is by that means that the artificial institutions such as property and 
government are established, and people’s constant adherence to the rules then being 
promulgated by the institution of government creating order in society, hence the 
heading of Whelan’s work. For Whelan, therefore, moral sense is pivotal to deriving 
the values of moral judgments from the facts of human nature.
87
 Although moral 
sense is a faculty working in each person, there are certain propensities, as Hume 
observes, which are not only shared by people who belong to the same society, but 
by human beings in general, and this helps to ensure that some moral standards can 
be held steadily and some virtues/vices are generally accepted. The naturalistic turn 
of Hume’s philosophy, though rejecting the rational foundation of morality, does not 
eliminate reason thoroughly. Reason instead is assigned an instrumental role, and this 
is made clear in Hume’s psychological explanation of the origin of social order. The 
‘reflective moral sense’ or ‘enlargement of the moral sentiments’ as Whelan calls it 
(1985: 22; 316), along with other moral sentiments without redirection, are the 
foundation of morality which Whelan thinks has been reconstructed by Hume’s 
naturalism after his skeptical attack on ethical rationalism. 
We are now approaching the heart of Whelan’s argument; namely, given his 
view that Hume does provide a normative doctrine, Whelan is then obliged to 
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 Thus Whelan writes that ‘normative standards are generated by, or adopted from, the features of 
human nature; “is” yields “ought,” although without any claim of rational demonstration’ (Whelan, 
1985: 334). 
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indicate what the conceptions are by which Hume thinks our behaviour and judgment 
ought to be evaluated. In making this interpretative choice, Whelan is fully aware 
that, so far as Hume’s political theory is concerned, two options before him are habit 
(or custom) and utility, and Whelan’s tells us that it is the former which Hume adopts 
as a practical guide: 
On the question of…the criteria of legitimacy of particular governments, 
Hume’s theory is less precise; indeed it is quite conservative in its import, 
in the common sense of tending to support existing, or traditional, 
institutions…Given the difficulties, on strict Humean scientific grounds, 
of estimating the potential performance of untried alternatives, and of 
calculating the costs of implementing a new system of government, this 
orientation has evidently conservative practical implications, indicating 
the desirability of preserving whatever seems to be of value in what 
exists and otherwise of cautious and incremental reformism (Whelan, 
1985: 316). 
Whelan’s conservative interpretation is related to his convictions that Hume’s 
thought must be seen as a continuous whole, and that Hume’s philosophical system 
is accomplished in the Treatise. On the one hand, since each dimension of Hume’s 
thought can be properly understood only by being related to others, then Hume’s 
skeptical attack launched in the first Book of the Treatise must overshadow every 
development of Hume’s thought thereafter (Whelan, 1985: 81). On the other hand, as 
Whelan believes that Hume’s philosophical system in the Treatise is complete, 
Enquiries which are conventionally regarded as polished versions of the first and 
third Books of the earlier work tend to be overlooked. Moreover, since Hume’s 
Essays and History are seen as applications of the philosophical principles developed 
in the Treatise to a variety of practical issues, a more accurate observation of the 
transformation of Hume’s position which occurs among his various works is thus 
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sacrificed for the sake of strict continuity. It is in this way that I think Whelan takes 
Hume’s later thought as an extension of his earliest work. For, as Whelan argues, 
Hume has never ceased to be a skeptic; this tendency then prevents Hume from 
developing a more concrete moral principle as practical guide. Meanwhile, however, 
Whelan affirms that there is a normative doctrine parallel with a causal psychological 
explanation in the Treatise. In order to reconcile these seemingly incompatible 
aspects of Hume’s thought, Whelan thus attributes a normative feature to Hume’s 
naturalism. In this way, Hume’s naturalism not only provides a psychological 
explanation of the causal connections between phenomenon and human nature, but 
also has a normative dimension, that is, human nature is considered a foundation of 
values which guides us in our practical reasoning and judgment. Thus Whelan writes 
Human nature is indeed the object of Hume’s scientific study, pursued 
through the methods that properly govern all reasoning regarding matters 
of fact. But there remains the other sense in which nature provides the 
skeptic with guidance in choosing standards of right reasoning and of 
moral value from among the actual tendencies of the human imagination 
and judgment (Whelan, 1985: 74-75). 
Therefore, ideas like habit and custom, which in fact play important roles in 
men’s daily life and are observed and highlighted by Hume as a psychologist, are 
subsequently endowed with moral values by Hume as a moralist. Both theories, one 
psychological and another moral, are developed by Hume in the Treatise, they exist 
simultaneously in Hume’s account of understanding, of passions, and of morals 
(Whelan, 1985: 123, 142, 144, 195-196). Hume is comfortable, as Whelan believes, 
with this approach, because the psychological facts elucidated by Hume’s science of 
human nature is the groundwork of his normative naturalism and moral theory, and it 
is just ‘a short step’ from the former to the latter (Whelan, 1985: 21-22, 76). Hume’s 
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description and explanation of the status quo, then, is transformed by Whelan into a 
defence of the status quo, hence the conservatism he draws from Hume. 
The difference between the Treatise and EPM has not been overlooked by 
Whelan. He does provide an analysis of this topic and of Hume’s theoretical 
connection with the development of Benthamite utilitarianism. However, his analysis 
is not without weakness. For in order to defend his continuity thesis, EPM is treated 
as subordinate to the Treatise, hence the subordination of utility to moral sense, the 
one is principal in EPM and the other in the Treatise. Whelan recognises that Hume 
makes a move from description to prescription in EPM, for Hume’s explicit intention 
in that work is to discover an objective moral standard, and ‘if empirical study 
reveals certain universal standards of value, the step is short from their clarification 
to their acceptance’ (Whelan, 1985: 207). Furthermore, Whelan also notices that the 
dichotomy between natural and artificial virtues, the implications of which he takes 
as crucial for one to interpret Hume’s political philosophy properly given his 
preoccupation with the Treatise,
88
 is ‘skirted in the Enquiry’, where benevolence and 
justice are seen to exemplify the same general characteristic of ‘being useful to 
others’ and thus to manifest a family resemblance (Whelan, 1985: 210). However, 
despite the fact that utility is the moral standard advocated by Hume in EPM and the 
structure of Hume’s argument is altered as a consequence, Whelan nevertheless 
emphasises the differences between Hume and classic utilitarians like Bentham. First, 
Whelan indicates that the maximisation element is proposed by Bentham as a 
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 This distinction, as described by Whelan, is ‘one that marks the whole of Hume’s moral and 
political philosophy’ (Whelan, 1985: 219). 
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prescriptive criterion for a moral agent to choose among a number of available 
courses of action, all of them likely to be beneficial. Yet this element is not advanced 
in Hume’s theory. The absence of the maximisation imperative results in the modest 
demands of the prescriptive aspect of Hume’s thought which takes human nature as 
its standard, and is then allied with Hume’s fundamental skepticism that ‘generally 
rules out claims of knowledge of the sort that would be required for definitive 
solutions to many moral or political disagreements’ (Whelan, 1985: 214). Hence the 
conservative outlook of Hume’s political theory. Second, against the consequentialist 
feature of later utilitarianism, Whelan thinks that Hume adheres more closely to the 
ordinary moral sense school in acknowledging ‘good intensions’ and ‘benevolent 
affections’ as virtuous in themselves. Therefore the appropriate objects of moral 
approbation are motives instead of the actual consequences. Accordingly, Whelan 
reasserts that 
Here as elsewhere Hume is prepared to accept the natural propensities of 
the mind as appropriate, and to this extent he adheres to naturalistic 
standards that are looser than those of later utilitarianism and therefore 
less likely to issue in negative criticisms and programmatic prescriptions 
(Whelan, 1985: 215). 
Finally, Whelan argues that the two currents in British ethical thought: 
utilitarianism and moral sense school, ‘have often been interpreted as contrary 
positions’ (Whelan, 1985: 215). He takes Bentham as an example: ‘Bentham, in 
defending utility as the sole standard of morality, explicitly rejects theories of “moral 
sense”’ (Whelan, 1985: 215). Although these two moral principles do not appear 
incompatible in Hume’s moral philosophy, Whelan emphasises the importance of 
deciding the ‘ultimate source of moral value: which principle – feeling or utility – is 
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prior?’ Whelan claims that the moral sense is the fundamental category, whereas 
Hume’s utilitarianism is ‘derived from and depends on an affective basis’ of his 
theory of moral sense (Whelan, 1985: 215-216). 
In one sense, Wolin’s interpretation seems to be more convincing than 
Whelan’s. Wolin argues that Hume’s psychologism, ‘a legacy of empiricism in 
which the useful and the factual were made to cohere in subtle fashion’, was part of 
his general legacy to later conservatism. Yet Wolin also notices that this empirical 
and naturalistic approach was, due to revolutionary events arising since the year of 
Hume’s death, replaced by a metaphysical conservatism. What Wolin considers to 
have prepared the way for Burke was Hume’s emphasis on traditionalism. As 
mentioned earlier, Wolin draws from Hume’s approach a ‘sense of time’ which he 
thinks plays a principal role in later conservative thinking of England: ‘Time implied 
experience, and experience in turn provided the motive for gradual adjustment’ 
(Wolin, 1976: 247). Although Wolin is fairly clear that habit, imagination, and 
emotion are adopted by Hume as descriptivist ideas, he nonetheless believes that 
Hume cherishes long-existing practices and institutions for their own sake, because 
what Hume has indicated to later conservatives was that ‘utility could be located as 
an immanent value dwelling within the interstices of actual social arrangements, not 
as a grim measuring rod contrived to reveal the shortcomings of institutions’ (Wolin, 
1976: 246). In comparison, Whelan develops his conservative interpretation on the 
basis of Hume’s skeptical attitude about any rational foundation of morality, and also 
on his reservation about Hume’s attempt at developing a thoroughly descriptive 
moral science, thus he comments: ‘Hume…is ostensibly engaged in the descriptive 
study of morals’ (Whelan, 1985: 211). In this way, in his analysis of the difference 
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between the Treatise and EPM, Whelan does not concern himself with the tension 
that might arise between the principle of utility and Hume’s scientific research of 
human nature as elaborated in the earlier work. He does not perceive the tension 
because he believes that Hume’s normative doctrine is already parallel with a 
psychological scheme in the Treatise. Whelan’s concern, instead, is to prove the 
priority of moral sense over utility in Hume’s political theory. For, after all, as he is 
persuaded, Hume’s naturalistic turn in the Treatise was proved to be effective not 
only in saving him from the ‘abyss of Pyrrhonism’ but also to provide prescriptive 
principles as drawn from the facts of human nature. 
7.3 Negative Prescriptivism: Response to Whelan 
On the basis of the delineation of Whelan’s interpretation of Hume and the 
content of conservative utilitarianism that he proposes, now let us reflect on it and 
see if an alternative understanding of Hume’s conservative utilitarianism is available. 
First, as has been said, Whelan regards the Treatise as comprising of both the 
descriptive and normative naturalism of Hume, but it seems to be a misinterpretation 
of Hume’s position. I hope to insist that Hume is fully aware of two different 
methods of conducting moral enquiries, and that he also consciously picks up 
different roles in his various works and endeavours not to confound them. Hume’s 
Essays and History reveal explicit normative tendencies, and this is derived from 
Hume’s particular views on the implications of the study of history and the writing of 
essays. On the other hand, in the Treatise Hume never doubts that his mission is to 
provide a ‘cold and unentertaining’ dissection of human nature, and his intention 
remains identical in the composition of EPM; thus he is silent about the equal 
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distribution of property in his theory of justice and about the ideal form of 
government in his political theory, just as he does in the deliberate ambiguity shown 
in his discussion of the measure of political obligation in the Treatise. It is mainly on 
these grounds that Hume’s political theory could be considered conservative. 89 
However, Hume’s persistent ambition of being a moral scientist is somehow 
undermined by the principal role of utility in EPM. Although for Hume utility is a 
principle derived from his inductive reasoning of empirical human affairs and 
conducts, still when compared with sympathy, its quasi-objectified and nearly 
universal feature forces Hume to deviate slightly from his role as a moral scientist, 
and to argue for a thin but general moral criterion. This view defended here, as I 
believe it is doing justice to Hume’s philosophy, is founded on a belief that Hume’s 
thought developed throughout his life, thus each of his works should be considered 
on the equal footing. To compress a long and complex process of thought 
development into a single, earliest work of Hume is to ignore some of his important 
teachings. 
MacIntyre is one of the interpreters who pays attention to the dual roles of 
anatomist and painter in Hume’s thought. He notices that Hume concludes the 
Treatise with a reassertion of his role as an anatomist of human nature, and indicates 
that the relationship of the anatomist to the painter resembles that of the philosopher 
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 Compare this with Hume’s depiction of an ideal governmental constitution in his essay ‘Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth’ and his approval of modest reformism: ‘In all cases, it must be advantageous 
to know what is most perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring any real constitution or form of 
government as near it as possible, by such gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too great 
disturbance to society’ (Essays, 513-514). 
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to the practical person (MacIntyre, 1988: 313-314).
90
 MacIntyre’s observation is 
supported by Hume’s letters in response to Francis Hutcheson’s criticism of the third 
Book of the Treatise, where Hume writes: 
There are different ways of examining the Mind as well as the Body. One 
may consider it either as an Anatomist or as a Painter; either to discover 
its most secret Springs & Principles or to describe the Grace & Beauty of 
its Actions. I imagine it impossible to conjoin these two Views. Where 
you pull of the Skin, & display all the minute Parts, there appears 
something trivial, even in the noblest Attitudes & most vigorous Actions: 
Nor can you ever render the Object graceful or engaging but by clothing 
the Parts again with Skin & Flesh, & presenting only their bare Outside. 
An anatomist, however, can give very good Advice to a Painter or 
Statuary: And in like manner, I am perswaded, that a Metaphysician may 
be very helpful to a Moralist; tho’ I cannot conceive these two Characters 
united in the same Work. Any warm Sentiment of Morals, I am afraid, 
wou’d have the Air of Declamation amidst abstract Reasonings, & wou’d 
be esteem’d contrary to good Taste. And tho’ I am much more ambitious 
of being esteem’d a Friend to Virtue, than a Writer of Taste; yet I must 
always carry the latter in my Eye, otherwise I must despair of ever being 
servicable to Virtue. I hope these Reasons will satisfy you; tho at the 
same time, I intend to make a new Tryal, if it be possible to make the 
Moralist & Metaphysician agree a little better (Letters vol.1: 32-33). 
  It is clear from this letter that Hume’s mission in the Treatise is to provide a 
dissection of the human mind just like an anatomist does to the human body, hence 
the calm and indifferent tendency of that work which Hutcheson takes as a defect. 
We have no direct evidence to prove that Hume’s advocate of utility instead of 
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 Before concluding the first book of the Treatise, Hume first mentions this metaphor. He says: ‘’Tis 
now time to return to a more close examination of our subject, and to proceed in the accurate anatomy 
of human nature, having fully explain’d the nature of our judgment and understanding’ (Treatise, 171). 
See also Treatise, 211. 
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sympathy in EPM corresponds to the ‘new Tryal’ he mentioned, but by implication 
this might not be an absurd presumption. Perhaps what is the more immediate 
consequence of Hume’s ‘new Tryal’ is his Essays, Moral and Political (1741-42) 
published right after the unwelcome Treatise. In ‘Of the Study of History’, Hume 
recommends this activity to his readers by showing its advantages as amusing the 
fancy, improving the understanding, and strengthening virtue (Essays, 565). In 
discussing the last, Hume indicates the differences between several characters and 
their weaknesses in promoting virtues, whereas historians, by contrast, have been, 
‘almost without exception, the true friend of virtue, and have always represented it in 
its proper colours’ (Essays, 567 emphasis added). Poets, as Hume comments, are 
able to ‘paint virtue’ in the most charming colours (Essays, 567 emphasis added); but, 
as they address themselves entirely to the passions, they often become advocates for 
vice. When a philosopher contemplates characters and manners in his closet, his 
abstract theory derives from a mind so cold and unmoved, that ‘he scarce feels the 
difference between vice and virtue’. Moreover, the vulgar, Hume observes, tends to 
evaluate the characters of men in relation to his interest, and ‘has his judgment 
warped on every occasion by the violence of his passion’ (Essays, 567-568). Only 
the historian treads a middle ground between these extremes: 
The writers of history, as well as the readers, are sufficiently interested in 
the characters and events, to have a lively sentiment of blame or praise; 
and, at the same time, have no particular interest or concern to pervert 
their judgment (Essays, 568). 
This is relevant for our argument here, as Hume clearly indicated that his role 
in composing History is distinct from a philosopher, the former being evaluative 
while the latter being descriptive. A similar contrast again appears in another essay 
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published in 1742 named ‘Of Essay-Writing’. There Hume distinguishes the ‘elegant 
part’ of mankind into two: the one devoting themselves to the study which requires 
‘higher and more difficult Operations of the mind’ with leisure and solitude, the 
other being featured by their sociable disposition and taste of pleasure, and having an 
inclination to the ‘easier and more gentle Exercises of the Understanding’ (Essays, 
533). Hume calls them the learned and the conversible respectively. The gulf that 
long existed between them had not only rendered ‘Time spent in Company the most 
unentertaining, as well as the most unprofitable’, but also gave rise to abstruse 
philosophy cultivated by men ‘without any Taste of Life or Manners, and without 
that Liberty and Facility of Thought and Expression, which can only be acquir’d by 
Conversation’ (Essays, 534). In this way, Hume shows his approval for the 
increasing communication between the two in his time, ‘this League betwixt the 
learned and conversible Worlds, which is so happily begun, will be still farther 
improv’d to their mutual Advantage’. It is for this purpose that Hume thinks his 
writing of essays is justified: 
I cannot but consider myself as a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from 
the Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation; and shall think it 
my constant Duty to promote a good Correspondence betwixt these two 
States, which have so great a Dependence on each other (Essays, 535). 
In this way, like a historian, Hume also regards the essayist as occupying a 
place between the philosopher and vulgar, and we need not suppose that the learned 
and the conversable Hume mentions represents distinct groups of people, it is likely 
that Hume is also recommending his own philosophical approach, in contrast with 
philosophers, Pascal for example, whose life and theory are founded on ‘ridiculous 
superstitions’ and ‘an extreme contempt of this life’ (EPM, 198-199). This may 
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clarify that, whether by drawing the distinction between anatomist and painter, or the 
differences between the philosopher, the vulgar, and historians or essayists, different 
writings of Hume’s represent his different intentions of describing and explaining on 
the one hand, persuading and evaluating on the other. Whelan’s preoccupation with 
the Treatise and with the continuity of Hume’s thought leads him to overlook these 
differences. 
One reason that prevents Hume from being a classic utilitarian, Whelan thinks, 
is that later utilitarian explicitly rejected theories of moral sense in the defence of 
utility as the sole standard of morality. While Whelan sees that these two principles 
in Hume’s theory have for the most part been portrayed as complementary and 
coincidental, he nevertheless attributes the foundation of Hume’s political theory to 
moral sense, and in this way utility is a subordinate principle. By implication, 
Hume’s theory would have been the target of Bentham’s criticism. Yet this need not 
be the case. It is true that Bentham emphasises the difference between the motive or 
cause of any act and the ground or reason which warrant that act with approbation, 
and he also argues that our antipathy or sympathy with the motive of an act ‘can 
never be a right ground of action’, primarily because of the capricious feature of our 
sentiments: 
There is no incident imaginable, be it ever so trivial, and so remote from 
mischief, from which this principle may not extract a ground of 
punishment. Any difference in taste: any difference in opinion: upon one 
subject as well as upon another. No disagreement so trifling which 
perseverance and altercation will not render serious. Each becomes in the 
other’s eyes an enemy, and, if laws permit, a criminal (Bentham, 1948: 
143-144). 
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So Bentham argues that the communication of sentiments only reveals to us the 
cause or motive of the act observed, while our moral approbation must be founded on 
stable and objective grounds, that is, the effect or the utility produced, ‘which if it is 
a right principle of action, and of approbation, in any one case, is so in every other’ 
(Bentham, 1948: 146). However, Bentham also writes: 
the dictates of this principle (i.e. sympathy or antipathy) will frequently 
coincide with those of utility, though perhaps without intending any such 
thing. Probably more frequently than not: and hence it is that the business 
of penal justice is carried on upon that tolerable sort of footing upon 
which we see it carried on in common at this day (Bentham, 1948: 141-
142). 
Accordingly, Bentham’s utilitarianism, instead of explicitly rejecting the moral 
sense as Whelan claims, aims rather to draw a stable moral standard from human 
sentiments, which then in turn is applied to regulate human nature (Rosen, 2003: 
221-223). In this way, if more attention is devoted to the development of Hume’s 
thought that took place between the Treatise and EPM, one may find that Bentham is 
walking on a path which existed already, though more implicitly, in Hume. Utility in 
EPM represents a general moral principle which less interests Hume in the Treatise, 
and Hume’s emphasis on the effect instead of the motive of virtues, along with the 
transformation of the nature of sympathy from a neutral psychological mechanism to 
a kind of social feeling which has no remarkable difference with benevolence and 
humanity, all suggest Hume’s deviation from a purely descriptive position to 
negative prescriptivism. It is prescriptive because Hume explicitly indicates that it is 
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utility instead of self-interest that should be considered the foundation of morality.
91
 
It is negative because utility remains a principle corresponding to men’s natural 
sociability, and Hume has not combined utility with the maximisation principle for 
the purpose of developing a normative moral doctrine. 
This then refers us to the third point which Whelan believes has prevented 
Hume from being a classic utilitarian, namely Hume’s non-consequentialism. 
Hume’s exploration of men’s psychological motives for being virtuous in the 
Treatise does not render him as adhering more closely to the ordinary moral sense in 
acknowledging ‘good intentions’ and ‘benevolent affections’ as virtuous in 
themselves. For it is likely that the reason we regard certain motives and tendencies 
as virtuous is based on our supposition that they have been bringing about beneficial 
consequences all the time, as experience instructs us.
92
 This is particularly true in the 
case of artificial virtues, and still holds partly true in the case of natural virtues. The 
examples Hume examined in EPM verify this. If motives are the only thing that 
matter in our moral judgment, then practices like giving alms and tyrannicide would 
have ‘naturally’ been regarded as virtues, since the motives behind them are to 
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 For example, as the title of Section Five of EPM shows, Hume has made a normative judgment in 
highlighting the reason ‘Why Utility Pleases’ instead of ‘Why Selfishness Pleases’, since both 
propositions are empirically verified (EPM, 104-118). See also the following paragraph from EPM: 
‘no qualities are more entitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind, than beneficence 
and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from 
a tender sympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and species’ (EPM, 79). 
92
 Michael Frazer holds the same view. As he suggests, although what are approved by us are the 
qualities or characters of persons, nonetheless we are led by our sympathy with the effects of the 
characters to approve or disapprove their causes. The objects of our sympathy are thus different from 
the objects of our moral evaluation (Frazer, 2010: 44). 
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relieve the indigent and to free people from oppressive rulers. On the contrary, 
however, Hume writes that when ‘history and experience having since convinced us’ 
that the former increases idleness and the latter leads to the jealousy and cruelty of 
princes, ‘we regard that species of charity rather as a weakness than a virtue’ and ‘as 
very improper models for imitation’ (EPM, 81-82). Hume then says in a 
consequentialist tone: 
We carry our view into the salutary consequences of such a character and 
disposition; and whatever has so benign an influence, and forwards so 
desirable an end, is beheld with complacency and pleasure (EPM, 82). 
What is also worth noting is, in demonstrating his consequentialist position, 
Hume further clarifies the relationship between moral sense and utility, and again 
contrary to Whelan’s observation, Hume clearly shows that, although it is our moral 
sense that first gives rise to our moral judgment, utility always guides and reshapes it 
according to experience. For example, luxury or refinement in the pleasures and 
conveniences of life were universally regarded as vices, for they had long been 
supposed the source of corruption in government, as well as the immediate cause of 
faction, sedition, civil war, and the total loss of liberty. But those who prove the 
contrary, such as Hume himself, show that such refinements rather tend to the 
increase of industry, civility, the arts, and as a consequence further cultivate men’s 
sociability and sympathy, then ‘regulat[ing] anew our moral as well as political 
sentiments, and represent [luxury] as laudable and innocent, what had formerly been 
regarded as pernicious or blameable’ (EPM, 82). Moreover, it is still worth noting 
that Hume discusses these cases in the section named ‘Of Benevolence’, and for 
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Hume, benevolence is a natural feeling with which men are naturally endowed and is 
the source of most natural virtues such as lenity, tenderness, and friendship.
93
 In this 
way, Whelan’s view that ‘Here as elsewhere Hume is prepared to accept the natural 
propensities of mind as appropriate’ seems problematic, for, according to Hume, 
men’s natural propensities, not only the narrowness of soul (Treatise, 344) but even 
benign benevolence, are all subject to the direction of utility as a universal moral 
principle.
94
 
7.4 Natural and Civil Moralities: Response to Wolin 
Having reflected on Whelan’s views, now let us turn to Wolin’s conservative 
account of Hume, particularly that Hume represents a paradigm which poses a 
challenge to Locke’s theory and clears the way for later conservatism. Contrary to 
Wolin’s view, by exploring the idea of politics in two philosophers, I hope to show 
that there is a theoretical affinity between Hume and Locke, that is, Hume has 
inherited the main theme of Locke’s political theory, and further supplies it with an 
empirical, psychological foundation, while their difference is mainly a result of the 
change of social context in which their theories were developed. When we approach 
Hume’s theory of allegiance and government by means of its most ample and 
detailed form, namely that elaborated in the Treatise, the primary feature which 
catches our attention is: Hume intends to express his theory of government as parallel 
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 Other tendencies of the same kind are love of children, gratitude to benefactors, and pity to the 
unfortunate (Essays, 479). 
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 For an alternative defence of Hume’s consequentialism, see Hardin, 2007: 159-160. For Hume’s 
view on the adjustability of moral sentiments as subject to the guide of moral reasoning, see also C. 
Taylor, 2009: 326-328. 
277 
 
with his theory of justice, both of which are comprehended in his account of morals. 
This is an observation not only supported by the structure of the text, but also by the 
fact that, in Hume’s discussion of the origin and object of allegiance and government, 
he is never tired of comparing them with justice and property. To understand Hume’s 
intention properly, we must go back to Locke’s STG, for it is by that work Hume’s 
political thought was mainly inspired, and the evidence lies in the same parallel of 
the state of nature and civil society that underlies Locke’s political theory. 
While Wolin says that Hume’s ‘analytic conservatism’ aims to challenge the 
state-of-nature hypothesis present in some social contract theorising, he does not 
specify which social contract theorist Hume has in mind. But when Wolin continues 
to argue that Hume has pointed out the slippery logic which sought to justify 
rebellion against authority on the basis of a mere philosophical fiction like the state 
of nature, Locke seems to be the likely candidate who is taken by Wolin as the object 
of Hume’s criticism. A few pages later, Wolin makes his argument more explicit by 
claiming that: 
Locke and Hobbes, while emphasising the importance of human nature 
for the understanding of politics, had nevertheless approached this 
element as preliminary to the central juridical concept of contract. In this 
way, the political categories of allegiance, obligation, and justice 
assumed the status of logical derivatives from the basic concept of 
sovereignty (or as Locke preferred to call it, “supreme power”) 
established by the contract. Hume, on the other hand, turned the 
procedure around: justice, obligation, and authority were consequences 
of human attitudes and expectations. These concepts were to be 
explained on psychological, not juridical, grounds (Wolin, 1976: 253). 
In both respects, Wolin takes Locke as a philosopher criticised by Hume, but 
this is an inaccurate account of Hume’s position, and I would like to suggest that it is 
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Hobbes instead of Locke that is the main target of Hume. On the one hand, although 
Hume does describe the state of nature as a mere fiction, it must be noticed that 
Hume also says it is a state ‘describ’d as full of war, violence and injustice’ (Treatise, 
317). From this it is evident that it is the theory of Hobbes rather than that of Locke 
which Hume is considering. Hobbes famously depicts the natural condition of 
mankind as a war of ‘every man against every man’ where there is no place for 
industry and society (Hobbes, 1994: 76). By contrast, Locke believes that, due to 
men’s duty of self-preservation and their natural sociability, the institution of 
property must have been established in the state of nature, that is, before the 
necessity of civil government was perceived by men. Accordingly, the state of nature 
is not a state of violence, which Hume criticises as mere fiction, but a state of order 
and commerce, and this is why Locke distinguishes the state of nature from the state 
of war. 
We are then led to Wolin’s second misunderstanding, namely that since the 
stability of possessions is secured before the establishment of government, and, at the 
same time the transactions among people are taking place along with the invention of 
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money, which also occurs in Locke’s state of nature,95 then it would be a mistake to 
attribute all moral concepts like justice and obligation to political categories, and to 
assume they are ‘logical derivatives from the basic concept of sovereignty’. Here, 
again, Wolin fails to make a distinction between Hobbes and Locke. For the former, 
morality is artificially created by the sovereign state, thus moral concepts such as 
justice and obligation are intelligible only in political society. However, for the latter, 
the state is created to serve the morality that already exists in the pre-political state of 
nature. Promise, contract, obligation, and right, in other words, the fundamental 
distinctions between right and wrong, are not beneficial consequences that the state 
brings about. Rather, the creation of state is meant to prevent the occasional 
transgression of natural laws and thus only to cure some inconveniences in the state 
of nature.
96
 Locke says  
The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, 
and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their 
                                                 
95
 Along with the use of money, speech and words are also invented, as Hume added. Further, Hume’s 
three laws of nature: the performance of promise, the stability of possessions, and the transference of 
possessions by consent, are all most fundamental rules indispensable to a peaceful social intercourse, 
which, it seems reasonable to infer, were extracted by Hume from Locke’s idea of the state of nature. 
What is unique of these conceptions in Hume’s theory is that he provided a secular and psychological 
explanation of their origin, i.e. utility, whereas in Locke’s theory they were derived from a theological 
premise that men are God’s workmanship and thus are obligated to preserve themselves. See Treatise, 
315; 322-337; EPM, 172. Hume’s thorough secularisation of the origin of virtues, fidelity no 
exception, leads to a political theory which detaches men’s civil duties from their natural duties. In 
this way, Hume secures government a foundation more solid and more independent of society which 
exists prior to it, hence places on government higher expectation than just the preservation of private 
property as we find in Locke’s theory. See below. 
96
 See also Hume’s Treatise, 344-345; 348. 
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Property. To which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting 
(§124, see also §3, §13, §91, §94, §123, §127). 
What is wanting in the state of nature are established laws, an indifferent judge, 
and the power to execute laws; with these man’s property is better secured and thus 
justifies the authority of sovereign. At the beginning of a Section called ‘Of the 
Source of Allegiance’ in Hume’s Treatise, before launching his criticism of social 
contract theory on the basis of naturalism, Hume clearly expresses his endorsement 
of Locke’s view as well as his objection to that of Hobbes’s: 
Tho’ government be an invention very advantageous, and even in some 
circumstances absolutely necessary to mankind; it is not necessary in all 
circumstances, nor is it impossible for men to preserve society for some 
time, without having recourse to such an invention…And so far am I 
from thinking with some philosophers, that men are utterly incapable of 
society without government, that I assert the first rudiments of 
government to arise from quarrels, not among men of the same society, 
but among those of different societies (Treatise, 345-346). 
Hume then suggests that his observation is verified in some part of America, 
where men live in the form of tribes without government, but only choose a leader in 
the time of war with other tribes, and that authority lasts no longer when war ceases 
and peace resumes. A similar example is cited by Locke from Josephus Acosta to 
support his argument of the state of nature (§103). It is not insignificant that Hume 
shows his approval of Locke’s view before he proceeds to elaborate the difference 
between his political theory and that of Locke’s in the remainder of that section. For, 
as Hume emphasises twice at the beginning of the following section named ‘Of the 
Measures of Allegiance’ that he is ready to accept Locke’s theory of resistance as 
‘just and reasonable’, he also aims to show that the same conclusion can be reached 
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through more reasonable principles (Treatise, 352). The principle which Hume 
regards as more reasonable is convention or the general utility of society that 
convention represents, and it is exactly this principle that Hume adopts as 
substitution for promise or consent in his discussion of the source of allegiance. 
Hume endeavours to show that allegiance is a virtue derived from its utility, and so is 
justice. Although utility of justice and utility of allegiance are distinct, it is important 
to note that, they are both ‘general and avow’d’. In this way, so long as men have 
motives to observe the one, they must also have motives to observe the other. To 
found the duty of allegiance on the duty of justice is not only redundant, but serves to 
obscure the true utilitarian origins of both: 
To obey the civil magistrate is requisite to preserve order and concord in 
society. To perform promises is requisite to beget mutual trust and 
confidence in the common offices of life. The ends, as well as the means, 
are perfectly distinct; nor is the one subordinate to the other (Treatise, 
348). 
Hume has long been regarded as the most devastating critic of contractarianism. 
However, given Locke’s conclusion that men have the right to resist an oppressive 
governor is not questionable to Hume, and that Hume endeavours to show the same 
conclusion can be derived from a more fundamental principle, then in a sense 
Hume’s criticism of Locke’s theory of contract turns out to be a powerful defence of 
Locke’s conclusion, which, as John Dunn describes, is ‘a theoretical proclamation of 
the ultimate right of revolution’ (Dunn, 1969: 48; see also Kelly, 2007: 9-11, 138-
139). To clarify this, we must realise Hume’s purpose of putting utility in the place 
of consent as the foundation of men’s political obligation. 
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According to Hume, in primitive society, a ruler is needed only when war 
among tribes occurs, but when society becomes rich and populous ‘either by the 
pillage of war, by commerce, or by any fortuitous inventions’, men tend to neglect 
their own interest in the preservation of peace and justice. People who find 
arguments and conflicts inconvenient then recall the advantage of a ruler in the time 
of war, and recourse to it as an arbiter even in the time of peace. Thus Hume says 
that ‘Camps are the true mothers of cities’ (Treatise, 346). However, Hume 
emphasises that ‘many years must elapse’ before the population and riches of a 
society become so numerous where a standing governor becomes indispensable. 
Now we can imagine that when the government was first formed, that is, at a time 
when this institution was established on a fragile basis, it is natural that people 
appealed to the morality that already existed as its foundation, the morality that pre-
dates the state being what Hume calls justice or natural duties. It is on this basis that 
Hume writes 
When men have once perceiv’d the necessity of government to maintain 
peace, and execute justice, they wou’d naturally assemble together, 
wou’d choose magistrates, determine their power, and promise them 
obedience. As a promise is suppos’d to be a bond or security already in 
use, and attended with a moral obligation, ’tis to be consider’d as the 
original sanction of government, and as the source of the first obligation 
to obedience (Treatise, 347). 
For Hume, the social contract theory goes wrong when consent is ‘carry’d so 
far to comprehend government in all its ages and situations’ (Treatise, 347 emphasis 
added), because as soon as the advantage of the state is generally realised, it no 
longer needs to rely on natural morality but acquires its own foundation and morality. 
In other words, when government is first formed, its utility has not yet been generally 
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recognised, so the governed are bound to obey when they promised to do so, for 
fidelity is a virtue which has already regulated their conduct at that point. However, 
after the advantages of government are gradually perceived, after that it is recognised 
by most people that ‘political society’ is more convenient and secure than ‘natural 
society’, the virtue of allegiance then acquires its natural (i.e. based on men’s self-
interest and sociability) and moral (i.e. based on men’s sympathy or conscience) 
foundation, and binds people without relying on the virtue of fidelity. Accordingly, it 
is evident that both Locke and Hume take natural duty as existing prior to and 
independent of civil duty. Moreover, they both agree that it is on the basis of natural 
duty that civil duty was formed. However, a difference between them lies in that 
while Locke takes men’s natural duty as indispensable to their civil duty, Hume 
regards the connection between them as functional, so he subsequently detaches the 
one from the other and somehow reverses their relationship by arguing that it is our 
natural duty which depends more on civil duty, for only the state can secure peace 
and order of society by executing justice on a strict and regular basis, and this is 
exactly why we created it (Treatise, 348). 
Although the same conclusion is to be reached by means of different principles, 
the alteration of principles, almost inevitably in the case of Hume and Locke, 
influences the applicability of the conclusion. As John Dunn comments, promises in 
Locke’s scheme are ‘the elementary human moral bonds and, once they have been 
made, their obligatoriness is almost a logical truth’ (Dunn, 1969: 162). According to 
Dunn, Locke shared in the growing 17
th
 century sense that an excessive 
multiplication of oaths was eroding the moral significance which men attached to the 
most powerful of contemporary taboos and he felt profoundly the rationale of this 
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uneasiness. ‘Language was the symbolic distinguishing characteristic of the human 
race and it was the actual bond which made specifically human existence possible’ 
(Dunn, 1969: 141). Promises and oaths being linguistic performances were of the 
most formal and most important kind where men’s social life was concerned. ‘They 
formed the primary tissue of human mutual obligation and their binding force was 
sustained directly by the will of God’ (Dunn, 1969: 141-142). They even bind the 
Almighty (First Treatise of Government, §6). However, this theological premise of 
Locke’s political theory does not contribute to Hume’s theory at all, as it is indeed 
Hume’s object to challenge the validity of the theological and deontological 
propositions by examining their connection with human psychology. Promises 
should be kept, but why? A reply like ‘because God wills it’ is not satisfactory for an 
atheist like Hume, and nor is a reply like ‘because it is intrinsically a good thing to 
do’ an acceptable answer to a theory which explores the naturalistic origin of moral 
values. Hence the difference between the political theory of Locke and Hume, hence 
Hume’s comment on Locke’s theory of resistance that ‘I repeat it: This conclusion is 
just, tho’ the principles be erroneous’ (Treatise, 352). Of course, this does not 
suggest that Hume has accepted Locke’s conclusion beforehand and then tries to 
reconcile it with his naturalistic scheme. If this is the case, we would not have argued 
that the change of principles influences the applicability of conclusion. Indeed, men’s 
right to resist is an idea not incompatible with Hume’s naturalistic account of 
government, whereas his highly cautious attitude towards the exercise of such right is 
derived from his descriptivism. That is to say, for most people who lived in a 
relatively peaceful time, as Hume’s English contemporaries did, it was by no means 
evident that the utility of a drastic political reform outweighed the utility of 
maintaining the status quo and the stability of their property. People’s right of 
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resistance must be secured, for a limited monarchy is only historically contingent, yet 
‘nor can any thing be more preposterous than an anxious care and solicitude in 
stating all the cases, in which resistance may be allowed’ (Essays, 490), for that 
decision is so difficult that it should be left to statesmen who are capable of weighing 
its utility against its cost. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion: Conservative Utilitarianism from Hume 
to Burke 
Each of the six main chapters presented here may potentially be seen as 
freestanding chapters, each of which engages with discrete debates in Hume 
scholarship, but my argument has been that they are connected with each other by a 
core idea and constitute a complete study of Hume’s political philosophy. The core 
idea is utility. In the Introductory Chapter, it was shown that there are three ways in 
which utility may be fulfilled, including the principle of the fusion of interest, the 
natural identity of interest, and the artificial identification of interest. Since these 
principles are all comprehended in Hume’s philosophy, different interpretations of 
Hume impact on one’s account of how Hume is connected with other philosophers 
and thus would result in different interpretations of English utilitarianism. Based on 
this knowledge of the different meanings of utility, I tried to make explicit in Chapter 
Two that one tends to misunderstand Hume’s position if he takes either of these 
principles as predominant in Hume’s philosophy and thus interprets him as a 
Hobbesian or Hutchesonian. This is a misunderstanding of Hume because his method 
is inductive rather than deductive. That is to say, his interest is not to construct a 
moral system on the principle of self-interest or benevolence, but to observe how 
these tendencies blend with one another and constitute man’s sociability. An 
approach like this, as I have suggested, is to be found neither in Hobbes nor in 
Hutcheson, but in Locke. Before I elaborated on the resemblance between the two 
philosophers, more needed to be said about Hume’s conception of utility, therefore in 
Chapter Three I focused on Hume’s idea of sympathy and explained how it 
contributes to Hume’s moral psychology. Hume used the idea of sympathy in a 
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different way to Hutcheson; it is not a specific feeling but the communication of 
feelings among people. Sympathy is crucial for one’s interpretation of Hume because 
it reveals the psychological tendency which is the basis for the development of 
Hume’s utilitarianism. In other words, sympathy is the foundation of Hume’s 
naturalistic moral psychology, and it is based on the psychological scheme which he 
had already accomplished in the Treatise, Hume then moves on to EPM and focuses 
on the practical consequences rather than the psychological origin of virtues. In this 
way, it is evident that Hume’s utilitarianism has a naturalistic basis, and what is 
controversial are its features. Therefore in Chapter Four I introduced the debate on 
this issue, and, inspired by Peter Railton, suggested that the division between 
methodological and substantive naturalism is useful. It is useful because although 
Hume’s naturalism is featured by both, it owes its allegiance primarily to the 
development of a theory effective in explaining moral concepts, which has much to 
do with the moral conventionalism that Hume owes to Locke. In this way, despite the 
fact that Hume points out a substantive foundation of morals by his definition of 
virtues in terms of utility, he is nevertheless free from the attack of intuitionists such 
as G. E. Moore because the specific content of utility varies in different communities. 
If these have been sufficient to prove that utility is indeed the core idea of Hume’s 
political philosophy, then the second part of this dissertation is a further clarification 
of Hume’s utilitarianism as well as a defence of it against its unsympathetic critics. 
In Chapter Five I tried to save Hume’s utilitarianism from Gauthier’s contractarian 
assimilation by distinguishing Hume’s idea of utility as public interest from 
Gauthier’s definition of utility as self-interest. I have shown that two different views 
on utility can lead to two different views on social transactions and thus to two 
distinct explanations of the origin of social order. In this way, no matter how hard 
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Gauthier has attempted to interpret Hume’s idea of utility as a form of social contract, 
he is unsuccessful, and this may be observed in Gauthier’s viewing the example of 
the boat rowers and the situation of social interaction as incompatible. The same 
question concerns another social contract theorist, Brian Barry, who has blamed 
Hume for drawing this misleading analogy between rowing and the origin of the 
conventions of social order. But the analogy is misleading only when one fails to 
appreciate what Hume means by convention. Hume has compared social interaction 
with rowing because in both cases we are other-regarding and capable of 
sympathising with others’ feelings, and we make moral distinctions according to this 
sympathetic feeling rather than purely egoistic concerns. Therefore, in either case we 
resist the temptation to be a free-rider and make due effort for what we desire, 
whether this is crossing the river or living peacefully. If the objection to the 
contractarian interpretation of Hume has been useful for showing that utility is 
originated from the sociability implanted in human nature rather than artificially 
created, then it still applied in my discussion of Hume’s conservative utilitarianism in 
Chapter Seven. That is to say, Hume may not be seen as a genuine conservative, 
because although Hume indicates that tradition and custom may fulfil man’s 
sociability stably and securely, he nevertheless recognises the use of innovation in 
this respect. The connection between tradition and man’s sociability is not intrinsic 
but functional, and it is utility rather than the status quo which is the standard of 
morals. Hume’s conservative utilitarianism represents a view on human nature and, 
as a consequence, a view of how utility could be interpreted. Hume has ascribed 
value to tradition and customs because he observes that expectation and security are 
the psychological mechanism on which man’s happiness is largely founded. Thus it 
follows that when custom or existing social order has lost its use in this respect, that 
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is to say, when general disobedience brings less or no more harm than general 
obedience, men are justified in reforming or overthrowing it. Since Hume’s moral 
psychology and moral conventionalism are derived from introspection and 
observation, his conservative utilitarianism may be seen as representing how a class 
of English people in Hume’s time evaluate the benefit of political reform against its 
cost. 
The idea of utility is not only crucial to the account of Hume’s political 
philosophy; it is also Hume’s legacy to later generations. As stated, Bentham’s 
philosophical radicalism is in contrast with conservative utilitarianism of Burke, 
however, according to Elie Halévy, they are both inspired by Hume. The principle of 
utility first formulated in Hume, ‘while it resulted in Adam Smith and Bentham in a 
doctrine of reform in economic and juristic matters…at the same time took, with 
Burke, another direction’ (Halévy, 1972: 164). From this viewpoint, it is no less 
important to observe Hume’s influence on Burke than to observe Locke’s impact on 
Hume, and by so doing, what is revealed is, first, the development of English 
empiricism originated from Locke, and, second, a genealogy of utilitarianism 
contrasted with Benthamite utilitarianism. According to Halévy and Plamenatz, the 
utilitarian bias is exhibited in Burke in three ways, all of which were overshadowed 
by Hume (Plamenatz, 1958: 56-57). First, Burke inherited the view from Hume and 
ascribed utility to an existing institution rather than to radical reforms. For Burke, it 
is an undeniable fact that there are forces that tend to disrupt every institution, and 
lead to their disintegration and decay. So an institution existing for generations is a 
proof both of its use and utility in resisting destructive force and of its conduciveness 
to human happiness. Second, Burke’s emphasis on prescription is another evidence 
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of his utilitarian bias. For Burke, as for Hume, man’s daily practice is shaped by his 
sentiment of expectation; in other words, habit is the second nature of man (Burke, 
1999: 185). To deprive man of habit and to deprive society of custom is to take away 
what guides man in his daily life, and thus undermines his happiness and security: 
When antient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot 
possibly be estimated. From that moment we have no compass to govern 
us; nor can we know distinctly to what port we steer (Burke, 1999: 78). 
From this it follows the important role of prescription as a title to property and to 
government in both philosophers. 
Third, as in Hume’s observation that man’s life is based on many natural 
beliefs formed by instincts and sentiments that we follow before verifying their truth, 
for Burke, prejudice is important for maintaining social order. Burke writes: 
Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages 
the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does not leave the 
man hesitating in the moment of decision, skeptical, puzzled, and 
unresolved. Prejudice renders a man’s virtue his habit; and not a series of 
unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his 
nature (Burke, 1999: 87). 
What is common among Locke, Hume, and Burke is their theories of 
empiricism and their criticism of rationalism. The idea of convention that is the most 
controversial in the interpretation of Hume’s political philosophy, it seems to me, is 
an idea that features this tradition of empiricism. That is to say, convention for these 
philosophers stands not only for the model of how men interact and transact with one 
another in the sphere of society, but for the wisdom of ancestors and man’s feelings 
for social life. Political philosophers like Brian Barry and Russell Hardin who apply 
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the game theoretic model to their account of Hume are criticised here because 
although they seem to provide a concise expression of the former, the latter have 
comprehended so many passions and instincts of man that can barely be expressed in 
their models. To miss Hume’s description of these passions and instincts is to miss 
not only the most remarkable contribution of Hume to the theory of social order, but 
also what he inherited from his ancestors and subsequently left to his successors. In 
other words, it leads to the neglect of Hume’s links with Locke and with Burke, and 
falsely takes him as a successor of Hobbes. 
  For the purpose of this research, what is most interesting to note is that, in 
comparing Hume’s theory of property with that of Locke’s, the latter argues that a 
system of property already existed in society before the state was established. For 
Locke, a system of property existing in the pre-political society can have no other 
basis than men’s tacit consent or conventional agreement. From this it follows that 
Locke, in contradiction to the interpretations of those scholars who take him as a 
disciple of Hobbes such as Leo Strauss (1965: 202-251), Richard Fox (1960), and 
Michael Zuckert (2002), believes that men are by nature capable of social life. 
Locke’s view of human nature, along with his argument that man’s love of reputation 
is most influential in shaping the moral standards of a community, both influenced 
Hume. The first is to be found in the structure of Hume’s political philosophy, that 
society and the institution of property are parallel with and not always dependent on 
political society and the institution of government. The second is represented in 
Hume’s ideas of sympathy and utility. Hume’s removal of the Christian premise of 
Locke’s political philosophy and his developing a moral psychology which was 
largely taken over from Locke reveal Hume’s ambition for the naturalisation of 
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moral philosophy; whereas Hume’s move from sympathy to utility suggests the 
deficiency he sees in his naturalistic scheme and his intention to develop a moral 
principle which may, like Locke’s religious premise, somewhat fulfil the normative 
function. Between the two philosophers, what has not changed is the idea that men 
are capable of leading a peaceful social life based on convention, and that the state is 
necessary only when society is enlarged to a certain scale. What has not been 
changed, to put it differently, are the priorities of social morality over political 
morality and the limited role of political authority in securing social order. The idea 
of convention which represents the wisdom of ancestors and the natural love of 
community was then inherited by Burke, and his use of it, if not identical with his 
two forerunners, is a consequence of the change of social atmosphere. 
During the period between Locke’s time and the publication of Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France in 1790, the most drastic political event 
happened in England was the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Both Hume and Burke 
commented on the event. In contrast to them, Locke was directly involved in the 
event because of his personal connection with the Earl of Shaftesbury, who was then 
the leader of the Whig faction in Parliament. Locke fled to the Netherlands following 
Shaftesbury’s fall and returned to England in 1689. The connection between Locke’s 
STG and the Revolution of 1688 throws up a complex issue. The conventional view 
which takes Locke’s STG as defending and restating the principles of Revolution is 
now challenged. On the one hand, although STG was published in 1689, Locke 
composed it in the early 1680s, in a time when it was unlikely for someone to foresee 
the Revolution. On the other, STG was published anonymously, and the fact that 
Locke was the author was strictly concealed until after his death in 1704 (Kelly, 2007: 
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139). As Professor Kelly indicates, if Locke’s work was a defence of the Revolution, 
a strategy like this would not have been necessary. Therefore, according to Kelly, 
one likely explanation of this is that, instead of being an endorsement of the 
Revolution, Locke’s argument in STG is a radical challenge to it. The conservatives 
take the event as nothing more than ‘inheritance’, that is, there was neither revolution 
nor resistance, but a throne left vacant by James II and which was accepted by 
William of Orange through marriage. Locke challenges the conservative defenders of 
the new regime and advocates the idea that the authority of the governor is derived 
from the consent of the governed, and that the governed have a right to resist when 
the governor pursuit his own interest at the cost of the general welfare of society. 
Being the author of a doctrine which appeared to the new regime radical and 
dangerous, Locke had good reason to conceal the truth until his death (Kelly, 2007: 
10-11, 138-139). 
As stated, Hume claims in the Treatise and Essays that he accepts Locke’s 
theory of resistance but purports to place it on a more reasonable principle of utility. 
What this shows again is Hume’s endeavour to naturalise Locke’s theory of natural 
right. Moreover, when we turn to the last two Chapters in Volume 6 of Hume’s 
History, we find Hume’s detailed records of the Revolution along with his comments 
on it. Hume remarks: 
Never king mounted the throne of England with greater advantages than 
James; nay, possessed greater facility, if that were any advantage, of 
rendering himself and his posterity absolute: But all these fortunate 
circumstances tended only, by his own misconduct, to bring more sudden 
ruin upon him (History, vol.6: 470). 
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Regarding the misconduct of James II, Hume provides a comprehensive 
analysis, some of which can be enumerated as follows: the dispensing and 
suspending power; the court of ecclesiastical commission; the filling of all offices 
with Catholics; the open encouragement given to popery; the displacing of judges if 
they refused to give sentences according to orders received from court; the annulling 
of the charters of all the corporations, and the subjecting of elections to arbitrary will 
and pleasure; the treating of petitions, even the most modest, and from persons of the 
highest rank, as criminal and seditious (History, vol.6: 509-510). All of these, to sum 
up, offend the laws that a good governor should observe and thus result in his own 
ruin: James has at once invaded the constitution, threatened people’s religion, 
established a standing army, and has challenged the patience of Parliament by 
requiring them to contribute to these measures (History, vol.6: 468; 520). Facing the 
grievances prevalent in the whole country, along with people’s desire to preserve 
their laws and constitution, Hume remarks: 
The revolution alone, which soon succeeded, happily put an end to all 
these disputes: By means of it, a more uniform edifice was at last erected: 
The monstrous inconsistence, so visible between the ancient Gothic parts 
of the fabric and the recent plans of liberty, was fully corrected: And to 
their mutual felicity, king and people were finally taught to know their 
proper boundaries (History, vol.6: 475-476). 
In this explicit approval of the Glorious Revolution, Hume says nothing about 
man’s natural right, his reasoning instead being utilitarian. That is, the principle of 
utility which Hume advances in his philosophical works is now applied to his 
evaluation of the political institution. Therefore Hume cites the example of Charles I 
and shows that king’s prerogative is approved or disapproved on the basis of its 
utility: 
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In general, we may remark, that, where the exercise of the suspending 
power was agreeable and useful, the power itself was little questioned: 
Where the exercise was thought liable to exceptions, men not only 
opposed it, but proceeded to deny altogether the legality of the 
prerogative, on which it was founded (History, vol.6: 482). 
Utility is a principle underlying every political institution, as it originates from 
man’s sociability. A good institution is one which facilitates man’s social life, yet on 
the other hand, an institution is considered bad because it undermines social morality 
by invading people’s property. Its effects upon society determine people’s opinions 
of it, which then justifies either the legitimacy of an institution or people’s right to 
resist it: 
in such a government as that of England, it was not sufficient that a 
prerogative be approved of by some lawyers and antiquaries: If it was 
condemned by the general voice of the nation, and yet was still exerted, 
the victory over national liberty was no less signal than if obtained by the 
most flagrant injustice and usurpation (History, vol.6: 482). 
This passage verifies the account of Hume’s conservative utilitarianism in 
Chapter Seven, namely that although Hume appreciates the utility of ancient 
institutions, he nevertheless insists that they should be subjected to the test of utility, 
for he is ultimately a utilitarian rather than conservative. Alongside this, Hume also 
verifies what has been argued in Chapter Four, that utility is a principle underlying 
not only social virtues but almost every personal character, as he describes the Prince 
of Orange thus: ‘in history, it will be difficult to find any person, whose actions and 
conduct have contributed more eminently to the general interests of society and of 
mankind’ (History, vol.6: 504). With these happy coincidences, the dreadful 
consequence which is likely to follow the social contract theory is not seen in the 
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events of 1688: disorder, tumult, and violence are nowhere to be found. On the 
contrary, in this ‘singular exception’ the troops are ordered and new election is 
carried on in tranquillity. Thus Hume praises: ‘This conduct was highly meritorious, 
and discovered great moderation and magnanimity’ (History, vol.6: 529) As a 
consequence, the disputes between the king and people was finally settled, and the 
royal powers were more exactly defined and more narrowly circumscribed than in 
any period of English history. What follows is ‘a new epoch in the constitution’ 
which  
attended with consequences more advantageous to the people, than 
barely freeing them from an exceptionable administration. By deciding 
many important questions in favour of liberty, and still more, by that 
great precedent of deposing one king, and establishing a new family, it 
gave such an ascendant to popular principles, as has put the nature of the 
English constitution beyond all controversy. And it may justly be 
affirmed, without any danger of exaggeration, that we, in this island, 
have ever since enjoyed, if not the best system of government, at least the 
most entire system of liberty, that ever was known amongst mankind 
(History, vol.6: 531). 
By describing the nature of the Glorious Revolution as ‘deposing one king’ and 
‘establishing a new family’, and by evaluating its consequence as ‘put[ting] the 
nature of the English constitution beyond all controversy’, Hume not only transfers 
the foundation of Locke’s theory of resistance from the theory of natural right to the 
principle of utility, but says what Locke can only say anonymously. That is, it is 
from people and from the society that people constitute that political authority 
derives its right to govern, therefore people’s right to resist and rebel, although its 
exercise is subject to the test of utility and thus should be exercised prudently and 
cautiously, is nevertheless a right that people retain and with full title to employ. 
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  If from Hume’s moral psychology one learns the important role of the 
sentiments of expectation and of security in man’s daily life, and from Hume’s 
evaluative judgment on historical and practical events one learns the value of 
prudence and practical wisdom, then in Burke’s political thought one finds these two 
dimensions are perfectly combined. On the one hand, Burke, like Hume, criticises 
rationalism and what he terms ‘theoretic science’ (Burke, 1999: 32) by manifesting 
the tendencies and values implied in human nature:  
Through the same plan of a conformity to nature in our artificial 
institutions, and by calling in the aid of her unerring and powerful 
instincts, to fortify the fallible and feeble contrivances of our reason, we 
have derived several other, and those no small benefits, from considering 
our liberties in the light of an inheritance (Burke, 1999: 34). 
On the other hand, having realised the fallibility of reason, we then see the 
danger of what Burke calls ‘political metaphysics’ or ‘barbarous philosophy’ (Burke, 
1999: 58; 77). As Burke criticises, the ‘empire of reason’ rudely tears off ‘all the 
decent drapery of life’, and removes all the ideas ‘furnished from the wardrobe of a 
moral imagination, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies’ (Burke, 
1999: 77). This ‘Barbarism with regard to science and literature’, being ‘unskillful 
with regard to arts and manufactures’, only fancies to guide people and practice with 
abstract principles, the consequence of which is that ‘the commonwealth itself would, 
in a few generations, crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of 
individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven’ (Burke, 1999: 96). 
What is fatal to rationalism is the fact it despises the utility of tradition and thus 
overlooks the fact that, in the sphere of politics, change and conservation must be 
conducted at the same time: ‘A state without the means of some change is without 
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the means of its conservation’ (Burke, 1999: 21). In this way, when Burke observes 
the Revolution of 1688, he remarks that although ‘The crown was carried somewhat 
out of the line in which it had before moved; but the new line was derived from the 
same stock’, that is, from a line of hereditary descent in the same blood (Burke, 1999: 
22). 
Burke is critical of the French Revolution and is concerned that the turbulence 
might extend to England: ‘Whenever our neighbour’s house is on fire, it cannot be 
amiss for the engines to play a little on our own’ (Burke, 1999: 9). However, it is 
helpful to see that Burke’s criticism of the Revolution in France starts with a contrast 
between that event and the Glorious Revolution, and like Hume’s approval of the 
latter, Burke is positive about its contribution to the development of the English 
constitution. For Burke, Richard Price has confused the two political events and 
mistaken the nature of the Glorious Revolution in three respects. First, contrary to 
what Price claims, English people do not acquire a right ‘to choose their own 
governors’ (Burke, 1999: 16). What the Declaration of Right confirms, according to 
Burke, is not man’s right to choose their governor, but the indissoluble bound 
between the rights and liberties of the subject and the succession of the crown. In this 
way, Burke describes the Declaration of Right as ‘the cornerstone of our 
constitution’. It might be argued that at the Revolution there was, in the person of 
King William, a small and temporary deviation from the strict order of regular 
hereditary succession. However, one should not translate an individual’s right into a 
general rule, not to mention that the matter is not a choice proper, that is, it is 
essentially not an exercise of the right which Price claims people have, but a prudent 
political decision based on the calculation of utility. In other words, for those who do 
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not wish to recall King James and leave their liberty and laws in peril, and for those 
who hope to save their country from disorder, their accepting of King William is an 
act of necessity, ‘in the strictest moral sense in which necessity can be taken’ (Burke, 
1999: 18), i.e. an act which produces most utility or least harm in the situation. 
Burke’s point here is, Price and the Society of Revolution see nothing in the 
Revolution of 1688 but the deviation from the constitution, ‘they take the deviation 
from the principle for the principle’, but they can be proved wrong when deviation 
and exception is a part internal rather than external to the political institution: 
It is far from impossible to reconcile, if we do not suffer ourselves to be 
entangled in the mazes of metaphysic sophistry, the use both of a fixed 
rule and an occasional deviation; the sacredness of an hereditary 
principle of succession in our government, with a power of change in its 
application in cases of extreme emergency. Even in that extremity…the 
change is to be confined to the peccant part only; to the part which 
produced the necessary deviation (Burke, 1999: 21). 
In reading this passage, it is likely that one recalls Hume’s discussions of 
justice and allegiance and the utilitarian reasoning implied in it. Hume’s moral 
conventionalism based on the principle of utility remains true in Burke’s thought, 
and this became more explicit in Burke’s objections to two more rights which Price 
mistook as the fruits of the Glorious Revolution, i.e. a right for English people to 
cashier their governor for misconduct, and a right to frame a government. For the 
former, Burke criticises the use of the term ‘misconduct’ as ambiguous and thus 
dangerous: ‘No government could stand a moment, if it could be blown down with 
anything so loose and indefinite as an opinion of “misconduct”’ (Burke, 1999: 27). In 
fact, the leader in the Glorious Revolution charged King James with something much 
more substantive, as enumerated above, and ‘more than misconduct’. From this one 
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may discern that these men were obliged by ‘A grave and overruling necessity…to 
take the step they took, and took with infinite reluctance, as under that most rigorous 
of all laws’ (Burke, 1999: 27). As a result, their amendment of the constitution was 
not based on the thought that the liberty and prosperity of posterity depend on future 
revolution, but rather on the thought that future governor should be confined to the 
extent that they can in no way be despotic, so that violent remedies will no longer be 
appealed to. This explains the political reforms after the revolution, such as the 
constant inspection of Parliament and the practical claim of impeachment, all of 
which were more effective and less mischievous in maintaining a liberal constitution 
than ‘cashiering their governors’ (Burke, 1999: 28). Hume’s intentional ambiguity 
towards the measure of people’s right to resist, and his idea that resistance is the last 
resort because the catastrophe it brings about will only be compensated by the 
enormous benefits it produces in the most extreme circumstances, both appear in 
Burke’s thought: 
The speculative line of demarcation, where obedience ought to end, and 
resistance must begin, is faint, obscure, and not easily definable. It is not 
a single act, or a single event, which determines it. Government must be 
abused and deranged indeed, before it can be thought of; and the prospect 
of the future must be as bad as the experience of the past...Times and 
occasions, and provocations, will teach their own lessons…but, with or 
without right, a revolution will be the very last resource of the thinking 
and the good (Burke, 1999: 30-31). 
The inadequacy of Price’s view lies in the fact that he treats the sovereign as no 
more than a servant of the people. In a sense Burke thinks this is not incorrect, since 
‘their power has no other rational end than that of the general advantage’ (Burke, 
1999: 29). However, it is absolutely dangerous to argue that the essence of the 
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sovereign is to obey the commands of some other and is removable at pleasure. A 
performance almost inevitably followed by violence was discussed so easily by Price, 
the consequence of which was to render an issue of constitution an issue of war. This 
surely is not the spirit of the Revolution of 1688, for, as Burke says, the Revolution 
was obtained by a just war, and the only case in which any war can be just is ‘Justa 
bella quibus necessaria’, a war is just to those to whom it is necessary (Burke, 1999: 
30). Burke’s utilitarian reasoning is again evident. 
The third point which Price has falsely ascribed to the Revolution of 1688 is 
that it gives English people a right to frame a government for themselves. In this 
regard, as in his first two claims, Burke thinks Price misunderstood the nature of the 
Revolution, and mistook what it meant to preserve as something created by it: 
The revolution was made to preserve our antient indisputable laws and 
liberties, and that antient constitution of government which is our only 
security for law and liberty. If you are desirous of knowing the spirit of 
our constitution, and the policy which predominated in that great period 
which has secured it to this hour, pray look for both in our histories, in 
our records, in our acts of parliament, and journals of parliaments, and 
not in the sermons of the Old Jewry, and the after-dinner toasts of the 
Revolutionary Society (Burke, 1999: 31). 
Liberty is an inheritance of English people throughout their history rather than 
a creation of the disciples of revolution: it is a value embedded in the tradition of 
England rather than a vague speculative right. To judge from the works of a number 
of great men in the history of England, such as those of Sir Edward Coke and 
Blackstone, and to observe the evolution of English constitution, one sees that liberty 
is an entailed inheritance derived to the English people from their forefathers, and is 
to be transmitted to their posterity. A spirit of innovation is, according to Burke, 
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‘generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views’, because people who 
never cherish the values of their ancestors would have very little concern for their 
posterity. Here, again, Burke’s conservatism is conventionalist rather than 
traditionalist, as he says: ‘the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of 
conservation, and a sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding a 
principle of improvement’ (Burke, 1999: 33). The traditional practices are not valued 
for their own sake but for the beneficial consequences they bring about, and it is 
according to this consequentialist view that they are improved and renewed in the 
history, thus the idea of inheritance ‘leaves acquisition free; but it secures what it 
acquires’ (Burke, 1999: 33). This would remind us of Hume’s conventionalist 
account of the principle of utility: the principle is general and passed from one 
generation to the next, but the content of the principle is flexible and open to 
different interpretations with the change of circumstances. One would have to dig 
deeper to show that Burke, as with Hume, may be treated as conservative utilitarian, 
and to reveal the complex connection between two great philosophers. This will be 
my work for next stage. For now, it is sufficient here to point out that Hume’s 
naturalism and prescriptive utilitarianism are both to be found in Burke’s 
conservative thought and, unlike Hume, he seems to see no difficulty at all in these 
two dimensions being perfectly combined, thus Burke says: ‘We procure reverence 
to our civil institutions on the principle upon which nature teaches us to revere 
individual men; on account of their age; and on account of those from whom they are 
descended’ (Burke, 1999: 34-35 emphases added). 
Although it is likely that Locke’s STG is a challenge to the Revolution of 1688, 
it is more likely to be a challenge to the conservative interpretation of the event than 
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to the event per se. It is unlikely that Locke would have endorsed Hume’s 
naturalisation of his philosophy; however, Locke would presumably be consoled if 
he had a chance to read Hume’s account of the Revolution in which society plays a 
more active part than passive obedience in deciding its governor. Furthermore, Hume 
died before the French Revolution and before Burke’s criticism of the event became 
the bestseller both in England and France, so we can nowhere discover Hume’s 
comments on a work which essentially combines the descriptive and prescriptive 
dimensions of his philosophy. However, given the hostility towards rationalism and 
the skeptical attitude towards radical reformations shared by the two thinkers, Hume 
would presumably approve of Burke’s criticism of that violent revolution and would 
take Burke’s work as aptly demonstrating a cautious and prudent estimation of utility 
when facing a crisis that was one of the most astonishing and drastic in the history of 
mankind. 
The dissertation started with reflecting on Hume’s responses to his 
philosophical predecessors such as Hobbes and Hutcheson, and its ends with 
illustrating Hume’s legacy to later great thinkers such as Burke. It examined the 
affinity between Hume and Locke, and it also showed the differences and contrasts 
between Hume and Hobbes. What the dissertation has tried to capture is the 
continuity of thought that exists within a British tradition of liberal thought from 
Locke to Hume which was then succeeded by Burke. The purpose of the dissertation 
in criticizing the contemporary contractarian interpretation of Hume is to recover 
Hume’s important contribution to the tradition of conservative utilitarianism that 
continues into 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century in such thinkers as Sidgwick. The argument 
has been to situate Hume’s political theory within that conservative utilitarian 
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tradition within British liberal political theory. The point is not to reject alternative 
interpretive traditions such as the perspective of Scottish political economy, but it is 
to reassert that there is still much to be gained by interpreting Hume as a contributor 
to the conservative utilitarian tradition. 
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